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(1596-1650)
TRANSLATED
BY
JOHN
VEITCH, LL. D.
LATE
PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
From
the Publisher’s Preface.
The
present volume contains a reprint of the preface and the first part of the
Principles of Philosophy, together with selections from the second, third and
fourth parts of that work, corresponding to the extracts in the French edition
of Gamier, are also given, as well as an appendix containing part of Descartes’
reply to the Second Objections (viz., his formal demonstrations of the
existence of Deity). The translation is based on the original Latin edition of
the Principles, published in 1644.
The
work had been translated into French during Descartes’ lifetime, and
personally revised and corrected by him, the French text is evidently
deserving of the same consideration as the Latin originals, and consequently,
the additions and variations of the French version have also been given—the
additions being put in square brackets in the text and the variations in the
footnotes.
A
copy of the title-page of the original edition, as given in Dr. C.
Guttler’s work (Munich: C. H. Beck. 1901), are also reproduced in the
present volume.
TO
THE FRENCH TRANSLATOR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY SERVING FOR A PREFACE.
Sir,--The
version of my principles which you have been at pains to make, is so elegant
and finished as to lead me to expect that the work will be more generally read
in French than in Latin, and better understood. The only apprehension I
entertain is lest the title should deter some who have not been brought up to
letters, or with whom philosophy is in bad repute, because the kind they were
taught has proved unsatisfactory; and this makes me think that it will be
useful to add a preface to it for the purpose of showing what the MATTER of
the work is, what END I had in view in writing it, and what UTILITY may be
derived from it. But although it might be my part to write a preface of this
nature, seeing I ought to know those particulars better than any other person,
I cannot nevertheless prevail upon myself to do anything more than merely to
give a summary of the chief points that fall, as I think, to be discussed in
it: and I leave it to your discretion to present to the public such part of
them as you shall judge proper.
I
should have desired, in the first place, to explain in it what philosophy is,
by commencing with the most common matters, as, for example, that the word
PHILOSOPHY signifies the study of wisdom, and that by wisdom is to be
understood not merely prudence in the management of affairs, but a perfect
knowledge of all that man can know, as well for the conduct of his life as for
the preservation of his health and the discovery of all the arts, and that
knowledge to subserve these ends must necessarily be deduced from first
causes; so that in order to study the acquisition of it (which is properly
called philosophizing), we must commence with the investigation of those first
causes which are called PRINCIPLES. Now these principles must possess TWO
CONDITIONS: in the first place, they must be so clear and evident that the
human mind, when it attentively considers them, cannot doubt of their truth;
in the second place, the knowledge of other things must be so dependent on
them as that though the principles themselves may indeed be known apart from
what depends on them, the latter cannot nevertheless be known apart from the
former. It will accordingly be necessary thereafter to endeavour so to deduce
from those principles the knowledge of the things that depend on them, as that
there may be nothing in the whole series of deductions which is not perfectly
manifest. God is in truth the only being who is absolutely wise, that is, who
possesses a perfect knowledge of all things; but we may say that men are more
or less wise as their knowledge of the most important truths is greater or
less. And I am confident that there is nothing, in what I have now said, in
which all the learned do not concur.
I
should, in the next place, have proposed to consider the utility of
philosophy, and at the same time have shown that, since it embraces all that
the human mind can know, we ought to believe that it is by it we are
distinguished from savages and barbarians, and that the civilisation and
culture of a nation is regulated by the degree in which true philosophy
nourishes in it, and, accordingly, that to contain true philosophers is the
highest privilege a state can enjoy. Besides this, I should have shown that,
as regards individuals, it is not only useful for each man to have intercourse
with those who apply themselves to this study, but that it is incomparably
better he should himself direct his attention to it; just as it is doubtless
to be preferred that a man should make use of his own eyes to direct his
steps, and enjoy by means of the same the beauties of colour and light, than
that he should blindly follow the guidance of another; though the latter
course is certainly better than to have the eyes closed with no guide except
one’s self. But to live without
philosophizing is in truth the same as keeping the eyes closed without
attempting to open them; and the pleasure of seeing all that sight discloses
is not to be compared with the satisfaction afforded by the discoveries of
philosophy. And, finally, this study is more imperatively requisite for the
regulation of our manners, and for conducting us through life, than is the use
of our eyes for directing our steps. The brutes, which have only their bodies
to conserve, are continually occupied in seeking sources of nourishment; but
men, of whom the chief part is the mind, ought to make the search after wisdom
their principal care, for wisdom is the true nourishment of the mind; and I
feel assured, moreover, that there are very many who would not fail in the
search, if they would but hope for success in it, and knew the degree of their
capabilities for it. There is no mind, how ignoble soever it be, which remains
so firmly bound up in the objects of the senses, as not sometime or other to
turn itself away from them in the aspiration after some higher good, although
not knowing frequently wherein that good consists. The greatest favourites of
fortune—those who have health, honours, and riches in abundance— are not
more exempt from aspirations of this nature than others; nay, I am persuaded
that these are the persons who sigh the most deeply after another good greater
and more perfect still than any they already possess. But the supreme good,
considered by natural reason without the light of faith, is nothing more than
the knowledge of truth through its first causes, in other words, the wisdom of
which philosophy is the study. And, as all these particulars are indisputably
true, all that is required to gain assent to their truth is that they be well
stated.
But
as one is restrained from assenting to these doctrines by experience, which
shows that they who make pretensions to philosophy are often less wise and
reasonable than others who never applied themselves to the study, I should
have here shortly explained wherein consists all the science we now possess,
and what are the degrees of wisdom at which we have arrived. The first degree
contains only notions so clear of themselves that they can be acquired without
meditation; the second comprehends all that the experience of the senses
dictates; the third, that which the conversation of other men teaches us; to
which may be added as the fourth, the reading, not of all books, but
especially of such as have been written by persons capable of conveying proper
instruction, for it is a species of conversation we hold with their authors.
And it seems to me that all the wisdom we in ordinary possess is acquired only
in these four ways; for I do not class divine revelation among them, because
it does not conduct us by degrees, but elevates us at once to an infallible
faith.
There
have been, indeed, in all ages great minds who endeavoured to find a fifth
road to wisdom, incomparably more sure and elevated than the other four. The
path they essayed was the search of first causes and true principles, from
which might be deduced the reasons of all that can be known by man; and it is
to them the appellation of philosophers has been more especially accorded. I
am not aware that there is any one of them up to the present who has succeeded
in this enterprise. The first and chief whose writings we possess are Plato
and Aristotle, between whom there was no difference, except that the former,
following in the footsteps of his master, Socrates, ingenuously confessed that
he had never yet been able to find anything certain, and that he was contented
to write what seemed to him probable, imagining, for this end, certain
principles by which he endeavoured to account for the other things. Aristotle,
on the other hand, characterised by less candour, although for twenty years
the disciple of Plato, and with no principles beyond those of his master,
completely reversed his mode of putting them, and proposed as true and certain
what it is probable he himself never esteemed as such. But these two men had
acquired much judgment and wisdom by the four preceding means, qualities which
raised their authority very high, so much so that those who succeeded them
were willing rather to acquiesce in their opinions, than to seek better for
themselves. The chief question
among their disciples, however, was as to whether we ought to doubt of all
things or hold some as certain,--a dispute which led them on both sides into
extravagant errors; for a part of those who were for doubt, extended it even
to the actions of life, to the neglect of the most ordinary rules required for
its conduct; those, on the other hand, who maintained the doctrine of
certainty, supposing that it must depend upon the senses, trusted entirely to
them. To such an extent was this carried by Epicurus, that it is said he
ventured to affirm, contrary to all the reasonings of the astronomers, that
the sun is no larger than it appears.
It
is a fault we may remark in most disputes, that, as truth is the mean between
the two opinions that are upheld, each disputant departs from it in proportion
to the degree in which he possesses the spirit of contradiction. But the error
of those who leant too much to the side of doubt, was not followed for any
length of time, and that of the opposite party has been to some extent
corrected by the doctrine that the senses are deceitful in many instances.
Nevertheless, I do not know that this error was wholly removed by
showing that certitude is not in the senses, but in the understanding alone
when it has clear perceptions; and that while we only possess the knowledge
which is acquired in the first four grades of wisdom, we ought not to doubt of
the things that appear to be true in what regards the conduct of life, nor
esteem them as so certain that we cannot change our opinions regarding them,
even though constrained by the evidence of reason.
From
ignorance of this truth, or, if there was any one to whom it was known, from
neglect of it, the majority of those who in these later ages aspired to be
philosophers, blindly followed Aristotle, so that they frequently corrupted
the sense of his writings, and attributed to him various opinions which he
would not recognise as his own were he now to return to the world; and those
who did not follow him, among whom are to be found many of the greatest minds,
did yet not escape being imbued with his opinions in their youth, as these
form the staple of instruction in the schools; and thus their minds were so
preoccupied that they could not rise to the knowledge of true principles. And
though I hold all the philosophers in esteem, and am unwilling to incur odium
by my censure, I can adduce a proof of my assertion, which I do not think any
of them will gainsay, which is, that they all laid down as a principle what
they did not perfectly know. For example, I know none of them who did not
suppose that there was gravity in terrestrial bodies; but although experience
shows us very clearly that bodies we call heavy descend towards the center of
the earth, we do not, therefore, know the nature of gravity, that is, the
cause or principle in virtue of which bodies descend, and we must derive our
knowledge of it from some other source. The same may be said of a vacuum and
atoms, of heat and cold, of dryness and humidity, and of salt, sulphur, and
mercury, and the other things of this sort which some have adopted as their
principles. But no conclusion deduced from a principle which is not clear can
be evident, even although the deduction be formally valid; and hence it
follows that no reasonings based on such principles could lead them to the
certain knowledge of any one thing, nor consequently advance them one step in
the search after wisdom. And if they did discover any truth, this was due to
one or other of the four means above mentioned. Notwithstanding this, I am in
no degree desirous to lessen the honour which each of them can justly claim; I
am only constrained to say, for the consolation of those who have not given
their attention to study, that just as in travelling, when we turn our back
upon the place to which we were going, we recede the farther from it in
proportion as we proceed in the new direction for a greater length of time and
with greater speed, so that, though we may be afterwards brought back to the
right way, we cannot nevertheless arrive at the destined place as soon as if
we had not moved backwards at all; so in philosophy, when we make use of false
principles, we depart the farther from the knowledge of truth and wisdom
exactly in proportion to the care with which we cultivate them, and apply
ourselves to the deduction of diverse consequences from them, thinking that we
are philosophizing well, while we are only departing the farther from the
truth; from which it must be inferred that they who have learned the least of
all that has been hitherto distinguished by the name of philosophy are the
most fitted for the apprehension of truth.
After
making those matters clear, I should, in the next place, have desired to set
forth the grounds for holding that the true principles by which we may reach
that highest degree of wisdom wherein consists the sovereign good of human
life, are those I have proposed in this work; and two considerations alone are
sufficient to establish this—the first of which is, that these principles
are very clear, and the second, that we can deduce all other truths from them;
for it is only these two conditions that are required in true principles. But
I easily prove that they are very clear; firstly, by a reference to the manner
in which I found them, namely, by rejecting all propositions that were in the
least doubtful, for it is certain that such as could not be rejected by this
test when they were attentively considered, are the most evident and clear
which the human mind can know. Thus by considering that he who strives to
doubt of all is unable nevertheless to doubt that he is while he doubts, and
that what reasons thus, in not being able to doubt of itself and doubting
nevertheless of everything else, is not that which we call our body, but what
we name our mind or thought, I have taken the existence of this thought for
the first principle, from which I very clearly deduced the following truths,
namely, that there is a God who is the author of all that is in the world, and
who, being the source of all truth, cannot have created our understanding of
such a nature as to be deceived in the judgments it forms of the things of
which it possesses a very clear and distinct perception. Those are all the
principles of which I avail myself touching immaterial or metaphysical
objects, from which I most clearly deduce these other principles of physical
or corporeal things, namely, that there are bodies extended in length,
breadth, and depth, which are of diverse figures and are moved in a variety of
ways. Such are in sum the principles from which I deduce all other truths. The
second circumstance that proves the clearness of these principles is, that
they have been known in all ages, and even received as true and indubitable by
all men, with the exception only of the existence of God, which has been
doubted by some, because they attributed too much to the perceptions of the
senses, and God can neither be seen nor touched.
But,
though all the truths which I class among my principles were known at all
times, and by all men, nevertheless, there has been no one up to the present,
who, so far as I know, has adopted them as principles of philosophy: in other
words, as such that we can deduce from them the knowledge of whatever else is
in the world. It accordingly now remains for me to prove that they are such;
and it appears to me that I cannot better establish this than by the test of
experience: in other words, by inviting readers to peruse the following work.
For, though I have not treated in it of all matters--that being impossible—I
think I have so explained all of which I had occasion to treat, that they who
read it attentively will have ground for the persuasion that it is unnecessary
to seek for any other principles than those I have given, in order to arrive
at the most exalted knowledge of which the mind of man is capable; especially
if, after the perusal of my writings, they take the trouble to consider how
many diverse questions are therein discussed and explained, and, referring to
the writings of others, they see how little probability there is in the
reasons that are adduced in explanation of the same questions by principles
different from mine. And that
they may the more easily undertake this, I might have said that those imbued
with my doctrines have much less difficulty in comprehending the writings of
others, and estimating their true value, than those who have not been so
imbued; and this is precisely the opposite of what I before said of such as
commenced with the ancient philosophy, namely, that the more they have studied
it the less fit are they for rightly apprehending the truth.
I
should also have added a word of advice regarding the manner of reading this
work, which is, that I should wish the reader at first to go over the whole of
it, as he would a romance, without greatly straining his attention, or
tarrying at the difficulties he may perhaps meet with in it, with the view
simply of knowing in general the matters of which I treat; and that
afterwards, if they seem to him to merit a more careful examination, and he
feel a desire to know their causes, he may read it a second time, in order to
observe the connection of my reasonings; but that he must not then give it up
in despair, although he may not everywhere sufficiently discover the
connection of the proof, or understand all the reasonings—it being only
necessary to mark with a pen the places where the difficulties occur, and
continue to read without interruption to the end; then, if he does not grudge
to take up the book a third time, I am confident he will find in a fresh
perusal the solution of most of the difficulties he will have marked before;
and that, if any still remain, their solution will in the end be found in
another reading.
I
have observed, on examining the natural constitutions of different minds, that
there are hardly any so dull or slow of understanding as to be incapable of
apprehending good opinions, or even of acquiring all the highest sciences, if
they be but conducted along the right road. And this can also be proved by
reason; for, as the principles are clear, and as nothing ought to be deduced
from them, unless most manifest inferences, no one is so devoid of
intelligence as to be unable to comprehend the conclusions that flow from
them. But, besides the entanglement of prejudices, from which no one is
entirely exempt, although it is they who have been the most ardent students of
the false sciences that receive the greatest detriment from them, it happens
very generally that people of ordinary capacity neglect to study from a
conviction that they want ability, and that others, who are more ardent, press
on too rapidly: whence it comes to pass that they frequently admit principles
far from evident, and draw doubtful inferences from them. For this reason, I
should wish to assure those who are too distrustful of their own ability that
there is nothing in my writings which they may not entirely understand, if
they only take the trouble to examine them; and I should wish, at the same
time, to warn those of an opposite tendency that even the most superior minds
will have need of much time and attention to remark all I designed to embrace
therein.
After
this, that I might lead men to understand the real design I had in publishing
them, I should have wished here to explain the order which it seems to me one
ought to follow with the view of instructing himself. In the first place, a
man who has merely the vulgar and imperfect knowledge which can be acquired by
the four means above explained, ought, before all else, to endeavour to form
for himself a code of morals, sufficient to regulate the actions of his life,
as well for the reason that this does not admit of delay as because it ought
to be our first care to live well. In the next place, he ought to study Logic,
not that of the schools, for it is only, properly speaking, a dialectic which
teaches the mode of expounding to others what we already know, or even of
speaking much, without judgment, of what we do not know, by which means it
corrupts rather than increases good sense—but the logic which teaches the
right conduct of the reason with the view of discovering the truths of which
we are ignorant; and, because it greatly depends on usage, it is desirable he
should exercise himself for a length of time in practising its rules on easy
and simple questions, as those of the mathematics. Then, when he has acquired
some skill in discovering the truth in these questions, he should commence to
apply himself in earnest to true philosophy, of which the first part is
Metaphysics, containing the principles of knowledge, among which is the
explication of the principal attributes of God, of the immateriality of the
soul, and of all the clear and simple notions that are in us; the second is
Physics, in which, after finding the true principles of material things, we
examine, in general, how the whole universe has been framed; in the next
place, we consider, in particular, the nature of the earth, and of all the
bodies that are most generally found upon it, as air, water, fire, the
loadstone and other minerals. In the next place it is necessary also to
examine singly the nature of plants, of animals, and above all of man, in
order that we may thereafter be able to discover the other sciences that are
useful to us. Thus, all Philosophy is like a tree, of which Metaphysics is the
root, Physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out
of this trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely, Medicine,
Mechanics, and Ethics. By the science of Morals, I understand the highest and
most perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences, is
the last degree of wisdom.
But
as it is not from the roots or the trunks of trees that we gather the fruit,
but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principal utility of
philosophy depends on the separate uses of its parts, which we can only learn
last of all. But, though I am ignorant of almost all these, the zeal I have
always felt in endeavouring to be of service to the public, was the reason why
I published, some ten or twelve years ago, certain Essays on the doctrines I
thought I had acquired. The first part of these Essays was a “Discourse on
the Method of rightly conducting the Reason, and seeking Truth in the
Sciences,” in which I gave a summary of the principal rules of logic, and
also of an imperfect ethic, which a person may follow provisionally so long as
he does not know any better. The other parts were three treatises: the first
of Dioptrics, the second of Meteors, and the third of Geometry. In the
Dioptrics, I designed to show that we might proceed far enough in philosophy
as to arrive, by its means, at the knowledge of the arts that are useful to
life, because the invention of the telescope, of which I there gave an
explanation, is one of the most difficult that has ever been made. In the
treatise of Meteors, I desired to exhibit the difference that subsists between
the philosophy I cultivate and that taught in the schools, in which the same
matters are usually discussed. In fine, in the Geometry, I professed to
demonstrate that I had discovered many things that were before unknown, and
thus afford ground for believing that we may still discover many others, with
the view of thus stimulating all to the investigation of truth.
Since that period, anticipating the difficulty which many would
experience in apprehending the foundations of the Metaphysics, I endeavoured
to explain the chief points of them in a book of Meditations, which is not in
itself large, but the size of which has been increased, and the matter greatly
illustrated, by the Objections which several very learned persons sent to me
on occasion of it, and by the Replies which I made to them. At length, after
it appeared to me that those preceding treatises had sufficiently prepared the
minds of my readers for the Principles of Philosophy, I also published it; and
I have divided this work into four parts, the first of which contains the
principles of human knowledge, and which may be called the First Philosophy,
or Metaphysics. That this part, accordingly, may be properly understood, it
will be necessary to read beforehand the book of Meditations I wrote on the
same subject. The other three
parts contain all that is most general in Physics, namely, the explication of
the first laws or principles of nature, and the way in which the heavens, the
fixed stars, the planets, comets, and generally the whole universe, were
composed; in the next place, the explication, in particular, of the nature of
this earth, the air, water, fire, the magnet, which are the bodies we most
commonly find everywhere around it, and of all the qualities we observe in
these bodies, as light, heat, gravity, and the like. In this way, it seems to
me, I have commenced the orderly explanation of the whole of philosophy,
without omitting any of the matters that ought to precede the last which I
discussed. But to bring this undertaking to its conclusion, I ought hereafter
to explain, in the same manner, the nature of the other more particular bodies
that are on the earth, namely, minerals, plants, animals, and especially man;
finally, to treat thereafter with accuracy of Medicine, Ethics, and Mechanics.
I should require to do this in order to give to the world a complete body of
philosophy; and I do not yet feel myself so old,--I do not so much distrust my
strength, nor do I find myself so far removed from the knowledge of what
remains, as that I should not dare to undertake to complete this design,
provided I were in a position to make all the experiments which I should
require for the basis and verification of my reasonings. But seeing that would
demand a great expenditure, to which the resources of a private individual
like myself would not be adequate, unless aided by the public, and as I have
no ground to expect this aid, I believe that I ought for the future to content
myself with studying for my own instruction, and posterity will excuse me if I
fail hereafter to labour for them.
Meanwhile,
that it may be seen wherein I think I have already promoted the general good,
I will here mention the fruits that may be gathered from my Principles. The
first is the satisfaction which the mind will experience on finding in the
work many truths before unknown; for although frequently truth does not so
greatly affect our imagination as falsity and fiction, because it seems less
wonderful and is more simple, yet the gratification it affords is always more
durable and solid. The second fruit is, that in studying these principles we
will become accustomed by degrees to judge better of all the things we come in
contact with, and thus be made wiser, in which respect the effect will be
quite the opposite of the common philosophy, for we may easily remark in those
we call pedants that it renders them less capable of rightly exercising their
reason than they would have been if they had never known it. The third is,
that the truths which they contain, being highly clear and certain, will take
away all ground of dispute, and thus dispose men’s minds to gentleness and
concord; whereas the contrary is the effect of the controversies of the
schools, which, as they insensibly render those who are exercised in them more
wrangling and opinionative, are perhaps the prime cause of the heresies and
dissensions that now harass the world. The last and chief fruit of these
Principles is, that one will be able, by cultivating them, to discover many
truths I myself have not unfolded, and thus passing by degrees from one to
another, to acquire in course of time a perfect knowledge of the whole of
philosophy, and to rise to the highest degree of wisdom.
For just as all the arts, though in their beginnings they are rude and
imperfect, are yet gradually perfected by practice, from their containing at
first something true, and whose effect experience evinces; so in philosophy,
when we have true principles, we cannot fail by following them to meet
sometimes with other truths; and we could not better prove the falsity of
those of Aristotle, than by saying that men made no progress in knowledge by
their means during the many ages they prosecuted them.
I
well know that there are some men so precipitate and accustomed to use so
little circumspection in what they do, that, even with the most solid
foundations, they could not rear a firm superstructure; and as it is usually
those who are the readiest to make books, they would in a short time mar all
that I have done, and introduce uncertainty and doubt into my manner of
philosophizing, from which I have carefully endeavoured to banish them, if
people were to receive their writings as mine, or as representing my opinions.
I had, not long ago, some experience of this in one of those who were believed
desirous of following me the most closely, [Footnote: Regius; see La Vie de M.
Descartes, reduite en abrege (Baillet). Liv. vii., chap.
vii.—T.] and one too of whom I had somewhere said that I had such
confidence in his genius as to believe that he adhered to no opinions which I
should not be ready to avow as mine; for he last year published a book
entitled “Fundamental Physics,” in which, although he seems to have
written nothing on the subject of Physics and Medicine which he did not take
from my writings, as well from those I have published as from another still
imperfect on the nature of animals, which fell into his hands; nevertheless,
because he has copied them badly, and changed the order, and denied certain
metaphysical truths upon which all Physics ought to be based, I am obliged
wholly to disavow his work, and here to request readers not to attribute to me
any opinion unless they find it expressly stated in my own writings, and to
receive no opinion as true, whether in my writings or elsewhere, unless they
see that it is very clearly deduced from true principles. I well know,
likewise, that many ages may elapse ere all the truths deducible from these
principles are evolved out of them, as well because the greater number of such
as remain to be discovered depend on certain particular experiments that never
occur by chance, but which require to be investigated with care and expense by
men of the highest intelligence, as because it will hardly happen that the
same persons who have the sagacity to make a right use of them, will possess
also the means of making them, and also because the majority of the best minds
have formed so low an estimate of philosophy in general, from the
imperfections they have remarked in the kind in vogue up to the present time,
that they cannot apply themselves to the search after truth.
But,
in conclusion, if the difference discernible between the principles in
question and those of every other system, and the great array of truths
deducible from them, lead them to discern the importance of continuing the
search after these truths, and to observe the degree of wisdom, the perfection
and felicity of life, to which they are fitted to conduct us, I venture to
believe that there will not be found one who is not ready to labour hard in so
profitable a study, or at least to favour and aid with all his might those who
shall devote themselves to it with success.
The
height of my wishes is, that posterity may sometime behold the happy issue of
it, etc.
ELIZABETH,
ELDEST DAUGHTER OF FREDERICK, KING OF BOHEMIA, COUNT PALATINE, AND ELECTOR OF
THE SACRED ROMAN EMPIRE.
MADAM,--The
greatest advantage I have derived from the writings which I have already
published, has arisen from my having, through means of them, become known to
your Highness, and thus been privileged to hold occasional converse with one
in whom so many rare and estimable qualities are united, as to lead me to
believe I should do service to the public by proposing them as an example to
posterity. It would ill become me to flatter, or to give expression to
anything of which I had no certain knowledge, especially in the first pages of
a work in which I aim at laying down the principles of truth. And the generous
modesty that is conspicuous in all your actions, assures me that the frank and
simple judgment of a man who only writes what he believes will be more
agreeable to you than the ornate laudations of those who have studied the art
of compliment. For this reason, I
will give insertion to nothing in this letter for which I have not the
certainty both of experience and reason; and in the exordium, as in the rest
of the work, I will write only as becomes a philosopher. There is a vast
difference between real and apparent virtues; and there is also a great
discrepancy between those real virtues that proceed from an accurate knowledge
of the truth, and such as are accompanied with ignorance or error. The virtues
I call apparent are only, properly speaking, vices, which, as they are less
frequent than the vices that are opposed to them, and are farther removed from
them than the intermediate virtues, are usually held in higher esteem than
those virtues. Thus, because those who fear dangers too much are more numerous
than they who fear them too little, temerity is frequently opposed to the vice
of timidity, and taken for a virtue, and is commonly more highly esteemed than
true fortitude. Thus, also, the prodigal are in ordinary more praised than the
liberal; and none more easily acquire a great reputation for piety than the
superstitious and hypocritical. With regard to true virtues, these do not all
proceed from true knowledge, for there are some that likewise spring from
defect or error; thus, simplicity is frequently the source of goodness, fear
of devotion, and despair of courage. The virtues that are thus accompanied
with some imperfections differ from each other, and have received diverse
appellations. But those pure and perfect virtues that arise from the knowledge
of good alone are all of the same nature, and may be comprised under the
single term wisdom. For, whoever owns the firm and constant resolution of
always using his reason as well as lies in his power, and in all his actions
of doing what he judges to be best, is truly wise, as far as his nature
permits; and by this alone he is just, courageous, temperate, and possesses
all the other virtues, but so well balanced as that none of them appears more
prominent than another: and for this reason, although they are much more
perfect than the virtues that blaze forth through the mixture of some defect,
yet, because the crowd thus observes them less, they are not usually extolled
so highly. Besides, of the two
things that are requisite for the wisdom thus described, namely, the
perception of the understanding and the disposition of the will, it is only
that which lies in the will which all men can possess equally, inasmuch as the
understanding of some is inferior to that of others. But although those who
have only an inferior understanding may be as perfectly wise as their nature
permits, and may render themselves highly acceptable to God by their virtue,
provided they preserve always a firm and constant resolution to do all that
they shall judge to be right, and to omit nothing that may lead them to the
knowledge of the duties of which they are ignorant; nevertheless, those who
preserve a constant resolution of performing the right, and are especially
careful in instructing themselves, and who possess also a highly perspicacious
intellect, arrive doubtless at a higher degree of wisdom than others; and I
see that these three particulars are found in great perfection in your
Highness. For, in the first place, your desire of self-instruction is
manifest, from the circumstance that neither the amusements of the court, nor
the accustomed mode of educating ladies, which ordinarily condemns them to
ignorance, have been sufficient to prevent you from studying with much care
all that is best in the arts and sciences; and the incomparable perspicacity
of your intellect is evinced by this, that you penetrated the secrets of the
sciences and acquired an accurate knowledge of them in a very short period.
But of the vigour of your intellect I have a still stronger proof, and one
peculiar to myself, in that I have never yet met any one who understood so
generally and so well as yourself all that is contained in my writings. For
there are several, even among men of the highest intellect and learning, who
find them very obscure. And I remark, in almost all those who are versant in
Metaphysics, that they are wholly disinclined from Geometry; and, on the other
hand, that the cultivators of Geometry have no ability for the investigations
of the First Philosophy: insomuch that I can say with truth I know but one
mind, and that is your own, to which both studies are alike congenial, and
which I therefore, with propriety, designate incomparable. But what most of
all enhances my admiration is, that so accurate and varied an acquaintance
with the whole circle of the sciences is not found in some aged doctor who has
employed many years in contemplation, but in a Princess still young, and whose
countenance and years would more fitly represent one of the Graces than a Muse
or the sage Minerva. In conclusion, I not only remark in your Highness all
that is requisite on the part of the mind to perfect and sublime wisdom, but
also all that can be required on the part of the will or the manners, in which
benignity and gentleness are so conjoined with majesty that, though fortune
has attacked you with continued injustice, it has failed either to irritate or
crush you. And this constrains me to such veneration that I not only think
this work due to you, since it treats of philosophy which is the study of
wisdom, but likewise feel not more zeal for my reputation as a philosopher
than pleasure in subscribing myself,--
Of
your most Serene Highness, The most devoted servant,
I.
THAT in order to seek truth, it is necessary once in the course of our
life, to doubt, as far as possible, of all things.
As
we were at one time children, and as we formed various judgments regarding the
objects presented to our senses, when as yet we had not the entire use of our
reason, numerous prejudices stand in the way of our arriving at the knowledge
of truth; and of these it seems impossible for us to rid ourselves, unless we
undertake, once in our lifetime, to doubt of all those things in which we may
discover even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty.
II.
That we ought also to consider as false all that is doubtful.
Moreover,
it will be useful likewise to esteem as false the things of which we shall be
able to doubt, that we may with greater clearness discover what possesses most
certainty and is the easiest to know.
III.
That we ought not meanwhile to make use of doubt in the conduct of
life.
In
the meantime, it is to be observed that we are to avail ourselves of this
general doubt only while engaged in the contemplation of truth. For, as far as
concerns the conduct of life, we are very frequently obliged to follow
opinions merely probable, or even sometimes, though of two courses of action
we may not perceive more probability in the one than in the other, to choose
one or other, seeing the opportunity of acting would not unfrequently pass
away before we could free ourselves from our doubts.
IV.
Why we may doubt of sensible things.
Accordingly,
since we now only design to apply ourselves to the investigation of truth, we
will doubt, first, whether of all the things that have ever fallen under our
senses, or which we have ever imagined, any one really exist; in the first
place, because we know by experience that the senses sometimes err, and it
would be imprudent to trust too much to what has even once deceived us;
secondly, because in dreams we perpetually seem to perceive or imagine
innumerable objects which have no existence. And to one who has thus resolved
upon a general doubt, there appear no marks by which he can with certainty
distinguish sleep from the waking state.
V.
Why we may also doubt of mathematical demonstrations.
We
will also doubt of the other things we have before held as most certain, even
of the demonstrations of mathematics, and of their principles which we have
hitherto deemed self-evident; in the first place, because we have sometimes
seen men fall into error in such matters, and admit as absolutely certain and
self evident what to us appeared false, but chiefly because we have learnt
that God who created us is all-powerful; for we do not yet know whether
perhaps it was his will to create us so that we are always deceived, even in
the things we think we know best: since this does not appear more impossible
than our being occasionally deceived, which, however, as observation teaches
us, is the case. And if we suppose that an all-powerful God is not the author
of our being, and that we exist of ourselves or by some other means, still,
the less powerful we suppose our author to be, the greater reason will we have
for believing that we are not so perfect as that we may not be continually
deceived.
VI.
That we possess a free-will, by which we can withhold our assent from
what is doubtful, and thus avoid error.
But
meanwhile, whoever in the end may be the author of our being, and however
powerful and deceitful he may be, we are nevertheless conscious of a freedom,
by which we can refrain from admitting to a place in our belief aught that is
not manifestly certain and undoubted, and thus guard against ever being
deceived.
VII.
That we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt, and that this is
the first knowledge we acquire when we philosophize in order.
While
we thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even
imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God,
nor sky, nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet,
nor, finally, a body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not
while we doubt of the truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in
conceiving that what thinks does not exist at the very time when it thinks.
Accordingly, the knowledge, I THINK, THEREFORE I AM, is the
first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly.
VIII.
That we hence discover the distinction between the mind and the body,
or between a thinking and corporeal thing.
And
this is the best mode of discovering the nature of the mind, and its
distinctness from the body: for examining what we are, while supposing, as we
now do, that there is nothing really existing apart from our thought, we
clearly perceive that neither extension, nor figure, nor local
motion,[Footnote: Instead of “local motion,” the French has “existence
in any place.”] nor anything similar that can be attributed to body,
pertains to our nature, and nothing save thought alone; and, consequently,
that the notion we have of our mind precedes that of any corporeal thing, and
is more certain, seeing we still doubt whether there is any body in existence,
while we already perceive that we think.
IX.
What thought (COGITATIO) is.
By
the word thought, I understand all that which so takes place in us that we of
ourselves are immediately conscious of it; and, accordingly, not only to
understand (INTELLIGERE, ENTENDRE), to will (VELLE), to imagine (IMAGINARI),
but even to perceive (SENTIRE, SENTIR), are here the same as to think
(COGITARE, PENSER). For if I say, I see, or, I walk, therefore I am; and if I
understand by vision or walking the act of my eyes or of my limbs, which is
the work of the body, the conclusion is not absolutely certain, because, as is
often the case in dreams, I may think that I see or walk, although I do not
open my eyes or move from my place, and even, perhaps, although I have no
body: but, if I mean the sensation itself, or consciousness of seeing or
walking, the knowledge is manifestly certain, because it is then referred to
the mind, which alone perceives or is conscious that it sees or walks.
[Footnote: In the French, “which alone has the power of perceiving, or of
being conscious in any other way whatever.”]
X.
That the notions which are simplest and self-evident, are obscured by
logical definitions; and that such are not to be reckoned among the cognitions
acquired by study, [but as born with us].
I
do not here explain several other terms which I have used, or design to use in
the sequel, because their meaning seems to me sufficiently self-evident. And I
frequently remarked that philosophers erred in attempting to explain, by
logical definitions, such truths as are most simple and self-evident; for they
thus only rendered them more obscure. And when I said that the proposition, I
THINK, THEREFORE I AM, is of all others the first and most certain
which occurs to one philosophizing orderly, I did not therefore deny that it
was necessary to know what thought, existence, and certitude are, and the
truth that, in order to think it is necessary to be, and the like; but,
because these are the most simple notions, and such as of themselves afford
the knowledge of nothing existing, I did not judge it proper there to
enumerate them.
XI.
How we can know our mind more clearly than our body.
But
now that it may be discerned how the knowledge we have of the mind not only
precedes, and has greater certainty, but is even clearer, than that we have of
the body, it must be remarked, as a matter that is highly manifest by the
natural light, that to nothing no affections or qualities belong; and,
accordingly, that where we observe certain affections, there a thing or
substance to which these pertain, is necessarily found. The same light also
shows us that we know a thing or substance more clearly in proportion as we
discover in it a greater number of qualities. Now, it is manifest that we
remark a greater number of qualities in our mind than in any other thing; for
there is no occasion on which we know anything whatever when we are not at the
same time led with much greater certainty to the knowledge of our own mind.
For example, if I judge that there is an earth because I touch or see it, on
the same ground, and with still greater reason, I must be persuaded that my
mind exists; for it may be, perhaps, that I think I touch the earth while
there is one in existence; but it is not possible that I should so judge, and
my mind which thus judges not exist; and the same holds good of whatever
object is presented to our mind.
XII.
How it happens that every one does not come equally to know this.
Those
who have not philosophized in order have had other opinions on this subject,
because they never distinguished with sufficient care the mind from the body.
For, although they had no difficulty in believing that they themselves
existed, and that they had a higher assurance of this than of any other thing,
nevertheless, as they did not observe that by THEMSELVES, they ought here to
understand their MINDS alone [when the question related to metaphysical
certainty]; and since, on the contrary, they rather meant their bodies which
they saw with their eyes, touched with their hands, and to which they
erroneously attributed the faculty of perception, they were prevented from
distinctly apprehending the nature of the mind.
XIII.
In what sense the knowledge of other things depends upon the knowledge
of God.
But
when the mind, which thus knows itself but is still in doubt as to all other
things, looks around on all sides, with a view to the farther extension of its
knowledge, it first of all discovers within itself the ideas of many things;
and while it simply contemplates them, and neither affirms nor denies that
there is anything beyond itself corresponding to them, it is in no danger of
erring. The mind also discovers certain common notions out of which it frames
various demonstrations that carry conviction to such a degree as to render
doubt of their truth impossible, so long as we give attention to them. For
example, the mind has within itself ideas of numbers and figures, and it has
likewise among its common notions the principle THAT IF EQUALS BE ADDED TO
EQUALS THE WHOLES WILL BE EQUAL and the like; from which it is easy to
demonstrate that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,
etc. Now, so long as we attend to the premises from which this conclusion and
others similar to it were deduced, we feel assured of their truth; but, as the
mind cannot always think of these with attention, when it has the remembrance
of a conclusion without recollecting the order of its deduction, and is
uncertain whether the author of its being has created it of a nature that is
liable to be deceived, even in what appears most evident, it perceives that
there is just ground to distrust the truth of such conclusions, and that it
cannot possess any certain knowledge until it has discovered its author.
XIV.
That we may validly infer the existence of God from necessary existence
being comprised in the concept we have of him.
When
the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers
what is by far the chief among them—that of a Being omniscient,
all-powerful, and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea there
is contained not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of
all other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely
necessary and eternal. And just
as because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles
is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly
persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles;
so, from its perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be comprised in the
idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to conclude
that this all-perfect Being exists.
XV.
That necessary existence is not in the same way comprised in the
notions which we have of other things, but merely contingent existence.
The
mind will be still more certain of the truth of this conclusion, if it
consider that it has no idea of any other thing in which it can discover that
necessary existence is contained; for, from this circumstance alone, it will
discern that the idea of an all-perfect Being has not been framed by itself,
and that it does not represent a chimera, but a true and immutable nature,
which must exist since it can only be conceived as necessarily existing.
XVI.
That prejudices hinder many from clearly knowing the necessity of the
existence of God.
Our
mind would have no difficulty in assenting to this truth, if it were, first of
all, wholly free from prejudices; but as we have been accustomed to
distinguish, in all other things, essence from existence, and to imagine at
will many ideas of things which neither are nor have been, it easily happens,
when we do not steadily fix our thoughts on the contemplation of the
all-perfect Being, that a doubt arises as to whether the idea we have of him
is not one of those which we frame at pleasure, or at least of that class to
whose essence existence does not pertain.
XVII.
That the greater objective (representative) perfection there is in our
idea of a thing, the greater also must be the perfection of its cause.
When
we further reflect on the various ideas that are in us, it is easy to perceive
that there is not much difference among them, when we consider them simply as
certain modes of thinking, but that they are widely different, considered in
reference to the objects they represent; and that their causes must be so much
the more perfect according to the degree of objective perfection contained in
them. [Footnote: “as what they
represent of their object has more perfection.”—FRENCH.] For there is no
difference between this and the case of a person who has the idea of a
machine, in the construction of which great skill is displayed, in which
circumstances we have a right to inquire how he came by this idea, whether,
for example, he somewhere saw such a machine constructed by another, or
whether he was so accurately taught the mechanical sciences, or is endowed
with such force of genius, that he was able of himself to invent it, without
having elsewhere seen anything like it; for all the ingenuity which is
contained in the idea objectively only, or as it were in a picture, must exist
at least in its first and chief cause, whatever that may be, not only
objectively or representatively, but in truth formally or eminently.
XVIII.
That the existence of God may be again inferred from the above.
Thus,
because we discover in our minds the idea of God, or of an all-perfect Being,
we have a right to inquire into the source whence we derive it; and we will
discover that the perfections it represents are so immense as to render it
quite certain that we could only derive it from an all-perfect Being; that is,
from a God really existing. For it is not only manifest by the natural light
that nothing cannot be the cause of anything whatever, and that the more
perfect cannot arise from the less perfect, so as to be thereby produced as by
its efficient and total cause, but also that it is impossible we can have the
idea or representation of anything whatever, unless there be somewhere, either
in us or out of us, an original which comprises, in reality, all the
perfections that are thus represented to us; but, as we do not in any way find
in ourselves those absolute perfections of which we have the idea, we must
conclude that they exist in some nature different from ours, that is, in God,
or at least that they were once in him; and it most manifestly follows [from
their infinity] that they are still there.
XIX.
That, although we may not comprehend the nature of God, there is yet
nothing which we know so clearly as his perfections.
This
will appear sufficiently certain and manifest to those who have been
accustomed to contemplate the idea of God, and to turn their thoughts to his
infinite perfections; for, although we may not comprehend them, because it is
of the nature of the infinite not to be comprehended by what is finite, we
nevertheless conceive them more clearly and distinctly than material objects,
for this reason, that, being simple, and unobscured by limits,[Footnote: After
LIMITS, “what of them we do conceive is much less confused. There is,
besides, no speculation more calculated to aid in perfecting our
understanding, and which is more important than this, inasmuch as the
consideration of an object that has no limits to its perfections fills us with
satisfaction and assurance.”-FRENCH.] they occupy our mind more fully.
XX.
That we are not the cause of ourselves, but that this is God, and
consequently that there is a God.
But,
because every one has not observed this, and because, when we have an idea of
any machine in which great skill is displayed, we usually know with sufficient
accuracy the manner in which we obtained it, and as we cannot even recollect
when the idea we have of a God was communicated to us by him, seeing it was
always in our minds, it is still necessary that we should continue our review,
and make inquiry after our author, possessing, as we do, the idea of the
infinite perfections of a God: for it is in the highest degree evident by the
natural light, that that which knows something more perfect than itself, is
not the source of its own being, since it would thus have given to itself all
the perfections which it knows; and that, consequently, it could draw its
origin from no other being than from him who possesses in himself all those
perfections, that is, from God.
XXI.
That the duration alone of our life is sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of God.
The
truth of this demonstration will clearly appear, provided we consider the
nature of time, or the duration of things; for this is of such a kind that its
parts are not mutually dependent, and never co-existent; and, accordingly,
from the fact that we now are, it does not necessarily follow that we shall be
a moment afterwards, unless some cause, viz., that which first produced us,
shall, as it were, continually reproduce us, that is, conserve us. For we
easily understand that there is no power in us by which we can conserve
ourselves, and that the being who has so much power as to conserve us out of
himself, must also by so much the greater reason conserve himself, or rather
stand in need of being conserved by no one whatever, and, in fine, be God.
XXII.
That in knowing the existence of God, in the manner here explained, we
likewise know all his attributes, as far as they can be known by the natural
light alone.
There
is the great advantage in proving the existence of God in this way, viz., by
his idea, that we at the same time know what he is, as far as the weakness of
our nature allows; for, reflecting on the idea we have of him which is born
with us, we perceive that he is eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, the source of
all goodness and truth, creator of all things, and that, in fine, he has in
himself all that in which we can clearly discover any infinite perfection or
good that is not limited by any imperfection.
XXIII.
That God is not corporeal, and does not perceive by means of senses as
we do, or will the evil of sin.
For
there are indeed many things in the world that are to a certain extent
imperfect or limited, though possessing also some perfection; and it is
accordingly impossible that any such can be in God. Thus, looking to corporeal
nature,[Footnote: In the French, “since extension constitutes the nature of
body.”] since divisibility is included in local extension, and this
indicates imperfection, it is certain that God is not body. And although in
men it is to some degree a perfection to be capable of perceiving by means of
the senses, nevertheless since in every sense there is passivity [Footnote: In
the French, “because our perceptions arise from impressions made upon us
from another source,” i.e., than ourselves.] which indicates dependency, we
must conclude that God is in no manner possessed of senses, and that he only
understands and wills, not, however, like us, by acts in any way distinct, but
always by an act that is one, identical, and the simplest possible,
understands, wills, and operates all, that is, all things that in reality
exist; for he does not will the evil of sin, seeing this is but the negation
of being.
XXIV.
That in passing from the knowledge of God to the knowledge of the
creatures, it is necessary to remember that our understanding is finite, and
the power of God infinite.
But
as we know that God alone is the true cause of all that is or can be, we will
doubtless follow the best way of philosophizing, if, from the knowledge we
have of God himself, we pass to the explication of the things which he has
created, and essay to deduce it from the notions that are naturally in our
minds, for we will thus obtain the most perfect science, that is, the
knowledge of effects through their causes. But that we may be able to make
this attempt with sufficient security from error, we must use the precaution
to bear in mind as much as possible that God, who is the author of things, is
infinite, while we are wholly finite.
XXV.
That we must believe all that God has revealed, although it may surpass
the reach of our faculties.
Thus,
if perhaps God reveal to us or others, matters concerning himself which
surpass the natural powers of our mind, such as the mysteries of the
incarnation and of the trinity, we will not refuse to believe them, although
we may not clearly understand them; nor will we be in any way surprised to
find in the immensity of his nature, or even in what he has created, many
things that exceed our comprehension.
XXVI.
That it is not needful to enter into disputes [Footnote: “to essay to
comprehend the infinite.”—FRENCH.] regarding the infinite, but merely to
hold all that in which we can find no limits as indefinite, such as the
extension of the world, the divisibility of the parts of matter, the number of
the stars, etc.
We
will thus never embarrass ourselves by disputes about the infinite, seeing it
would be absurd for us who are finite to undertake to determine anything
regarding it, and thus as it were to limit it by endeavouring to comprehend
it. We will accordingly give ourselves no concern to reply to those who demand
whether the half of an infinite line is also infinite, and whether an infinite
number is even or odd, and the like, because it is only such as imagine their
minds to be infinite who seem bound to entertain questions of this sort. And,
for our part, looking to all those things in which in certain senses, we
discover no limits, we will not, therefore, affirm that they are infinite, but
will regard them simply as indefinite. Thus, because we cannot imagine
extension so great that we cannot still conceive greater, we will say that the
magnitude of possible things is indefinite, and because a body cannot be
divided into parts so small that each of these may not be conceived as again
divided into others still smaller, let us regard quantity as divisible into
parts whose number is indefinite; and as we cannot imagine so many stars that
it would seem impossible for God to create more, let us suppose that their
number is indefinite, and so in other instances.
XXVII.
What difference there is between the indefinite and the infinite.
And
we will call those things indefinite rather than infinite, with the view of
reserving to God alone the appellation of infinite; in the first place,
because not only do we discover in him alone no limits on any side, but also
because we positively conceive that he admits of none; and in the second
place, because we do not in the same way positively conceive that other things
are in every part unlimited, but merely negatively admit that their limits, if
they have any, cannot be discovered by us.
XXVIII.
That we must examine, not the final, but the efficient, causes of
created things.
Likewise,
finally, we will not seek reasons of natural things from the end which God or
nature proposed to himself in their creation (i. e., final causes), [Footnote:
“We will not stop to consider the ends which God proposed to himself in the
creation of the world, and we will entirely reject from our philosophy the
search of final causes!”—French.] for we ought not to presume so far as to
think that we are sharers in the counsels of Deity, but, considering him as
the efficient cause of all things, let us endeavour to discover by the natural
light [Footnote: “Faculty of reasoning.”—FRENCH.] which he has planted
in us, applied to those of his attributes of which he has been willing we
should have some knowledge, what must be concluded regarding those effects we
perceive by our senses; bearing in mind, however, what has been already said,
that we must only confide in this natural light so long as nothing contrary to
its dictates is revealed by God himself. [Footnote: The last clause, beginning
“bearing in mind.” is omitted in the French.]
XXIX.
That God is not the cause of our errors.
The
first attribute of God which here falls to be considered, is that he is
absolutely veracious and the source of all light, so that it is plainly
repugnant for him to deceive us, or to be properly and positively the cause of
the errors to which we are consciously subject; for although the address to
deceive seems to be some mark of subtlety of mind among men, yet without doubt
the will to deceive only proceeds from malice or from fear and weakness, and
consequently cannot be attributed to God.
XXX.
That consequently all which we clearly perceive is true, and that we
are thus delivered from the doubts above proposed.
Whence
it follows, that the light of nature, or faculty of knowledge given us by God,
can never compass any object which is not true, in as far as it attains to a
knowledge of it, that is, in as far as the object is clearly and distinctly
apprehended. For God would have merited the appellation of a deceiver if he
had given us this faculty perverted, and such as might lead us to take falsity
for truth [when we used it aright]. Thus the highest doubt is removed, which
arose from our ignorance on the point as to whether perhaps our nature was
such that we might be deceived even in those things that appear to us the most
evident. The same principle ought also to be of avail against all the other
grounds of doubting that have been already enumerated. For mathematical truths
ought now to be above suspicion, since these are of the clearest. And if we
perceive anything by our senses, whether while awake or asleep, we will easily
discover the truth provided we separate what there is of clear and distinct in
the knowledge from what is obscure and confused. There is no need that I
should here say more on this subject, since it has already received ample
treatment in the metaphysical Meditations; and what follows will serve to
explain it still more accurately.
XXXI.
That our errors are, in respect of God, merely negations, but, in
respect of ourselves, privations.
But
as it happens that we frequently fall into error, although God is no deceiver,
if we desire to inquire into the origin and cause of our errors, with a view
to guard against them, it is necessary to observe that they depend less on our
understanding than on our will, and that they have no need of the actual
concourse of God, in order to their production; so that, when considered in
reference to God, they are merely negations, but in reference to ourselves,
privations.
XXXII.
That there are only two modes of thinking in us, viz., the perception
of the understanding and the action of the will.
For
all the modes of thinking of which we are conscious may be
referred
to two general classes, the one of which is the perception
or
operation of the understanding, and the other the volition or
operation
of the will. Thus, to perceive by the senses (SENTIRE), to
imagine,