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Title In Latin: Ethica Ordine
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This
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(Ethica
Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
by
Benedict de Spinoza
Translated
from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes
DEFINITIONS.
I.
By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves
existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.
II.
A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by
another thing of the same nature ; for instance, a body is called finite
because we always conceive another greater body.
So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not
limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
III.
By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through
itself : in other words, that of which a conception can be formed
independently of any other conception.
IV.
By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting
the essence of substance.
V.
By mode, I mean the modifications1 of substance, or that which exists
in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
VI.
By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance
consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and
infinite essentiality.
Explanation-I
say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind : for, of a thing
infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied ; but that
which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses
reality, and involves no negation.
VII.
That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its
own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone.
On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained,
which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite
method of existence or action.
VIII.
By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived
necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.
Explanation-Existence
of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing,
and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though
continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.
I.
Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else.
II.
That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived
through itself.
III.
From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows ; and, on the
other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect
can follow.
IV.
The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a
cause.
V.
Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by
means of the other ; the conception of one does not involve the conception of
the other.
VI.
A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
VII.
If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not
involve existence.
PROP.
I. Substance is by nature prior
to its modifications.
Proof.-This
is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
PROP.
II. Two substances, whose
attributes are different, have nothing in common.
Proof.-Also
evident from Def. iii. For each
must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself ; in other words, the
conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
PROP.
III. Things which have nothing in
common cannot be one the cause of the other.
Proof.-If
they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by
means of the other (Ax. v.), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the
other (Ax. iv.).
PROP.
IV. Two or more distinct things
are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the
attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
Proof.-Everything
which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (Ax. i.),-that is
(by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding,
except substance and its modifications. Nothing
is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be
distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words
(see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
V. There cannot exist in the
universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.
Proof.-If
several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from
the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference
of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If
only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there
cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications-as substance is
naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),-it follows that setting the
modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff.
iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from
another,-that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances,
but one substance only.
PROP.
VI. One substance cannot be
produced by another substance.
Proof.-It
is impossible that there should be in the universe two substances with an
identical attribute, i.e. which have anything common to them both (Prop. ii.),
and, therefore (Prop. iii.), one
cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be produced by the other.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
For in the universe nothing is granted, save substances and their
modifications (as appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).
Now (by the last Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another
substance, therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself. Q.E.D. This is
shown still more readily by the absurdity of the contradictory. For, if substance be produced by an external cause, the
knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its cause (Ax. iv.), and (by
Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.
PROP.
VII. Existence belongs to the
nature of substances.
Proof.-Substance
cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop vi.), it must,
therefore, be its own cause-that is, its essence necessarily involves
existence, or existence belongs to its nature.
PROP.
VIII. Every substance is
necessarily infinite.
Proof.-There
can only be one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows
from its nature (Prop. vii.) ; its nature, therefore, involves existence,
either as finite or infinite. It
does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by
something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop.
vii.) ; and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which
is absurd (Prop. v.). It
therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.
Note
I.-As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infinite existence is
the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows (solely from Prop.
vii.) that every substance is necessarily infinite.
Note
II.-No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely,
and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to
comprehend the demonstration of Prop. vii.
: for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances
and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things
are produced ; hence they may attribute to substances the beginning which they
observe in natural objects. Those
who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion-think that trees
might talk just as well as men-that men might be formed from stones as well as
from seed ; and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute
human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how
passions originate in the mind. But,
if people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no doubt
about the truth of Prop. vii. In
fact, this proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.
For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself-that is, something of which the conception requires
not the conception of anything else ; whereas modifications exist in something
external to themselves, and a conception of them is formed by means of a
conception of the thing in which they exist.
Therefore, we may have true ideas of non-existent modifications ; for,
although they may have no actual existence apart from the conceiving
intellect, yet their essence is so involved in something external to
themselves that they may through it be conceived. Whereas the only truth substances can have, external to the
intellect, must consist in their existence, because they are conceived through
themselves.
Therefore,
for a person to say that he has a clear and
distinct-that
is, a true-idea of a substance, but that he is not
sure
whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
said
that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
was
false (a little consideration will make this plain) ; or if
anyone
affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
as
saying that a false idea was true-in short, the height of
absurdity.
It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
existence
of substance as its essence is an eternal truth. And
we
can hence conclude by another process of reasoning-that there
is
but one such substance. I think
that this may profitably be
done
at once ; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
demonstration,
we must premise :-
1.
The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses anything
beyond the nature of the thing defined. From
this it follows that-
2.
No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals,
inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined.
For instance, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing beyond the
actual nature of a triangle : it does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
3.
There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a cause why it
should exist.
4.
This cause of existence must either be contained in the nature and
definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated apart from such
definition.
It
therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things exist in
nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exactly that number,
neither more nor less. For
example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity’s sake, I will
suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we
want to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough
to show the cause of human existence in general ; we must also show why there
are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less : for a cause must be assigned
for the existence of each individual. Now
this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty
men, and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought externally
to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything
which may consist of several individuals must have an external cause.
And, as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the
nature of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition
; and from its definition alone existence must be deducible.
But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii., iii.), we cannot
infer the existence of several substances ; therefore it follows that there is
only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.
PROP.
IX. The more reality or being a
thing has, the greater the number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
PROP.
X. Each particular attribute of
the one substance must be conceived through itself.
Proof.-An
attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting
its essence (Def. iv.), and, therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def.
iii.). Q.E.D.
Note-It
is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in fact, conceived as
distinct-that is, one without the help of the other-yet we cannot, therefore,
conclude that they constitute two entities, or two different substances.
For it is the nature of substance that each of its attributes is
conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always
existed simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other ; but
each expresses the reality or being of substance.
It is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
substance : for nothing in nature is more clear than that each and every
entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that its reality or being
is in proportion to the number of its attributes expressing necessity or
eternity and infinity. Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely
infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.
If
anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish different
substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that there is
but one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite,
wherefore such a sign would be sought in vain.
PROP.
XI. God, or substance, consisting
of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite
essentiality, necessarily exists.
Proof.-If
this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist : then his
essence does not involve existence. But
this (Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore
God necessarily exists.
Another
proof.-Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for
its existence, or for its non-existence-e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or
cause must be granted for its existence ; if, on the contrary, it does not
exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or
annuls its existence. This reason
or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or
be external to it. For instance,
the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its
nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction.
On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from
its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence.
(See Prop. vii.)
But
the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from
the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in
extension. From the latter it
must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
impossible that it should exist. So
much is self-evident. It follows
therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted
which prevents its existence.
If,
then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or
which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily
does exist. If such a reason or
cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or
be external to him-that is, drawn from another substance of another nature.
For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be
admitted to exist. But substance
of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and
therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.
As,
then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn
from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God
does not exist, be drawn from God’s own nature, which would involve a
contradiction. To make such an
affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is absurd
; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a
cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence.
Therefore, God necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.
Another
proof.-The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and
contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious.
If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings,
such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which
is obviously absurd ; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.
Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which
necessarily exists (see Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).
Therefore a being absolutely infinite-in other words, God (Def.
vi.)-necessarily exists.
Note.-In
this last proof, I have purposely shown God’s existence à posteriori, so
that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same
premises, God’s existence does not follow à priori.
For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in
proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it
increase its strength for existence. Therefore
a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely
infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist.
Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this
proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which
flow from external causes. Of
such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass-that is, quickly
come into existence-quickly also disappear ; whereas they regard as more
difficult of accomplishment-that is, not so easily brought into
existence-those things which they conceive as more complicated.
However,
to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth
in the proverb, “What comes quickly, goes quickly,” nor discuss whether,
from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or
otherwise : I need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances
which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they
consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they
possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause ; and therefore their existence arises solely from the
perfection of their external cause, not from their own.
Contrrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due
to no external cause ; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely
from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence.
Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on
the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection,
on the other hand, does annul it ; therefore we cannot be more certain of the
existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or
perfect-that is, of God. For
inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute
perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the
utmost certainty on the question is given.
This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader.
PROP.
XII. No attribute of substance
can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.
Proof.-The
parts into which substance as thus conceived would be divided either will
retain the nature of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self-caused, and (by Prop. v.)
will perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case, several
substances could be formed out of one substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is
absurd. Moreover, the parts (by
Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by
Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be conceived without its parts,
which everyone will admit to be absurd. If
we adopt the second alternative-namely, that the parts will not retain the
nature of substance-then, if the whole substance were divided into equal
parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which
(by Prop. vii.) is absurd.
PROP.
XIII. Substance absolutely
infinite is indivisible.
Proof.-If
it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided would either retain
the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they would not.
If the former, we should have several substances of the same nature,
which (by Prop. v.) is absurd. If
the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to
exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.
Corollary.-It
follows, that no substance, and consequently no extended substance, in so far
as it is substance, is divisible.
Note.-The
indivisibility of substance may be more easily understood as follows.
The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and by a
part of substance, nothing else can be understood than finite substance, which
(by Prop. viii) involves a manifest contradiction.
PROP.
XIV. Besides God no substance can
be granted or conceived.
Proof.-As
God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no attribute that expresses the
essence of substance can be denied (by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists
(by Prop. xi.) ; if any substance besides God were granted, it would have to
be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd ; therefore, besides God
no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be conceived.
If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as
existent ; but this (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
Therefore, besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Q.E.D.
Corollary
I.-Clearly, therefore : 1. God is
one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe,
and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in
the note to Prop. x.).
Corollary
II.-It follows : 2.
That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.)
accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.
PROP.
XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and
without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
Proof.-Besides
God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by
Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself.
But modes (by Def. v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance ;
wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be
conceived. But substances and
modes form the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God
nothing can be, or be conceived. Q.E.D.
Note.-Some
assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
mind,
and is susceptible of passions. How
far such persons have
strayed
from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
said.
But these I pass over. For
all who have in anywise
reflected
on the divine nature deny that God has a body.
Of this
they
find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
a
definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
certain
shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
such
a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.
But meanwhile
by
other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
show
that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
from
the divine nature, and say it was created by God.
Wherefrom
the
divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant
;
thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
their
own words. I myself have proved
sufficiently clearly, at
any
rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
viii.),
that no substance can be produced or created by anything
other
than itself. Further, I showed
(in Prop. xiv.), that
besides
God no substance can be granted or conceived.
Hence we
drew
the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
infinite
attributes of God. However, in
order to explain more
fully,
I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
start
from the following points :-
Extended
substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as they think, in parts,
wherefore they deny that it can be infinite, or consequently, that it can
appertain to God. This they
illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or two. If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
conceived to be divided into two parts ; each part will then be either finite
or infinite. If the former, then
infinite substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as
another infinite, which is also absurd.
Further,
if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will consist of an
infinite number of such parts ; it would equally consist of an infinite number
of parts, if each part measured only an inch : therefore, one infinity would
be twelve times as great as the other.
Lastly,
if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two diverging lines
which at first are at a definite distance apart, but are produced to infinity,
it is certain that the distance between the two lines will be continually
increased, until at length it changes from definite to indefinable. As these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering
quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance must
necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the nature of
God.
The
second argument is also drawn from God’s supreme perfection.
God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be
passive ; but extended substance, insofar as it is divisible, is passive.
It follows, therefore, that extended substance does not appertain to
the essence of God.
Such
are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by them try to prove
that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot possibly
appertain thereto. However, I
think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered their
propositions ; for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that
extended substance is composed of parts, and such a hypothesis I have shown
(Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.) to be absurd.
Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these absurdities (if
absurdities they be, which I am not now discussing), from which it is sought
to extract the conclusion that extended substance is finite, do not at all
follow from the notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion
that an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts :
therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite quantity is
not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite parts.
This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop. xii.).
Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in reality recoiled
upon themselves. If, from this
absurdity of theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like a man who
asserts that circles have the properties of squares, and, finding himself
thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny that circles have any center,
from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal.
For, taking extended substance, which can only be conceived as
infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order
to prove that it is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it
can be multiplied and divided.
So,
also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points, can produce
many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely divided.
Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert that extended substance is
made up of bodies or parts, than it would be to assert that a solid is made up
of surfaces, a surface of lines, and a line of points.
This must be admitted by all who know clear reason to be infallible,
and most of all by those who deny the possibility of a vacuum.
For if extended substance could be so divided that its parts were
really separate, why should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
remaining joined together as before? And
why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?
Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct one from the
other, one can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
condition. As, then,
there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of which anon), but all parts
are bound to come together to prevent it, it follows from this that the parts
cannot really be distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
substance cannot be divided.
If
anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so prone to divide
quantity? I answer, that quantity
is conceived by us in two ways ; in the abstract and superficially, as we
imagine it ; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect. If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our
imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find that it is
finite, divisible, and compounded of parts ; but if we regard it as it is
represented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very
difficult to do, we shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
infinite, one, and indivisible. This
will be plain enough to all who make a distinction between the intellect and
the imagination, especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as we conceive
matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguished, not really,
but modally. For instance, water,
in so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts to be
separated one from the other ; but not in so far as it is extended substance ;
from this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible.
Further, water, in so far as it is water, is produced and corrupted ;
but, in so far as it is substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
I
think I have now answered the second argument ; it is, in fact, founded on the
same assumption as the first-namely, that matter, in so far as it is
substance, is divisible, and composed of parts.
Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be considered unworthy
of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God (by Prop. xiv.) no substance can
be granted, wherefrom it could receive its modifications.
All things, I repeat, are in God, and all things which come to pass,
come to pass solely through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow
(as I will shortly show) from the necessity of his essence. Wherefore it can in nowise be said, that God is passive in
respect to anything other than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy
of the Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
granted to be infinite and eternal. But
enough of this for the present.
PROP.
XVI. From the necessity of the
divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways-that
is, all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
Proof.-This
proposition will be clear to everyone, who remembers that from the given
definition of any thing the intellect infers several properties, which really
necessarily follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
defined) ; and it infers more properties in proportion as the definition of
the thing expresses more reality, that is, in proportion as the essence of the
thing defined involves more reality. Now,
as the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. vi.), of
which each expresses infinite essence after its kind, it follows that from the
necessity of its nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything
which can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must necessarily
follow. Q.E.D.
Corollary
I.-Hence it follows, that God is the efficient cause of all that can fall
within the sphere of an infinite intellect.
Corollary
II.-It also follows that God is a cause in himself, and not through an
accident of his nature.
Corollary
III.-It follows, thirdly, that God is the absolutely first cause.
PROP.
XVII. God acts solely by the laws
of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.
Proof.-We
have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the necessity of the divine
nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from the laws of his nature, an
infinite number of things absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways ;
and we proved (in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
; but that all things are in God. Wherefore
nothing can exist outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or
constrained to act. Wherefore God
acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.
Q.E.D.
Corollary
I.-It follows : 1. That there can
be no cause which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
Corollary
II.-It follows : 2. That God is
the sole free cause. For God
alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature (by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv.,
Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his own nature, wherefore God
is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause. Q.E.D.
Note.-Others
think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about,
that those things which we have said follow from his nature-that is, which are
in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.
But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior
angles should not be equal to two right angles ; or that from a given cause no
effect should follow, which is absurd.
Moreover,
I will show below, without the aid of this proposition, that neither intellect
nor will appertain to God’s nature. I
know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect
and free will do appertain to God’s nature ; for they say they know of
nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the
highest perfection in ourselves. Further,
although they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not
believe that he can bring into existence everything which he actually
understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God’s power.
If, they contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect,
he would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think, would
clash with God’s omnipotence ; therefore, they prefer to asset that God is
indifferent to all things, and that he creates nothing except that which he
has decided, by some absolute exercise of will, to create.
However, I think I have shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.),
that from God’s supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of
things-that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number
of ways, or always flow from the same necessity ; in the same way as from the
nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for eternity, that its three
interior angles are equal to two right angles.
Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from all eternity,
and will for all eternity remain in the same state of activity.
This manner of treating the question attributes to God an omnipotence,
in my opinion, far more perfect. For,
otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an infinite number
of creatable things, which he will never be able to create, for, if he created
all that he understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his
omnipotence, and render himself imperfect.
Wherefore, in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be
reduced to establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass
everything over which his power extends ; this seems to be a hypothesis most
absurd, and most repugnant to God’s omnipotence.
Further
(to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute
to God), if intellect and will appertain to the eternal essence of God, we
must take these words in some significance quite different from those they
usually bear. For intellect and
will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far
apart as the poles from the human intellect and will, in fact, would have
nothing in common with them but the name ; there would be about as much
correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.
This I will prove as follows. If
intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is
generally thought to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things
understood, inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.). On the
contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it
exists by representation as such in the intellect of God.
Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to
constitute God’s essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
essence and of their existence. This
seems to have been recognized by those who have asserted, that God’s
intellect, God’s will, and God’s power, are one and the same.
As, therefore, God’s intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in
respect to its essence, and in respect to its existence.
For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely in the quality
which the latter gains from the former.
For
example, a man is the cause of another man’s existence, but not of his
essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and, therefore, the two men may
be entirely similar in essence, but must be different in existence ; and hence
if the existence of one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
necessarily cease also ; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be
made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also.
Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the
existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect both in respect to
its essence, and also in respect to its existence. Now the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and
the existence of our intellect ; therefore, the intellect of God in so far as
it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect
both in respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise
agree therewith save in name, as we said before.
The reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can
easily see.
PROP.
XVIII. God is the indwelling and
not the transient cause of all things.
Proof.-All
things which are, are in God, and must be conceived through God (by Prop.
xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things
which are in him. This is our
first point. Further, besides God
there can be no substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external
to God. This is our second point.
God, therefore, is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XIX. God, and all the attributes
of God, are eternal.
Proof.-God
(by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.) necessarily exists, that is
(by Prop. vii.) existence appertains to its nature, or (what is the same
thing) follows from its definition ; therefore, God is eternal (by Def.
viii.). Further, by the
attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance-in other words, that
which appertains to substance : that, I say, should be involved in the
attributes of substance. Now
eternity appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
Prop. vii.) ; therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the attributes,
and thus all are eternal. Q.E.D.
Note.-This
proposition is also evident from the manner in which (in Prop. xi.) I
demonstrated the existence of God ; it is evident, I repeat, from that proof,
that the existence of God, like his essence, is an eternal truth.
Further (in Prop. xix. of my “Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy”),
I have proved the eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here
repeat.
PROP.
XX. The existence of God and his
essence are one and the same.
Proof.-God
(by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Def.
viii.) each of his attributes expresses existence.
Therefore the same attributes of God which explain his eternal essence,
explain at the same time his eternal existence-in other words, that which
constitutes God’s essence constitutes at the same time his existence.
Wherefore God’s existence and God’s essence are one and the same.
Q.E.D.
Coroll.
I.-Hence it follows that God’s existence, like his essence, is an eternal
truth.
Coroll.
II-Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are
unchangeable. For if they could
be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in
respect to essence-that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is
absurd.
PROP.
XXI. All things which follow from
the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite,
or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
Proof.-Conceive,
if it be possible (supposing the proposition to be denied), that something in
some attribute of God can follow from the absolute nature of the said
attribute, and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned
existence or duration ; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
attribute thought. Now thought,
in so far as it is supposed to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by
Prop. xi.) in its nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of
God, it is supposed finite. It
cannot, however, be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by thought (by
Def. ii.) ; but it is not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has
constituted the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite) ;
therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not constituted the
idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.) must necessarily exist.
We
have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea of God, and,
accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally follow from its nature in so
far as it is absolute thought (for it is conceived as constituting, and also
as not constituting, the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.
Wherefore, if the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or,
indeed, anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any example, as
the proof is of universal application) follows from the necessity of the
absolute nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be
infinite, which was our first point.
Furthermore,
a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the nature of any attribute
cannot have a limited duration. For
if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the nature of
some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for instance, the idea of
God expressed in the attribute thought, and let it be supposed at some time
not to have existed, or to be about not to exist.
Now
thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist unchanged (by Prop.
xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.) ; and beyond the limits of the duration of
the idea of God (supposing the latter at some time not to have existed, or not
to be going to exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that, thought being
given, the idea of God necessarily flowed therefrom.
Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or anything which
necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, cannot
have a limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is
our second point. Bear in mind
that the same proposition may be affirmed of anything, which in any attribute
necessarily follows from God’s absolute nature.
PROP.
XXII. Whatsoever follows from any
attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists
necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
necessarily and as infinite.
Proof.-The
proof of this proposition is similar to that of the preceding one.
PROP.
XXIII. Every mode, which exists
both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the
absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
Proof.-A
mode exists in something else, through which it must be conceived (Def. v.),
that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in God, and solely through God can be
conceived. If therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and
infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute
of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the infinity
and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity ; that is, in
so far as it is considered absolutely. A
mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must follow from the
absolute nature of some attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or
through the means of some modification, which follows from the absolute nature
of the said attribute ; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and
as infinite.
PROP.
XXIV. The essence of things
produced by God does not involve existence.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from Def. i. For
that of which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but
also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God
is cause of the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we
contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor
duration ; consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the
other. God must be the sole
cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXV. God is the efficient cause
not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
Proof.-If
this be denied, then God is not the cause of the essence of things ; and
therefore the essence of things can (by Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.
This (by Prop. xv.) is absurd. Therefore,
God is the cause of the essence of things.
Note.-This
proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi. For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their existence-in a
word, God must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense as he is
called the cause of himself. This
will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
Corollary.-Individual
things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by
which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.
The proof appears from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
PROP.
XXVI. A thing which is
conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus
conditioned by God ; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot
condition itself to act.
Proof.-That
by which things are said to be conditioned to act in a particular manner is
necessarily something positive (this is obvious) ; therefore both of its
essence and of its existence God by the necessity of his nature is the
efficient cause (Props. xxv. and
xvi.) ; this is our first point. Our
second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom.
For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition
itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown
is absurd.
PROP.
XXVII. A thing, which has been
conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself
unconditioned.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from the third axiom.
PROP.
XXVIII. Every individual thing,
or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or
be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a
cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence
; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act,
unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
Proof.-Whatsoever
is conditioned to exist and act, has been thus conditioned by God (by Prop.
xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).
But
that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot be produced by
the absolute nature of any attribute of God ; for whatsoever follows from the
absolute nature of any attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop.
xxi.). It must, therefore, follow
from some attribute of God, in so far as the said attribute is considered as
in some way modified ; for substance and modes make up the sum total of
existence (by Ax. i. and Def.
iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes, in so far as the
latter is modified by a modification infinite and eternal, a conditioned thing
cannot follow. Wherefore it must
follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by God or one of his
attributes, in so far as the latter are modified by some modification which is
finite, and has a conditioned existence.
This is our first point. Again,
this cause or this modification (for the reason by which we established the
first part of this proof) must in its turn be conditioned by another cause,
which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and, again, this last
by another (for the same reason) ; and so on (for the same reason) to
infinity.
Note.-As
certain things must be produced immediately by God, namely those things which
necessarily follow from his absolute nature, through the means of these
primary attributes, which, nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived
without God, it follows :-1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of
those things immediately produced by him.
I say absolutely, not after his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot either exist or be conceived
without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop. xxiv.
Coroll.). 2. That God cannot
properly be styled the remote cause of individual things, except for the sake
of distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
follows from his absolute nature. For,
by a remote cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the
effect. But all things which are,
are in God, and so depend on God, that without him they can neither be nor be
conceived.
PROP.
XXIX. Nothing in the universe is
contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a
particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
Proof.-Whatsoever
is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But
God cannot be called a thing contingent.
For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessarily, and not contingently.
Further, the modes of the divine nature follow therefrom necessarily,
and not contingently (Prop. xvi.) ; and they thus follow, whether we consider
the divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the cause of these modes, in so far
as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv,
Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as conditioned for
operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.). If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition themselves ;
contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is impossible, and not
contingent, that they should render themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all
things are conditioned by the necessity of the divine nature, not only to
exist, but also to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is
nothing that is contingent. Q.E.D.
Note.-Before
going any further, I wish here to explain, what we should understand by nature
viewed as active (natura naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura
naturata). I say to explain, or
rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said, it is
sufficiently clear, that by nature viewed as active we should understand that
which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words (Prop.
xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God, in so far as he is
considered as a free cause.
By
nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows from the
necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God, that is,
all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as
things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
PROP.
XXX. Intellect, in function
(actu) finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God
and the modifications of God, and nothing else.
Proof.-A
true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.) ; in other words (obviously),
that which is contained in the intellect in representation must necessarily be
granted in nature. But in nature
(by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save God, nor any
modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God, and cannot without God
either be or be conceived. Therefore
the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend
the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXI. The intellect in function,
whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred
to passive nature and not to active nature.
Proof.-By
the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute thought, but only a certain
mode of thinking, differing from other modes, such as love, desire, &c.,
and therefore (Def. v.) requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.
It must (by Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God
which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so conceived,
that without such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived.
It must therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature
active, as must also the other modes of thinking.
Q.E.D.
Note.-I
do not here, by speaking of intellect in function, admit that there is such a
thing as intellect in potentiality : but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I
desire to speak only of what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the
very act of understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.
For we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of the
act of understanding.
PROP.
XXXII. Will cannot be called a
free cause, but only a necessary cause.
Proof.-Will
is only a particular mode of thinking, like intellect ; therefore (by Prop.
xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to act, unless it be
conditioned by some cause other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a
third cause, and so on to infinity. But
if will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act by
God, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue
of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus,
however it be conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
which it should be conditioned to exist and act.
Thus (Def. vii.) it cannot
be called a free cause, but only a necessary or constrained cause.
Q.E.D.
Coroll.
I.-Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the
will.
Coroll.
II.-It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation
to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural
phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in
a particular manner. For will,
like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist
and act in a particular manner. And
although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may
follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the
will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would
justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will.
Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in
nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like,
which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to
be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.
PROP.
XXXIII. Things could not have
been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from
that which has in fact obtained.
Proof-All
things necessarily follow from the nature of God (Prop. xvi.), and by the
nature of God are conditioned to exist and act in a particular way (Prop.
xxix.). If things, therefore,
could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned to act in a
different way, so that the order of nature would have been different, God’s
nature would also have been able to be different from what it now is ; and
therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature also would have perforce
existed, and consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods. This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.
Therefore things could not have been brought into being by God in any
other manner, &c. Q.E.D.
Note
I.-As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is
nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly
what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent ; but I will first explain
the words necessary and impossible.
A
thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to
its cause ; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its
essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause.
For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible ; namely, inasmuch
as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external
cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect ; but a thing
can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection
of our knowledge.
A
thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a
contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not involve a contradiction,
we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes
escapes us,-such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible. Wherefore we call it
contingent or possible.
Note
II.-It clearly follows from what we have said, that things have been brought
into being by God in the highest perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily
followed from a most perfect nature. Nor
does this prove any imperfection in God, for it has compelled us to affirm his
perfection. From its contrary
proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just shown), that God is not
supremely perfect, for if things had been brought into being in any other way,
we should have to assign to God a nature different from that, which we are
bound to attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect
being.
I
do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will refuse to
give their minds up to contemplating it, simply because they are accustomed to
assign to God a freedom very different from that which we (Def. vii.) have
deduced. They assign to him, in
short, absolute free will. However,
I am also convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly weigh
in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as
they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great
impediment to organized knowledge. There
is no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
xvii. But, for the sake of
my opponents, I will show further, that although it be granted that will
pertains to the essence of God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection,
that things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
different order ; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what our opponents
themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely on the decree and will of
God, that each thing is what it is. If
it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from
all eternity by God himself. If
it were otherwise, God would be convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or
after ; hence it follows solely from the perfection of God, that God never can
decree, or never could have decreed anything but what is ; that God did not
exist before his decrees, and would not exist without them.
But, it is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or
had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and her order,
we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in God.
But persons who say this must admit that God can change his decrees.
For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature and her order,
different from those which he has ordained-in other words, if he had willed
and conceived something different concerning nature-he would perforce have had
a different intellect from that which he has, and also a different will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a different
intellect and a different will, without any change in his essence or his
perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he
has made concerning created things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect and will concerning things created and
their order are the same, in respect to his essence and perfection, however
they be conceived.
Further,
all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God’s intellect is entirely
actual, and not at all potential ; as they also admit that God’s intellect,
and God’s will, and God’s essence are identical, it follows that, if God
had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would
also have been different ; and thus, as I concluded at first, if things had
been brought into being by God in a different way from that which has
obtained, God’s intellect and will, that is (as is admitted) his essence
would perforce have been different, which is absurd.
As
these things could not have been brought into being by God in any but the
actual way and order which has obtained ; and as the truth of this proposition
follows from the supreme perfection of God ; we can have no sound reason for
persuading ourselves to believe that God did not wish to create all the things
which were in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
had understood them.
But,
it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor imperfection ; that
which is in them, and which causes them to be called perfect or imperfect,
good or bad, depends solely on the will of God.
If God had so willed, he might have brought it about that what is now
perfection should be extreme imperfection, and vice versâ. What is such an assertion, but an open declaration that God,
who necessarily understands that which he wishes, might bring it about by his
will, that he should understand things differently from the way in which he
does understand them? This (as we
have just shown) is the height of absurdity.
Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its employers, as follows
:-All things depend on the power of God. In
order that things should be different from what they are, God’s will would
necessarily have to be different. But
God’s will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly demonstrated)
from God’s perfection. Therefore
neither can things be different. I
confess, that the theory which subjects all things to the will of an
indifferent deity, and asserts that they are all dependent on his fiat, is
less far from the truth than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts
in all things with a view of promoting what is good.
For these latter persons seem to set up something beyond God, which
does not depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar, or
which he aims at as a definite goal. This
is only another name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free
cause of the essence of all things and also of their existence.
I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting such wild theories.
PROP.
XXXIV. God’s power is identical
with his essence.
Proof.-From
the sole necessity of the essence of God it follows that God is the cause of
himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).
Wherefore the power of God, by which he and all things are and act, is
identical with his essence. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to
be in the power of God, necessarily exists.
Proof.-Whatsoever
is in God’s power, must (by the last Prop.) be comprehended in his essence
in such a manner, that it necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore
necessarily exists.
PROP.
XXXVI. There is no cause from
whose nature some effect does not follow.
Proof.-Whatsoever
exists expresses God’s nature or essence in a given conditioned manner (by
Prop. xxv., Coroll.) ; that is, (by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists,
expresses in a given conditioned manner God’s power, which is the cause of
all things, therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
In
the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God.
I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one : that he is,
and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature ; that he is the free cause
of all things, and how he is so ; that all things are in God, and so depend on
him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived ; lastly, that
all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute
fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I
have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices,
which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations.
Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may
prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of
things, as I have explained it above. I
have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the
bar of reason.
All
such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained, that all things in
nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an end in view.
It is accepted as certain, that God himself directs all things to a
definite goal (for it is said that God made all things for man, and man that
he might worship him). I will,
therefore, consider this opinion, asking first, why it obtains general
credence, and why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will
point out its falsity ; and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to
prejudices about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.
However, this is not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the
nature of the human mind : it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that all men
are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the desire to seek
for what is useful to them, and that they are conscious of such desire.
Herefrom it follows, first, that men think themselves free inasmuch as
they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and never even dream, in
their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
Secondly, that men do all things
for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek.
Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final
causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no
cause for further doubt. If they
cannot learn such causes from external sources, they are compelled to turn to
considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
personally to bring about the given event, and thus they necessarily judge
other natures by their own. Further,
as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them
not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance, eyes for seeing,
teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving
light, the sea for breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of
nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences.
Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not
make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has
made them for their use. As they
look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created ; but,
judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves,
they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with
human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use.
They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no
information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore
they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to
bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.
Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God might love
him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course of nature for the
satisfaction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice.
Thus the prejudice developed into superstition, and took deep root in
the human mind ; and for this reason everyone strove most zealously to
understand and explain the final causes of things ; but in their endeavor to
show that nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to man,
they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods, and men are all mad
together. Consider, I pray you,
the result : among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c. : so they declared
that such things happen, because the gods are angry at some wrong done to them
by men, or at some fault committed in their worship. Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite
examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious
alike ; still they would not abandon their inveterate prejudice, for it was
more easy for them to class such contradictions among other unknown things of
whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate
condition of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
and start afresh. They therefore
laid down as an axiom, that God’s judgments far transcend human
understanding. Such a doctrine
might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the human race for all
eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity in
considering solely the essence and properties of figures without regard to
their final causes. There are
other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides mathematics, which might
have caused men’s minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and have
led them to the knowledge of the truth.
I
have now sufficiently explained my first point. There is no need to show at length, that nature has no
particular goal in view, and that final causes are mere human figments.
This, I think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and also from
Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in fact, all those
propositions in which I have shown, that everything in nature proceeds from a
sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfection.
However, I will add a few remarks, in order to overthrow this doctrine
of a final cause utterly. That which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and
vice versâ : it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.
Passing over the questions of cause and priority as self-evident, it is
plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most perfect which is
produced immediately by God ; the effect which requires for its production
several intermediate causes is, in that respect, more imperfect.
But if those things which were made immediately by God were made to
enable him to attain his end, then the things which come after, for the sake
of which the first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.
Further,
this doctrine does away with the perfection of God :
for,
if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he lacks.
Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinction between
the object of want and the object of assimilation ; still they confess that
God made all things for the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.
They are unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore driven to
admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those things for whose
attainment he created means, and further that he desired them.
We
must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine, anxious to
display their talent in assigning final causes, have imported a new method of
argument in proof of their theory-namely, a reduction, not to the impossible,
but to ignorance ; thus showing that they have no other method of exhibiting
their doctrine. For example, if a
stone falls from a roof on to someone’s head, and kills him, they will
demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man
; for, if it had not by God’s will fallen with that object, how could so
many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent circumstances) have
all happened together by chance? Perhaps
you will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was blowing,
and the man was walking that way. “But
why,” they will insist, “was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that
very time walking that way?” If
you again answer, that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun
to be agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that the
man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist : “But why was the
sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?”
So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at last
you take refuge in the will of God-in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance. So, again, when they survey the frame of the human body, they
are amazed ; and being ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art,
conclude that it has been fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and
supernatural skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
another.
Hence
anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and strives to understand
natural phenomena as an intelligent being, and not to gaze at them like a
fool, is set down and denounced as an impious heretic by those, whom the
masses adore as the interpreters of nature and the gods.
Such persons know that, with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which
forms their only available means for proving and preserving their authority
would vanish also. But I now quit
this subject, and pass on to my third point.
After
men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for
their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything
that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best
of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind.
Further, they were bound to form abstract notions for the explanation
of the nature of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
cold, beauty, deformity, and so on ; and from the belief that they are free
agents arose the further notions of praise and blame, sin and merit.
I
will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human nature ; the
former I will briefly explain here.
Everything
which conduces to health and the worship of God they have called good,
everything which hinders these objects they have styled bad ; and inasmuch as
those who do not understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in
any way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that there is an
order in things, being really ignorant both of things and their own nature.
When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they make on our
senses requires little effort of imagination, and can consequently be easily
remembered, we say that they are well-ordered ; if the contrary, that they are
ill-ordered or confused. Further, as things which are easily imagined are more
pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion-as though there were any order
in nature, except in relation to our imagination-and say that God has created
all things in order ; thus, without knowing it, attributing imagination to
God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God foresaw human imagination,
and arranged everything, so that it should be most easily imagined.
If this be their theory, they would not, perhaps, be daunted by the
fact that we find an infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our
imagination, and very many others which confound its weakness.
But enough has been said on this subject.
The other abstract notions are nothing but modes of imagining, in which
the imagination is differently affected : though they are considered by the
ignorant as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
everything was created for the sake of themselves ; and, according as they are
affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt.
For instance, if the motion which objects we see communicate to our
nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful ;
if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.
Things
which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid ;
if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavored or insipid ; if through
our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, &c.
Whatsoever
affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony.
In this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe, that even
God himself takes pleasure in harmony ; and philosophers are not lacking who
have persuaded themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise
to harmony-all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone judges of
things according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes for things the
forms of his imagination. We need
no longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we have
witnessed, and finally skepticism : for, although human bodies in many
respects agree, yet in very many others they differ ; so that what seems good
to one seems bad to another ; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to
another ; what is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.
I need not further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat
the subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well known.
It is commonly said : “So many men, so many minds ; everyone is wise
in his own way ; brains differ as completely as palates.”
All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things according to their
mental disposition, and rather imagine than understand : for, if they
understood phenomena, they would, as mathematicians attest, be convinced, if
not attracted, by what I have urged.
We
have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are
mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but
only the constitution of the imagination ; and, although they have names, as
though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
entities imaginary rather than real ; and, therefore, all arguments against us
drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.
Many
argue in this way. If all things
follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the
point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c.
But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the
perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power ;
things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind.
To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be
governed only by reason, I give no answer but this : because matter was not
lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to
lowest ; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite
intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
Such
are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note ; if there are any more of
the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of
a little reflection.
Part
II.
I
now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the
essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being ; not, indeed, all of
them (for we proved in Part i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must
follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest
blessedness.
DEFINITION
I. By body I mean a mode which
expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he
is considered as an extended thing. (See
Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.)
DEFINITION
II. I consider as belonging to
the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given
also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also ; in
other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing,
can neither be nor be conceived.
DEFINITION
III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a
thinking thing.
Explanation.-I
say conception rather than perception, because the word perception seems to
imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object ; whereas conception
seems to express an activity of the mind.
DEFINITION
IV. By an adequate idea, I mean
an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to
the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.
Explanation.-I
say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the
agreement between the idea and its object (ideatum).
DEFINITION
V. Duration is the indefinite
continuance of existing.
Explanation.-I
say indefinite, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself
of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the
existence of the thing, but does not take it away.
DEFINITION
VI. Reality and perfection I use
as synonymous terms.
DEFINITION
VII. By particular things, I mean
things which are finite and have a conditioned existence ; but if several
individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the
effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.
I.
The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that is, it
may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or that man does or does
not exist.
II.
Man thinks.
III.
Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of the passions,
do not take place, unless there be in the same individual an idea of the thing
loved, desired, &c. But the
idea can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.
IV.
We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.
V.
We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and modes of
thought.
N.B.
The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.
PROP.
I. Thought is an attribute of
God, or God is a thinking thing.
Proof.-Particular
thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned
manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).
God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the
concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived
thereby. Thought, therefore, is
one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God’s eternal and
infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.).
In other words, God is a thinking thing.
Q.E.D.
Note.-This
proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are able to conceive an
infinite thinking being. For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts, so is
it conceived as containing more reality or perfection.
Therefore a being, which can think an infinite number of things in an
infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite.
As, therefore, from the consideration of thought alone, we conceive an
infinite being, thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.
PROP.
II. Extension is an attribute of
God, or God is an extended thing.
Proof.-The
proof of this proposition is similar to that of the last.
PROP.
III. In God there is necessarily
the idea not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily
follow from his essence.
Proof.-God
(by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an infinite number of things in
infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form
the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.
Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop.
xxxv.). Therefore, such an idea
as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone.
Q.E.D. (Part i., Prop.
xv.)
Note.-The
multitude understand by the power of God the free will of God, and the right
over all things that exist, which latter are accordingly generally considered
as contingent. For it is said
that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to nothing.
Further, the power of God is very often likened to the power of kings.
But this doctrine we have refuted (Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i.
and ii.), and we have shown (Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same
necessity, as that by which he understands himself ; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit), that God
understands himself, so also does it follow by the same necessity, that God
performs infinite acts in infinite ways.
We further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God’s power is
identical with God’s essence in action ; therefore it is as impossible for
us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive him as non-existent.
If we might pursue the subject further, I could point out, that the
power which is commonly attributed to God is not only human (as showing that
God is conceived by the multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but
involves a negation of power. However,
I am unwilling to go over the same ground so often.
I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over frequently in
his mind what I have said in Part I from Prop. xvi. to the end. No one will be able to follow my meaning, unless he is
scrupulously careful not to confound the power of God with the human power and
right of kings.
PROP.
IV. The idea of God, from which
an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.
Proof.-Infinite
intellect comprehends nothing save the attributes of God and his modifications
(Part i., Prop. xxx.). Now God is
one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.). Therefore
the idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in infinite
ways, can only be one. Q.E.D.
PROP.
V. The actual being of ideas owns
God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not
in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute ; that is, the ideas both
of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their
efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God
himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this Part. We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea of
his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely
because he is a thinking thing, and not because he is the object of his own
idea. Wherefore the actual being
of ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing. It may be differently proved as follows : the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the nature of
God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore (Part i., Prop. x.)
involves the conception of no other attribute of God, and consequently (by
Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect of any attribute save thought.
Therefore the actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as
he is considered as a thinking thing, &c.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
VI. The modes of any given
attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the
attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered
through any other attribute.
Proof.-Each
attribute is conceived through itself, without any other (Part i., Prop. x.) ;
wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the conception of that
attribute, but not of any other. Thus
(Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only in so far as he is considered
through the attribute whose modes they are, and not in so far as he is
considered through any other. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
the actual being of things, which are not modes of thought, does not follow
from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things.
Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas
follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.
PROP.
VII. The order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.
For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the
cause, whereof it is an effect.
Corollary.-Hence
God’s power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action-that is,
whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension
(formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).
Note.-Before
going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out
above-namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as
constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one
substance : consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through
the other. So, also, a mode of
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though
expressed in two ways. This truth
seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God’s
intellect, and the things understood by God are identical.
For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle
existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes. Thus,
whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the
attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same
order, or one and the same chain of causes-that is, the same things following
in either case.
I
said that God is the cause of an idea-for instance, of the idea of a
circle,-in so far as he is a thinking thing ; and of a circle, in so far as he
is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle
can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking,
and that again through another, and so on to infinity ; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole
of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought
only. And, in so far as we
consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole
of nature through the attributes of extension only ; and so on, in the case of
the other attributes. Wherefore
of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes. I
cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.
PROP.
VIII. The ideas of particular
things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite
idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or
modes are contained in the attributes of God.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from the last ; it is understood more clearly from the
preceding note.
Corollary.-Hence,
so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or
ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists ; and
when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they are
involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to
continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said
to continue.
Note.-If
anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I
fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of
which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique ; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible. The
nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect
within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one
another ; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.
Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as
the circle exists ; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to
exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle.
Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only
exist. The ideas of these two not
only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but
also as they involve the existence of those rectangles ; wherefore they are
distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.
PROP.
IX. The idea of an individual
thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but
in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third
idea, and so on to infinity.
Proof.-The
idea of an individual thing actually existing is an individual mode of
thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the Corollary and note to Prop.
viii. of this part) ; thus (by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in
so far only as he is a thinking thing. But
not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.) in so far as he is a thing thinking
absolutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode of
thinking ; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third,
and so on to infinity. Now, the
order and connection of ideas is (by Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the
order and connection of causes. Therefore
of a given individual idea another individual idea, or God, in so far as he is
considered as modified by that idea, is the cause ; and of this second idea
God is the cause, in so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to
infinity.
Corollary.-Whatsoever
takes place in the individual object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is in
God, in so far only as he has the idea of the object.
Proof.-Whatsoever
takes place in the object of any idea, its idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of
this part), not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered
as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.) ; but
(by Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things. The
knowledge, therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object will
be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
PROP.
X. The being of substance does
not appertain to the essence of man-in other words, substance does not
constitute the actual being2 of man.
Proof.-The
being of substance involves necessary existence (Part i., Prop. vii.).
If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the essence of man,
substance being granted, man would necessarily be granted also (II.Def.ii.),
and, consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd (II.Ax.i.).
Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
Note.-This
proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which it is shown that there
cannot be two substances of the same nature ; for as there may be many men,
the being of substance is not that which constitutes the actual being of man.
Again, the proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance-namely, that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable,
indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows, that the essence of man is constituted by certain modifications of
the attributes of God. For (by
the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to the essence of man.
That essence therefore (by i. 15)
is something which is in God, and which without God can neither be nor be
conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.), or a mode which
expresses God’s nature in a certain conditioned manner.
Note.-Everyone
must surely admit, that nothing can be or be conceived without God.
All men agree that God is the one and only cause of all things, both of
their essence and of their existence ; that is, God is not only the cause of
things in respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to
their being (secundum esse).
At
the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be
conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing ; wherefore they believe that
either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or else
that created things can be or be conceived without God ; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.
I think the cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep
to the proper order of philosophic thinking.
The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it
is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have
taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
what they call the objects of sensation ; hence, while they are considering
natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and,
when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they
are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have
overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
no help towards understanding the divine nature.
So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
themselves freely.
However,
I pass over this point. My
intention her was only to give a reason for not saying, that that, without
which a thing cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing
: individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God does not
appertain to their essence. I
said that “I considered as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which
being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also ; or that without which the thing, and which
itself without the thing can neither be nor be conceived.”
(II. Def. ii.)
PROP.
XI. The first element, which
constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular
thing actually existing.
Proof.-The
essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is constituted by certain
modes of the attributes of God, namely (by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of
thinking, of all which (by II. Ax.
iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other
modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior in nature) must be in the same
individual (by the same Axiom). Therefore
an idea is the first element constituting the human mind.
But not the idea of a non-existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist ; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing.
But not of an infinite thing. For
an infinite thing (I.xxi., xxii.), must always necessarily exist ; this would
(by II. Ax. i.) involve an absurdity. Therefore
the first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is
the idea of something actually existing.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God ;
thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the
assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite,
but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in
so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind ; and when we say that
God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind,
has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives
a thing in part or inadequately.
Note.-Here,
I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things
which will cause them to hesitate ;
I
therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce
on my statements, till they have read to the end.
PROP.
XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in
the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by
the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the
said occurrence. That is, if the
object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take
place in that body without being perceived by the mind.
Proof.-Whatsoever
comes to pass in the object of any idea, the knowledge thereof is necessarily
in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in so far as he is considered as affected by the
idea of the said object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the
mind of anything. Therefore,
whatsoever takes place in the object constituting the idea of the human mind,
the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the
essence of the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of the
said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words the mind perceives
it.
Note.-This
proposition is also evident, and is more clearly to be understood from II.
vii., which see.
PROP.
XIII. The object of the idea
constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of
extension which actually exists, and nothing else.
Proof.-If
indeed the body were not the object of the human mind, the ideas of the
modifications of the body would not be in God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of
his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his constituting the mind of
something else ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of
the body would not be in our mind : now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
idea of the modifications of the body. Therefore
the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body
as it actually exists (II. xi.). Further, if there were any other object of the idea
constituting the mind besides body, then, as nothing can exist from which some
effect does not follow (I. xxxvi.)
there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea, which would be the
effect of that other object (II. xi.) ; but (I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.
Wherefore the object of our mind is the body as it exists, and nothing
else. Q.E.D.
Note.-We
thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also
the nature of the union between mind and body.
However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately or distinctly,
unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of our body.
The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been entirely general,
applying not more to men than to other individual things, all of which, though
in different degrees, are animated.3 For
of everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause,
in the same way as there is an idea of the human body ; thus
whatever we have asserted of the idea of the human body must
necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.
Still, on the other hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects,
differ one from the other, one being more excellent than another and
containing more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent than
the object of another idea, and contains more reality.
Wherefore,
in order to determine, wherein the human mind differs from other things, and
wherein it surpasses them, it is necessary for us to know the nature of its
object, that is, of the human body. What
this nature is, I am not able here to explain, nor is it necessary for the
proof of what I advance, that I should do so. I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given
body is more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving many
impressions at once, so also is the mind, of which it is the object, more
fitted than others for forming many simultaneous perceptions ; and the more
the actions of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it is the
object for distinct comprehension. We
may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others, and may further
see the cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body, and
also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following propositions,
deduce from what has been advanced. Wherefore
I have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my present
statements. In order to do so, I
must premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.
AXIOM
I. All bodies are either in
motion or at rest.
AXIOM
II. Every body is moved sometimes
more slowly,
sometimes
more quickly.
LEMMA
I. Bodies are distinguished from
one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
respect of substance.
Proof.-The
first part of this proposition is, I take it, self-evident.
That bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance, is plain
both from I. v. and I. viii. It is brought out still more clearly from I. xv, note.
LEMMA
II. All bodies agree in certain
respects.
Proof.-All
bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
conception
of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more
quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.
LEMMA
III. A body in motion or at rest
must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which other body has
been determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third again by a
fourth, and so on to infinity.
Proof.-Bodies
are individual things (II., Def. i.), which (Lemma I.) are distinguished one
from the other in respect to motion and rest ; thus (I. xxviii.) each must
necessarily be determined to motion or rest by another individual thing,
namely (II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in motion
or at rest. And this body again
can only have been set in motion or caused to rest by being determined by a
third body to motion or rest. This
third body again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined to a
state of rest by some other body ; and a body at rest remains so, until it is
determined to a state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident. For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot
affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is at rest.
If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion, this cannot have
resulted from its having been at rest, for no other consequence could have
been involved than its remaining at rest.
If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so long as we
only consider A, be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it is
in motion. If A is
subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of A’s
previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued motion ; the
state of rest therefore must have resulted from something, which was not in A,
namely, from an external cause determining A to a state of rest.
Axiom
I.-All modes, wherein one body is affected by another body, follow
simultaneously from the nature of the body affected and the body affecting ;
so that one and the same body may be moved in different modes, according to
the difference in the nature of the bodies moving it ; on the other hand,
different bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.
Axiom
II.-When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest, which it is unable
to move, it recoils, in order to continue its motion, and the angle made by
the line of motion in the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon
the moving body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line of
motion of incidence and the same plane.
So
far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies, which are only
distinguished one from the other by motion and rest, quickness and slowness.
We now pass on to compound bodies.
Definition.-When
any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other
bodies to remain in contact, or if they be moved at the same or different
rates of speed, so that their mutual movements should preserve among
themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and
that together they compose one body or individual, which is distinguished from
other bodies by the fact of this union.
Axiom
III.-In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a compound body, are in
contact over a greater or less superficies, they will with greater or less
difficulty admit of being moved from their position ; consequently the
individual will, with greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another
form. Those bodies, whose parts
are in contact over large superficies, are called hard ; those, whose parts
are in contact over small superficies, are called soft ; those, whose parts
are in motion among one another, are called fluid.
LEMMA
IV. If from a body or individual,
compounded of several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take their place, the
individual will preserve its nature as before, without any change in its
actuality (forma).
Proof.-Bodies
(Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of substance : that which
constitutes the actuality (formam) of an individual consists (by the last
Def.) in a union of bodies ; but this union, although there is a continual
change of bodies, will (by our hypothesis) be maintained ; the individual,
therefore, will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance and
in respect of mode. Q.E.D.
LEMMA
V. If the parts composing an
individual become greater or less, but in such proportion, that they all
preserve the same mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will
still preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be changed.
Proof.-The
same as for the last Lemma.
compelled
to change the motion, which they have in one direction, for motion in another
direction, but in such a manner, that they be able to continue their motions
and their mutual communication in the same relations as before, the individual
will retain its own nature without any change of its actuality.
Proof.-This
proposition is self-evident, for the individual is supposed to retain all
that, which, in its definition, we spoke of as its actual being.
LEMMA
VII. Furthermore, the individual
thus composed preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction ; so long as each part
retains its motion, and preserves its communication with other parts as
before.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from the definition of an individual prefixed to Lemma
iv.
Note.-We
thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways,
and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and
slowness ; that is, of bodies of the most simple character.
If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of several
individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which
it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.
Each of its parts would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by
Lemma vi.) each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or
slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more
quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.
If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a
still greater number of ways without changing their actuality.
We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of
nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite
ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.
I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate this point at more
length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not my object ; I have
only touched on the question, because it enables me to prove easily that which
I have in view.
I.
The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse
nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex.
II.
Of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid, some
soft, some hard.
III.
The individual parts composing the human body, and consequently the
human body itself, are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies.
IV.
The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other
bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated.
V.
When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body
to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the surface of the latter,
and, as it were, leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which
impels it.
VI.
The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety
of ways.
PROP.
XIV. The human mind is capable of
perceiving a great number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is
capable of receiving a great number of impressions.
Proof.-The
human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in very many ways by external
bodies, and is capable in very many ways of affecting external bodies.
But (II. xii.) the human mind must perceive all that takes place in the
human body ; the human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great
number of things, and is so in proportion, &c.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XV. The idea, which constitutes
the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great
number of ideas.
Proof.-The
idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body
(II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is composed of a great number of complex
individual parts. But there is
necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is
composed (II. viii. Coroll.) ;
therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous
ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XVI. The idea of every mode, in
which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature
of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.
Proof.-All
the modes, in which any given body is affected, follow from the nature of the
body affected, and also from the nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i.,
after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I.
Ax. iv.) involves the nature of
both bodies ; therefore, the idea of every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the
external body. Q.E.D.
Corollary
I.-Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a
variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own.
Corollary
II.-It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we have of external bodies,
indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external
bodies. I have amply illustrated
this in the Appendix to Part I.
PROP.
XVII. If the human body is
affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human
mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to
itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the
existence or the presence of the said external body.
Proof.-This
proposition is self-evident, for so long as the human body continues to be
thus affected, so long will the human mind (II. xii.) regard this modification
of the body-that is (by the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as
actually existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body. In
other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but postulates the
existence or presence of the nature of the external body ; therefore the mind
(by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will regard the external body as actually existing,
until it is affected, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-The
mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has
once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.
Proof.-When
external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body, so that they
often impinge on the softer parts, they change the surface of the last named
(Post. v.) ; hence (Ax. ii., after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are
refracted therefrom in a different manner from that which they followed before
such change ; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new surfaces
by their own spontaneous movement, they will be refracted in the same manner,
as though they had been impelled towards those surfaces by external bodies ;
consequently, they will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the
human body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again take
cognizance-that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard the external body
as present, and will do so, as often as the fluid parts of the human body
impinge on the aforesaid surfaces by their own spontaneous motion.
Wherefore, although the external bodies, by which the human body has
once been affected, be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless
regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
Note.-We
thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present
many things which are not. It is
possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes ; but I
think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just
as well as if I had pointed out the true cause.
Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my
assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on
experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have,
that the human body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.). Furthermore (II. vii. Coroll.,
II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly understand what is the difference between
the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and
the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.
The former directly answers to the essence of Peter’s own body, and
only implies existence so long as
Peter exists ; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul’s body
than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul’s
body lasts, Paul’s mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though
he no longer exists. Further, to
retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas
represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things,
though they do not recall the figure of things.
When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines.
I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where
error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not
contain error. The mind does not
err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as
being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it
imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present
to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power
of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a
fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own
nature-that is (I. Def. vii.), if
this faculty of imagination be free.
PROP.
XVIII. If the human body has once
been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards
imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.
Proof.-The
mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body, because the human body is
affected and disposed by the impressions from an external body, in the same
manner as it is affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
external body ; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so disposed, that
the mind imagined two bodies at once ; therefore, it will also in the second
case imagine two bodies at once, and the mind, when it imagines one, will
straightway remember the other. Q.E.D.
Note.-We
now clearly see what Memory is. It
is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the
order and association of the modifications (affectiones) of the human body.
I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve
the nature of things outside the human body : not of ideas which answer to the
nature of the said things : ideas of the modifications of the human body are,
strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve the nature both of the human
body and of external bodies. I
say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
association of the modifications of the human body, in order to distinguish it
from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect,
whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is
in all men the same. And hence we
can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing,
should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no
similarity with the first ; for instance, from the thought of the word pomum
(an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit
apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor
anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been
affected by these two things ; that is, that the man has often heard the word
pomum, while he was looking at the fruit ; similarly every man will go on from
one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of
things in his body. For a
soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at
once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence
to the thought of war, &c. ; while a countryman will proceed from the
thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.
Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as
he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of
things in this or that manner.
PROP.
XIX. The human mind has no
knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas
of the modifications whereby the body is affected.
Proof.-The
human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body (II. xiii.), which
(II. ix.) is in God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by another idea
of a particular thing actually existing : or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the
human body stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
continually regenerated ; and the order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of causes (II. vii.) ; this idea will therefore be in
God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by the ideas of very many
particular things. Thus God has
the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in so far as he is
affected by very many other ideas, and not in so far as he constitutes the
nature of the human mind ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does
not know the human body. But the
ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far as
he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind
perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently (II. xvi.) the
human body itself, and as actually existing ; therefore the mind perceives
thus far only the human body.
PROP.
XX. The idea or knowledge of the
human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being
referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
body.
Proof.-Thought
is an attribute of God (II. i.) ; therefore (II. iii.) there must necessarily
be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications,
consequently also of the human mind (II. xi.).
Further, this idea or knowledge of the mind does not follow from God,
in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is affected by another idea
of an individual thing (II. ix.). But
(II. vii.) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and
connection of causes ; therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God
and is referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of the
body. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXI. This idea of the mind is
united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.
Proof.-That
the mind is united to the body we have shown from the fact, that the body is
the object of the mind (II. xii. and xiii.) ; and so for the same reason the
idea of the mind must be united with its object, that is, with the mind in the
same manner as the mind is united to the body.
Q.E.D.
Note.-This
proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we have said in the
note to II. vii. We there showed
that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.), are one
and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now
under the attribute of extension ; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind
itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same
attribute, namely, thought. The
idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same
necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking.
Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea,
is nothing but the distinctive quality (forma) of the idea in so far as it is
conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object ; if a man
knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same
time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity.
But I will treat of this hereafter.
PROP.
XXII. The human mind perceives
not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
modifications.
Proof.-The
ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God in the same manner, and are
referred to God in the same manner, as the ideas of the said modifications.
This is proved in the same way as II. xx.
But the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the human mind
(II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind ; therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as
he has the knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they will
be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not only the
modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXIII. The mind does not know
itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the
body.
Proof.-The
idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in God in the same manner, and
is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.
But since (II. xix.) the
human mind does not know the human body itself, that is (II. xi. Coroll.),
since the knowledge of the human body is not referred to God, in so far as he
constitutes the nature of the human mind ; therefore, neither is the knowledge
of the mind referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind ; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human mind thus far
has no knowledge of itself. Further
the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.), they agree
with the nature of the mind ; wherefore the knowledge of these ideas
necessarily involves knowledge of the mind ; but (by the last Prop.) the
knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself ; wherefore the human
mind thus far only has knowledge of itself.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXIV. The human mind does not
involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.
Proof.-The
parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body,
except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain
fixed relation (Def. after Lemma
iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation
to the human body. The parts of
the human body are highly complex individuals
(Post. i.), whose parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human
body without in any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after Lemma iii.) to
other bodies in another relation ; therefore (II.
iii.) the idea or
knowledge of each part will be in God, inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as
affected by another idea of a particular thing, which particular thing is
prior in the order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).
We may affirm the same thing of each part of each individual composing
the human body ; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the human
body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and
not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the
idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind (II. xiii) ; therefore
(II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXV. The idea of each
modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the
external body.
Proof.-We
have shown that the idea of a modification of the human body involves the
nature of an external body, in so far as that external body conditions the
human body in a given manner. But,
in so far as the external body is an individual, which has no reference to the
human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is in God (II. ix.), in so far as
God is regarded as affected by the idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.)
is naturally prior to the said external body.
Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in
so far as he has the idea of the modification of the human body ; in other
words, the idea of the modification of the human body does not involve an
adequate knowledge of the external body.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXVI. The human mind does not
perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of
the modifications of its own body.
Proof.-If
the human body is in no way affected by a given external body, then
(II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human body, in other words, the
human mind, affected in any way by the idea of the existence of the said
external body, nor does it in any manner perceive its existence.
But, in so far as the human body is affected in any way by a given
external body, thus far (II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external
body. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-In
so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate
knowledge thereof.
Proof.-When
the human mind regards external bodies through the ideas of the modifications
of its own body, we say that it imagines (see II. xvii. note) ; now the mind
can only imagine external bodies as actually existing.
Therefore (by II. xxv.), in so far as the mind imagines external
bodies, it has not an adequate knowledge of them.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXVII. The idea of each
modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the
human body itself.
Proof.-Every
idea of a modification of the human body involves the nature of the human
body, in so far as the human body is regarded as affected in a given manner
(II. xvi.). But, inasmuch as the
human body is an individual which may be affected in many other ways, the idea
of the said modification, &c.
PROP.
XXVIII. The ideas of the
modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the
human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.
Proof.-The
ideas of the modifications of the human body involve the nature both of the
human body and of external bodies (II. xvi.) ; they must involve the nature
not only of the human body but also of its parts ; for the modifications are
modes (Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and, consequently,
the human body as a whole are affected.
But (by II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so far as he is
regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is regarded as
affected by other ideas. These
ideas of modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words, confused ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.-The
idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner,
proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct ; as
also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas
of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the
mind only, as everyone may easily see.
PROP.
XXIX. The idea of the idea of
each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of
the human mind.
Proof.-The
idea of a modification of the human body (II.
xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body, in
other words, does not adequately express its nature ; that is (II. xiii.) it
does not agree with the nature of the mind adequately ; therefore (I. Ax. vi)
the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human
mind, or does not involve an adequate knowledge thereof.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common
order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary
knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it
perceives the ideas of the modifications of body (II. xxiii.).
It only perceives its own body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the
modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means ;
thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and
confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and note).
Q.E.D.
Note.-I
say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge
of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things
after the common order of nature ; that is, whenever it is determined from
without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to regard this or
that ; not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact
of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement,
difference, and contrast. Whenever
it is determined in anywise from within, it regards things clearly and
distinctly, as I will show below.
PROP.
XXX. We can only have a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.
Proof.-The
duration of our body does not depend on its essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the
absolute nature of God (I. xxi.).
But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate by causes,
which in their turn are conditioned to exist and operate in a fixed and
definite relation by other causes, these last again being conditioned by
others, and so on to infinity. The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order
of nature, or the constitution of things.
Now, however a thing may be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that
thing is in God, in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so
far as he has the idea of the human body only.
(II. ix. Coroll.) Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body
is in God very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind ; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this knowledge is
very inadequate to our mind. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXI. We can only have a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to
ourselves.
Proof.-Every
particular thing, like the human body, must be conditioned by another
particular thing to exist and operate in a fixed and definite relation ; this
other particular thing must likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to
infinity. (I. xxviii.) As we
have shown in the foregoing proposition, from this common property of
particular things, we have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
our body ; we must draw a similar conclusion with regard to the duration of
particular things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
of the duration thereof. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable.
For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by the last Prop.),
and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of
things. (I.
xxxiii., Note i.) For (I.
xxix.), except in this sense, nothing is contingent.
PROP.
XXXII. All ideas, in so far as
they are referred to God, are true.
Proof.-All
ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects (II. vii.
Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are all true. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXIII. There is nothing positive
in ideas, which causes them to be called false.
Proof.-If
this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thinking, which
should constitute the distinctive quality of falsehood.
Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
xxxii.) ; external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.). Therefore
there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is
absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.
Proof.-When
we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words (II.
xi. Coroll.), that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he
constitutes the essence of our mind ; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that
such an idea is true. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXV. Falsity consists in the
privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas
involve.
Proof.-There
is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false (II.
xxxiii.) ; but falsity cannot consist in simple privation (for minds, not
bodies, are said to err and to be mistaken), neither can it consist in
absolute ignorance, for ignorance and error are not identical ; wherefore it
consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
confused ideas involve. Q.E.D.
Note.-In
the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists in the privation of
knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject I will give an
example. For instance, men are
mistaken in thinking themselves free ; their opinion is made up of
consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they
are conditioned. Their idea of
freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will,
this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto.
What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know ;
those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the
soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust.
So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from
us about two hundred feet ; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but
in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun’s true
distance or the cause of the fancy. For
although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six
hundred of the earth’s diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near
; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its
true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence
of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.
PROP.
XXXVI. Inadequate and confused
ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.
Proof.-All
ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they are referred to God are true
(II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.) adequate ; therefore there are no ideas
confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv.
and xxviii.) ; therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate, follow by
the same necessity (II. vi.). Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXVII. That which is common to
all (cf. Lemma II., above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole,
does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.
Proof.-If
this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it constitutes the essence of some
particular thing ; for instance, the essence of B. Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either exist or be
conceived ; but this is against our hypothesis. Therefore it does not appertain to B’s essence, nor does it
constitute the essence of any particular thing.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
XXXVIII. Those things, which are
common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be
conceived except adequately.
Proof.-Let
A be something, which is common to all bodies, and which is equally present in
the part of any given body and in the whole.
I say A cannot be conceived except adequately. For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II.
vii. Coroll.), both in so far as
God has the idea of the human body, and also in so far as he has the idea of
the modifications of the human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in
part the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies ; that is
(II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be adequate, both in so
far as he constitutes the human mind, and in so far as he has the ideas, which
are in the human mind. Therefore
the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A adequately, and has this
adequate perception, both in so far as it perceives itself, and in so far as
it perceives its own or any external body, nor can A be conceived in any other
manner.
Corollary-Hence
it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men ; for (by
Lemma ii.) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the foregoing
Prop.) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.
PROP.
XXXIX. That, which is common to
and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect
the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the
whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.
Proof.-If
A be that, which is common to and a property of the human body and external
bodies, and equally present in the human body and in the said external bodies,
in each part of each external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate
idea of A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of the
human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given external bodies.
Let it now be granted, that the human body is affected by an external
body through that, which it has in common therewith, namely, A ; the idea of
this modification will involve the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II.
vii. Coroll.) the idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the
property A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the idea
of the human body ; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he constitutes the
nature of the human mind ; therefore (II. xi.
Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.
Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in
proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies.
PROP.
XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind
follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.
Proof.-This
proposition is self-evident. For
when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that an idea is in
the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is
infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular
things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.
Note
I.-I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all
men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions,
which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours ; for it
would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions
have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore,
we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only
clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should
detect those which are ill-founded. Again
we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin,
and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of
interest connected with these questions.
But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have
set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the
reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless,
in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down
the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
Thing, Something. These terms
arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of
distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in
the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time ; if this number be
exceeded, the images will begin to be confused ; if this number of images, of
which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely
exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another.
This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.)
that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as
its body can form images simultaneously.
When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also
imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend
them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being,
Thing, &c. The same
conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally
vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here
; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider
one only. All may be reduced to
this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused.
From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as
man, horse, dog, &c. They
arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are
formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break
down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their
definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the
individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree ; for that is
the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body ;
this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite
number of particular individuals. For,
as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals.
We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not
formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as
the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the
mind most easily imagines or remembers. For
instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature ; those who
have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different
general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a
two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other
cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of
his body.
It
is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain
things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies
should have arisen.
Note
II.-From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases,
perceive and form our general notions :-(1.) From particular things
represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order
through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.) ; I have settled to call such
perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.4
(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words
we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those
through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note).
I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first
kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.)
From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of
the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.) ;
this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will
hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition.
This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence
of things. I will illustrate all
three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three
numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the
second is to the first. Tradesmen
without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by
the first ; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they
received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made
trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth
proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general
property of proportionals.
But
with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see
that the fourth proportional is six ; and this is much clearer, because we
infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the
first bears to the second.
PROP.
XLI. Knowledge of the first kind
is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is
necessarily true.
Proof.-To
knowledge of the first kind we have (in the foregoing note) assigned all those
ideas, which are inadequate and confused ; therefore this kind of knowledge is
the only source of falsity (II. xxxv.). Furthermore,
we assigned to the second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
adequate ; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
xxxiv.). Q.E.D.
PROP.
XLII. Knowledge of the second and
third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the
true from the false.
Proof.-This
proposition is self-evident. He,
who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate
idea of true and false. That is
(II. xl., note ii.), he must know the true and the false by the second or
third kind of knowledge.
PROP.
XLIII. He, who has a true idea,
simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of
the thing perceived.
Proof.-A
true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God, in so far as he is
displayed through the nature of the human mind (II. xi. Coroll.).
Let us suppose that there is in God, in so far as he is displayed
through the human mind, an adequate idea, A.
The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be referred
to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx., whereof the proof is of
universal application). But the
idea A is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed through
the human mind ; therefore, the idea of the idea A must be referred to God in
the same manner ; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.),
the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind, which has the adequate
idea A ; therefore he, who has an adequate idea or knows a thing truly (II.
xxxiv.), must at the same time have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his
knowledge ; that is, obviously, he must be assured.
Q.E.D.
Note.-I
explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by the idea of an idea ; but
we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.
No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the
highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for
knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.
No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
thinking-namely, the very act of understanding.
And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do
first understand it? In other
words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of
that thing? Further, what can
there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of
truth? Even as light displays
both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of
falsity.
I
think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions-namely, if a true idea
is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with
its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark) ; consequently,
neither will a man who has a true idea have any advantage over him who has
only false ideas. Further, how
comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly,
how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects?
These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered. The difference between
a true idea and a false idea is plain : from what was said in II. xxxv., the
former is related to the latter as being is to not-being.
The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II.
xxxv. with the note. From what is
there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who
has only false ideas, is made apparent. As
for the last question-as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree
with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his
knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds
with its object-in other words, that truth is its own standard.
We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.) ; therefore, the clear
and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.
PROP.
XLIV. It is not in the nature of
reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.
Proof.-It
is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly (II. xli.), namely (I. Ax.
vi.), as they are in themselves-that is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as
necessary. Q.E.D.
Corollary
I.-Hence it follows, that it is only through our imagination that we consider
things, whether in respect to the future or the past, as contingent.
Note.-How
this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain.
We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.) that the mind always
regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence,
until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence.
Further (II. xviii.), we showed that, if the human body has once been
affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the
other-that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise
causes which exclude their existence and presence.
Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we
imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly,
some at equal speed. Thus, let us
suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning,
Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening ; then, that today he again sees Peter
in the morning. It is evident,
from II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will
imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when
he saw it on the preceding day ; in other words, he will imagine a complete
day, and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter
; with noon, he will imagine Paul ; and with evening, he will imagine
Simon-that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to
a future time ; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will
refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the
imagination of a past time. If it
should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see
James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his
imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together :
for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not
both together. His imagination will therefore waver ; and, with the
imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the
other-that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain,
but both as contingent. This
wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned
with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or
time present : consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they
be referred to time present, past, or future.
Corollary
II.-It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of
eternity (sub quâdam æternitatis specie).
Proof.-It
is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as
necessary (II. xliv.). Reason
perceives this necessity of things (II. xli.) truly-that is (I. Ax. vi.), as
it is in itself. But (I. xvi.)
this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God ;
therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of
eternity. We may add that the
bases of reason are the notions (II. xxxviii.),
which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing : which
must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form
of eternity.
PROP.
XLV. Every idea of every body, or
of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal
and infinite essence of God.
Proof.-The
idea of a particular thing actually existing necessarily involves both the
existence and the essence of the said thing (II. viii.).
Now particular things cannot be conceived without God (I. xv.) ; but,
inasmuch as (II. vi.) they have God for their cause, in so far as he is
regarded under the attribute of which the things in question are modes, their
ideas must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the attributes
of those ideas-that is (I. vi.), the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Q.E.D.
Note.-By
existence I do not here mean duration-that is, existence in so far as it is
conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity.
I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to
particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite
ways from the eternal necessity of God’s nature (I. xvi.).
I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things, in
so far as they are in God. For
although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to
exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres
in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God’s nature (cf. I. xxiv.
Coroll.).
PROP.
XLVI. The knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and
perfect.
Proof.-The
proof of the last proposition is universal ; and whether a thing be considered
as a part or a whole, the idea thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by
the last Prop.), will involve God’s eternal and infinite essence.
Wherefore, that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite
essence of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole
; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
PROP.
XLVII. The human mind has an
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
Proof.-The
human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II. xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually existing ;
therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and
infinite essence of God. Q.E.D.
Note.-Hence
we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all.
Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can
from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we
may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II.
xl., and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in
Part V. Men have not so clear a
knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to
imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name
God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they
can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by
external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely,
that we do not apply names to things rightly.
For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the centre of a
circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by
mathematicians. So again, when
men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind,
and another on the paper. If we
could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake ; they seem to do so,
because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have
on the paper. If this were not
so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a
man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had
flown into a neighbour’s hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently
clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of
others. For, as a matter of fact,
as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another,
of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken
and absurd in their opponents.
PROP.
XLVIII. In the mind there is no
absolute or free will ; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a
cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
another cause, and so on to infinity.
Proof.-The
mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II. xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions
(I. xvii. Coroll. ii.) ; in other
words, it cannot have an absolute faculty of positive or negative volition ;
but (by I. xxviii.) it must be determined by a cause, which has also been
determined by another cause, and this last by another, &c.
Q.E.D.
Note.-In
the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind no absolute faculty of
understanding, desiring, loving, &c. Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms, such as we are
accustomed to put together from particular things. Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
this or that idea, or this or that volition, as “lapidity” to this or that
stone, or as “man” to Peter and Paul.
The cause which leads men to consider themselves free has been set
forth in the Appendix to Part I. But,
before I proceed further, I would here remark that, by the will to affirm and
decide, I mean the faculty, not the desire.
I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby the mind affirms or denies what
is true or false, not the desire, wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away
from any given thing. After we
have proved, that these faculties of ours are general notions, which cannot be
distinguished from the particular instances on which they are based, we must
inquire whether volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
We must inquire, I say, whether
there is in the mind any affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea,
in so far as it is an idea, involves. On
which subject see the following proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea
of pictures should suggest itself. For
by ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in
the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought.
PROP.
XLIX. There is in the mind no
volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it
is an idea, involves.
Proof.-There
is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition, but only
particular volitions, namely, this or that affirmation, and this or that
negation. Now let us conceive a
particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms,
that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.
This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that
is, without the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.
It is the same thing to say, that the concept A must involve the
concept B, as it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.
Further, this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the
idea of a triangle. Therefore,
this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived, without the idea of a
triangle. Again, this idea of a
triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its three interior
angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore,
and vice versâ, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be conceived
without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation belongs to the essence
of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing besides.
What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have selected it at
random) may be said of any other volition, namely, that it is nothing but an
idea. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Will
and understanding are one and the same.
individual
volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).
But a particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
(by the foregoing Prop.) ; therefore, will and understanding are one and the
same. Q.E.D.
Note.-We
have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error.
For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation
of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused.
Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve
certainty. When we say, then,
that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the
subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or
that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which
should cause his imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).
Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we
shall never say that he is certain. For
by certainty we mean something positive (II. xliii. and note), not merely the
absence of doubt.
However,
in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw
attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the
objections which may be advanced against our doctrine.
Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worth while
to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom.
I say “some,” for they will be better appreciated from what we
shall set forth in the fifth part.
I
begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate
distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of
things which we imagine. It is
further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby
we signify things. These
three-namely, images, words, and ideas-are by many persons either entirely
confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and
hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a
knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for
the wise ordering of life. Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with
external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof
we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we
invent by the free decree of our will ; they thus regard ideas as though they
were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do
not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or
negation. Again, those who
confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves,
think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
deny. This misconception will
easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and
seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore
clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist
in the image of anything, nor in words. The
essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
wise involve the conception of thought.
These
few words on this subject will suffice : I will therefore pass on to consider
the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine.
Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a
wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different
therefrom. The reason for their
holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is
that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of
assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity
of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in
their faculty of understanding. The
will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the
former infinite. Secondly, it may
be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are
able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive ;
this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as
he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.
For
instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not therefore admit that a winged
horse exists ; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that
a winged horse does exist. Nothing
therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or
faculty of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding.
Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently
contain more reality than another ; in other words, that we do not seem to
need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for
affirming, that what is false is true. We
have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another,
for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of
them some more excellent than others ; this also seems to point to a
difference between the understanding and the will.
Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what
will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case
of Buridan’s ass? Will he
perish of hunger and thirst? If I
say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of
a man rather than an actual man. If
I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would
consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.
Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in
evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task
of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.
To
the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope
than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and
distinct ideas ; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the
perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions ; nor do I see why the
faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of
feeling : for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an
infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of
feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies.
If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we
cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any
thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition.
But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we
should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty
of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it
about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would
be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more
universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp
such infinite entities. We have
shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all
particular volitions-in other words, that which is common to all such
volitions.
As,
then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all
volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that
such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the
understanding : for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and
of an infinite number of individuals.
To
the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of
suspending our judgment : for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment,
we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question
adequately. Suspension of
judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy
imagining a horse, and perceive nothing else.
Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II.
xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the
existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present : he
will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain
thereof. We have daily experience
of such a state of things in dreams ; and I do not suppose that there is
anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power
of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees ;
yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment,
namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Further,
I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends-that
is, I grant that the mind’s imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not
involve error (II. xvii. note) ;
but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any
affirmation. For what is the
perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?
If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself : it would have no reasons for doubting
its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged
horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or
unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of
such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.
I
think that I have anticipated my answer to the third objection, namely, that
the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it
only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation,
whose adequate essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in
the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in
all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea’s essence :
for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as
much as do ideas. For instance,
the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that which
involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from
the idea of a triangle.
Further,
I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, to
affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false
is true. These two affirmations,
if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and
not-being ; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the
actual reality of falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).
We
must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we confuse
universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with
realities. As for the fourth
objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described (namely, as perceiving
nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each
equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst.
If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an
ass than a man ; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man
should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children,
fools, madmen, &c.
It
remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine
as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from
what has been said. The doctrine
is good,
1.
Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to
be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more
perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit,
but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely,
solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and
piety shall bid us. We may thus
clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those
who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and
their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery ; as if virtue
and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2.
Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to
the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow
from our nature. For it shows us,
that we should await and endure fortune’s smiles or frowns with an equal
mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same
necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles
are equal to two right angles.
3.
This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man,
neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any.
Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and
helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition,
but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion
demand, as I will show in Part III.
4.
Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth ; for it
teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves,
but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best.
I
have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus
bring the second part of my treatise to a close.
I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human
mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject,
with sufficient clearness. I have
laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the
highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be
partly made plain.
Most
writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of
matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature’s general
laws. They appear to conceive man
to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom : for they believe that
he disturbs rather than follows nature’s order, that he has absolute control
over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself.
They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of
nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse : he,
who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or
more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer.
Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and
industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy
things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to
mankind. But no one, so far as I
know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of
the mind against them for their restraint.
I
do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the
mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by
their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the
mind might attain to absolute dominion over them.
However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the
acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.
For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
deride human emotions than understand them.
Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to
treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with
rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to
reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.
However, such is my plan. Nothing
comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein ; for nature
is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power
of action ; that is, nature’s laws and ordinances, whereby all things come
to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the
same ; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the
nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature’s universal laws and
rules. Thus the passions of
hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this
same necessity and efficacy of nature ; they answer to certain definite
causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as
worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the
contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the
emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my
investigations concerning God and the mind.
I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner,
as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.
I.
By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be
clearly and distinctly perceived. By
an inadequate or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
effect cannot be understood.
II.
I say that we act when anything takes place, either within us or
externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause ; that is (by the
foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us
or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and
distinctly understood. On the
other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something
takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only
the partial cause.
III.
By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active
power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and
also the ideas of such modifications.
N.B.
If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then
call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein
the mind is passive.
I.
The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of
activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not
render its power of activity either greater or less.
N.B.
This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and Lemmas v. and vii.,
which see after II. xiii.
II.
The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the
impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.), and, consequently, the
same images of things (see note II. xvii.).
PROP.
I. Our mind is in certain cases
active, and in certain cases passive. In
so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it
has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.
Proof.-In
every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and some ideas that are
fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note). Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also
in God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise (by
the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he contains in himself the
essence of the given mind alone, but as he, at the same time, contains the
minds of other things. Again,
from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36) ; of this
effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not inasmuch as he is
infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as affected by the given idea (II.
ix.). But of that effect whereof
God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in a
given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in question is the adequate
cause (II. xi. Coroll.). Therefore
our mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in certain
cases necessarily active ; this was our first point. Again,
whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is adequate in God, not by
virtue of his possessing in himself the mind of one man only, but by virtue of
his containing, together with the mind of that one man, the minds of other
things also, of such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is
not an adequate, but only a partial cause ; thus (III. Def. ii.) the mind,
inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily passive ;
this was our second point. Therefore
our mind, &c. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon, in
proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or
less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas.
PROP.
II. Body cannot determine mind to
think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state
different from these, if such there be.
Proof.-All
modes of thinking have for their cause God, by virtue of his being a thinking
thing, and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.
vi.). That, therefore, which
determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of
extension ; that is (II. Def. i.), it is not body.
This was our first point. Again,
the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also
been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely
everything which takes place in a body must spring from God, in so far as he
is regarded as affected by some mode of extension, and not by some mode of
thought (II. vi.) ; that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode
of thought. This was our second
point. Therefore body cannot
determine mind, &c.
Note.-This
is made more clear by what was said in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind
and body are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of
thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is
identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other ;
consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is
simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in
the mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we proved
II. xii.
Nevertheless,
though such is the case, and though there be no further room for doubt, I can
scarcely believe, until the fact is proved by experience, that men can be
induced to consider the question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they
convinced that it is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set
in motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending solely on the
mind’s will or the exercise of thought.
However, no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can
accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as
extension. No one hitherto has
gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain
all its functions ; nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions
are observed in the lower animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and
that somnambulists do many things in their sleep, which they would not venture
to do when awake : these instances are enough to show, that the body can by
the sole laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.
Again,
no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many
various degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can
move it. Thus, when men say that
this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has
dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are
confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the
said action, and do not wonder at it.
But,
they will say, whether we know or do not know the means whereby the mind acts
on the body, we have, at any rate, experience of the fact that unless the
human mind is in a fit state to think, the body remains inert.
Moreover, we have experience, that the mind alone can determine whether
we speak or are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly, we
say depend on the mind’s decree. But,
as to the first point, I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also
teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for
thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking,
such as it possesses when the body is awake.
Again, I think everyone’s experience will confirm the statement, that
the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but
according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image
of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for
contemplating the said object.
But,
it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature
considered as extended substance, we should be able to deduce the causes of
buildings, pictures, and things of that kind, which are produced only by human
art ; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind,
be capable of building a single temple. However,
I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body’s
power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature,
whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the
laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the
direction of mind : such are the actions performed by somnambulists while
asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake.
I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body,
which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art,
not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As
for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if
men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.
Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily
than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites ;
when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to
objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we
are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our
desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else.
However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many
things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed
by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be
nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things.
Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an
angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes
that it freely desires to run away ; further, a drunken man believes that he
utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
would willingly have withheld : thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman,
a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free
decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their
impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their
actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined ;
and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name
for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying state of the
body. Everyone shapes his actions
according to his emotion, those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know
not what they wish ; those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily
swayed this way or that. All
these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and a bodily
appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the
same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained
through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is regarded
under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and
rest. This will appear yet more
plainly in the sequel. For the
present I wish to call attention to another point, namely, that we cannot act
by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so.
For instance, we cannot say a word without remembering that we have
done so. Again, it is not within
the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will.
Therefore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the
power of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers.
But when we dream that we speak, we believe that we speak from a free
decision of the mind, yet we do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a
spontaneous motion of the body. Again,
we dream that we are concealing something, and we seem to act from the same
decision of the mind as that, whereby we keep silence when awake concerning
something we know. Lastly, we
dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something, which we should
not dare to do when awake.
Now
I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts of decisions, one
sort illusive, and the other sort free? If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is believed to be
free, is not distinguishable from the imagination or memory, and is nothing
more than the affirmation, which an idea, by virtue of being an idea,
necessarily involves (II. xlix.). Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind by
the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore
those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the
free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open.
PROP.
III. The activities of the mind
arise solely from adequate ideas ; the passive states of the mind depend
solely on inadequate ideas.
Proof.-The
first element, which constitutes the essence of the mind, is nothing else but
the idea of the actually existent body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is
compounded of many other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate
(II. xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii.
Coroll.). Whatsoever therefore
follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate cause, through
which it must be understood, must necessarily follow either from an adequate
or from an inadequate idea. But
in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily
passive : wherefore the activities of the mind follow solely from adequate
ideas, and accordingly the mind is only passive in so far as it has inadequate
ideas. Q.E.D.
Note.-Thus
we see, that passive states are not attributed to the mind, except in so far
as it contains something involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as
a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through
itself without other parts : I could thus show, that passive states are
attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to
the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is
solely to treat of the human mind.
PROP.
IV. Nothing can be destroyed,
except by a cause external to itself.
Proof.-This
proposition is self-evident, for the definition of anything affirms the
essence of that thing, but does not negative it ; in other words, it
postulates the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself, without
taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to find in it
anything which could destroy it. Q.E.D.
PROP.
V. Things are naturally contrary,
that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of
destroying the other.
Proof.-If
they could agree together or co-exist in the same object, there would then be
in the said object something which could destroy it ; but this, by the
foregoing proposition, is absurd, therefore things, &c.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
VI. Everything, in so far as it
is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being.
Proof.-Individual
things are modes whereby the attributes of God are expressed in a given
determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.) ; that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things
which express in a given determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is
and acts ; now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.) ; but contrariwise
it is opposed to all that could take away its existence (III. v.).
Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as it is in itself, it
endeavours to persist in its own being. Q.E.D.
PROP.
VII. The endeavour, wherewith
everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the
actual essence of the thing in question.
Proof.-From
the given essence of any thing certain consequences necessarily follow (I.
xxxvi.), nor have things any power save such as necessarily follows from their
nature as determined (I. xxix.) ; wherefore the power of any given thing, or
the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it acts, or
endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or endeavour, wherewith it
endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the given or
actual essence of the thing in question.
Q.E.D.
PROP.
VIII. The endeavour, whereby a
thing endeavours to persist in its own being, involves no finite time, but an
indefinite time.
Proof.-If
it involved a limited time, which should determine the duration of the thing,
it would then follow solely from that power whereby the thing exists, that the
thing could not exist beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be
destroyed ; but this (III. iv.) is absurd.
Wherefore the endeavour wherewith a thing exists involves no definite
time ; but, contrariwise, since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby
it already exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.
PROP.
IX. The mind, both in so far as
it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas,
endeavours to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
endeavour it is conscious.
Proof.-The
essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (III.
iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so far as it possesses the former, and
in so far as it possesses the latter, it endeavours to persist in its own
being, and that for an indefinite time (III. viii.).
Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is necessarily conscious of itself through
the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
conscious of its own endeavour.
Note.-This
endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is called will, when referred to
the mind and body in conjunction it is called appetite ; it is, in fact,
nothing else but man’s essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow
all those results which tend to its preservation ; and which man has thus been
determined to perform.
Further,
between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term
desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their
appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined : Desire is appetite with
consciousness thereof. It is thus
plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for,
long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other
hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long
for it, or desire it.
PROP.
X. An idea, which excludes the
existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary
thereto.
Proof.-Whatsoever
can destroy our body, cannot be postulated therein (III. v.).
Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing occur in God, in so far
as he has the idea of our body (II. ix.
Coroll.) ; that is (II.xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing cannot be
postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of the
mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it follows that the
first and chief endeavour of our mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence
of our body : thus, an idea, which negatives the existence of our body, is
contrary to our mind, &c. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XI. Whatsoever increases or
diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea
thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our
mind.
Proof.-This
proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II. xiv.
Note.-Thus
we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a
state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.
These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of
pleasure and pain. By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection.
By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a
lesser perfection. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and
mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas),
the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
But we must bear in mind, that
stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature
is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are
alike affected. What I mean by
desire I have explained in the note to Prop. ix. of this part ; beyond these
three I recognize no other primary emotion ; I will show as I proceed, that
all other emotions arise from these three.
But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater
length Prop. x of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one
idea is contrary to another. In
the note to II. xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence
of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.
Again, it follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II.
viii., that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that
the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly,
we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of the mind, whereby it
imagines and remembers things, also depends on the fact, that it involves the
actual existence of the body. Whence
it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining
are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the
body. Now the cause, why the mind
ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III.
iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist.
For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the
body, is not that the body began to exist ; therefore, for the same reason, it
does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to
exist ; but (II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is
therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.
PROP.
XII. The mind, as far as it can,
endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of
activity in the body.
Proof.-So
long as the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of any
external body, the human mind will regard that external body as present (II.
xvii.), and consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it, the human
body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature of the said external
body ; thus so long as the mind conceives things, which increase or help the
power of activity in our body, the body is affected in modes which increase or
help its power of activity (III. Post. i.) ; consequently (III. xi.) the mind’s
power of thinking is for that period increased or helped. Thus (III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours
to imagine such things. Q.E.D.
PROP.
XIII. When the mind conceives
things which diminish or hinder the body’s power of activity, it endeavours,
as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
first-named things.
Proof.-So
long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the
mind and body is diminished or constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof) ;
nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives
something else, which excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.) ;
that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which
excludes the existence of the former thing conceived : therefore the mind
(III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the
latter. Q.E.D.
Corollary.-Hence
it follows that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish
or constrain the power of itself and of the body.
Note.-From
what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate.
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an
external cause : Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an
external cause. We further see,
that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him,
the object of his love ; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy
the object of his hatred. But I
will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.
PROP.
XIV. If the mind has once been
affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards
affected by one of these two, be also affected by the other.
Proof.-If
the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever
afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the
other also (II. xviii.). But the
mind’s conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature
of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.) ; therefore, if the body, and
consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been once affected by two emotions
at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the
two, be also affected by the other.
PROP.
XV. Anything can, accidentally,
be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.
Proof.-Let
it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
affected
by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
diminishes
its power of activity, and the other does either
increase
or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).
From the
foregoing
proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
afterwards
affected by the former, through its true cause, which
(by
hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
action,
it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
does
increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
xi.
note) it w