Go to Beginning of this Book |
Back to Philosopher's Page |
Table of Contents |
Fig Home |
******This
file should be named dcart10.txt or dcart10.zip******
Corrected
EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, dcart11.txt.
VERSIONS
based on separate sources get new LETTER, dcart10a.txt.
This
work is one of the most influential in history. The famous phrase, “COGITO ERGO SUM” (I think, therefore
I am) is a central theme. Descartes’
beliefs on that dual nature of mind and body, and his emphasis on the role of
doubt in all inquiry, formed the basis for centuries of science and social
thought.
This
etext was created by Ilana and Greg Newby.
They used a Mac IIci and Apple One Flatbed Scanner donated by Apple.
Caere text scanning and character recognition software (OmniPage) was
used.
Greg
is a professor in the U. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in
the
Grad. School of Library and Information Science. Ilana is a
reference
librarian at the Urbana Free Library. Thanks
to Apple
and
Caere for their donations and to the Computer Service Office of the University
of Illinois for their unofficial support.
Information
about Project Gutenberg (one page)
We
produce about one million dollars for each hour we work.
One hundred hours is a conservative estimate for how long it we take to
get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright searched and
analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc.
This projected audience is one hundred million readers.
If our value per text is nominally estimated at one dollar, then we
produce a million dollars per hour. In
1994 we will create and distribute eight new etexts every month.
The
Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext Files by the
December 31, 2001. [10,000 x
100,000,000=Trillion] This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million
readers.
All
donations should be made to “Project Gutenberg/IBC”, and are tax
deductible to the extent allowable by law (“IBC” is Illinois Benedictine
College). (Subscriptions to our
paper newsletter go to IBC, too)
For
these and other matters, please mail to:
David
Turner, Project Gutenberg
Illinois
Benedictine College
5700
College Road
Lisle,
IL 60532-0900
Email
requests to:
Internet:
chipmonk@eagle.ibc.edu
(David Turner)
Compuserve:
>INTERNET: chipmonk@eagle.ibc.edu
(David Turner)
Attmail:
internet!chipmonk@eagle.ibc.edu
(David Turner)
MCImail:
(David Turner)
ADDRESS
TYPE: MCI / EMS: INTERNET / MBX:chipmonk@eagle.ibc.edu
When
all other email fails try our Michael S. Hart, Executive Director:
hart@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu
(internet) hart@uiucvmd
(bitnet)
We
would prefer to send you this information by email (Internet, Bitnet,
Compuserve, ATTMAIL or MCImail).
If
you have an FTP program (or emulator), please:
FTP
directly to the Project Gutenberg archives:
ftp
mrcnext.cso.uiuc.edu
login:
anonymous
password:
your@login
cd
etext
Then:
cd etext91
or:
cd etext92
or:
cd etext93 [for new books] [now
also cd etext/etext93] or: cd etext/articles [get suggest.gut for more
information] dir [to see files] get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip
files]
GET
INDEX and AAINDEX
for
a list of books
and
GET
NEW.GUT for general information
and
MGET
GUT* for newsletters.
**Information
prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** (Three Pages)
****START**THE
SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START****
Why
is this “Small Print!” statement here?
You know: lawyers. They
tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with your copy of this
etext, even if you got it for free from someone other than us, and even if
what’s wrong is not our fault. So,
among other things, this “Small Print!” statement disclaims most of our
liability to you. It also tells you how you can distribute copies of this etext
if you want to.
BEFORE!
YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT
By
using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, you indicate
that you understand, agree to and accept this “Small Print!” statement.
If you do not, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid
for this etext by sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the
person you got it from. If you
received this etext on a physical medium (such as a disk), you must return it
with your request.
This
PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etexts, is a “public
domain” work distributed by Professor Michael S. Hart through the Project
Gutenberg Association (the “Project”).
Among other things, this means that no one owns a United States
copyright on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying
copyright royalties. Special
rules, set forth below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext
under the Project’s “PROJECT GUTENBERG” trademark.
To
create these etexts, the Project expends considerable efforts to identify,
transcribe and proofread public domain works.
Despite these efforts, the Project’s etexts and any medium they may
be on may contain “Defects”. Among
other things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual property
infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other etext medium, a computer
virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.
But
for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described below, [1] the Project
(and any other party you may receive this etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm
etext) disclaims all liability to you for damages, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR UNDER
STRICT LIABILI-TY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF
YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
If
you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending an
explanatory note within that time to the person you received it from. If you received it on a physical medium, you must return it
with your note, and such person may choose to alternatively give you a
replacement copy. If you received
it electronically, such person may choose to alternatively give you a second
opportunity to receive it elec-tronically.
THIS
ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU “AS-IS”.
NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS
TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Some
states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or the exclusion or
limitation of consequential damages, so the above disclaimers and exclusions
may not apply to you, and you may have other legal rights.
You
will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, officers, members and
agents harmless from all liability, cost and expense, including legal fees,
that arise from any distribution of this etext for which you are responsible,
and from [1] any alteration, modification or addition to the etext for which
you are responsible, or [2] any Defect.
You
may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by disk, book or any
other medium if you either delete this “Small Print!” and all other
references to Project Gutenberg, or:
[1]
Only give exact copies of it. Among
other things, this re-
quires
that you do not remove, alter or modify the etext or this “small print!”
statement. You may however, if
you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable binary, compressed,
mark-up, or proprietary form, including any form resulting from conversion by
word processing or hyper-text software, but only so long as EITHER:
[*]
The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable.
We
consider
an etext not clearly readable if it contains characters other than
those intended by the author of the work, although tilde (~), asterisk (*) and
underline (_) characters may be used to convey punctuation intended by the
author, and additional characters may be used to indicate hypertext links.
[*]
The etext may be readily converted by the reader at no
expense
into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent form by the program that displays the
etext (as is the case, for instance, with most word processors).
[*]
You provide, or agree to also provide on request at no
additional
cost, fee or expense, a copy of the etext in its original plain ASCII form (or
in EBCDIC or other equivalent proprietary form).
[2]
Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this
“Small
Print!” statement.
[3]
Pay a trademark license fee of 20% (twenty percent) of the
net
profits you derive from distributing this etext under the trademark,
determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices.
The license fee:
[*]
Is required only if you derive such profits.
In
distributing
under our trademark, you incur no
obligation
to charge money or earn profits for your
distribution.
[*]
Shall be paid to “Project Gutenberg Association /
Illinois
Benedictine College” (or to such other person as the Project Gutenberg
Association may direct) within the 60 days following each date you prepare (or
were legally required to prepare) your year-end tax return with respect to
your income for that year.
The
Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, scanning machines,
OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty free copyright licenses, and every
other sort of contribution you can think of.
Money should be paid to “Project Gutenberg Association / Illinois
Benedictine College”.
WRITE
TO US! We can be reached at:
Internet:
hart@vmd.cso.uiuc.edu
Bitnet:
hart@uiucvmd
CompuServe:
>internet:hart@.vmd.cso.uiuc.edu
Attmail:
internet!vmd.cso.uiuc.edu!Hart
or
ATT:
Michael Hart
P.O.
Box 2782
Champaign,
IL 61825
Drafted
by CHARLES B. KRAMER, Attorney
CompuServe:
72600,2026
Internet:
72600.2026@compuserve.com
Tel:
(212) 254-5093
*END*THE
SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.08.29.92*END*
The
Project Gutenberg Etext of A Discourse on Method
by
Rene Descartes
If
this Discourse appear too long to be read at once, it may be divided into six
Parts: and, in the first, will be
found various considerations touching the Sciences; in the second, the
principal rules of the Method which the Author has discovered, in the third,
certain of the rules of Morals which he has deduced from this Method; in the
fourth, the reasonings by which he establishes the existence of God and of the
Human Soul, which are the foundations of his Metaphysic; in the fifth, the
order of the Physical questions which he has investigated, and, in particular,
the explication of the motion of the heart and of some other difficulties
pertaining to Medicine, as also the difference between the soul of man and
that of the brutes; and, in the last, what the Author believes to be required
in order to greater advancement in the investigation of Nature than has yet
been made, with the reasons that have induced him to write.
Good
sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one
thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the
most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger
measure of this quality than they already possess.
And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is
rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of
distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called
good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the
diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being
endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that
we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on
the same objects. For to be
possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to
apply it. The greatest minds, as
they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest
aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater
progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who,
while they run, forsake it.
For
myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more perfect than
those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often wished that I were
equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in clearness and
distinctness of imagination, or in fullness and readiness of memory. And besides these, I know of no other qualities that
contribute to the perfection of the mind; for as to the reason or sense,
inasmuch as it is that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us
from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in
each individual; and on this point to adopt the common opinion of
philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less holds only among
the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same
species.
I
will not hesitate, however, to avow my belief that it has been my singular
good fortune to have very early
in life fallen in with certain tracks which have conducted me to
considerations and maxims, of which I have formed a method that gives me the
means, as I think, of gradually augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by
little and little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and
the brief duration of my life will permit me to reach.
For I have already reaped from it such fruits that, although I have
been accustomed to think lowly enough of myself, and although when I look with
the eye of a philosopher at the varied courses and pursuits of mankind at
large, I find scarcely one which does not appear in vain and useless, I
nevertheless derive the highest satisfaction from the progress I conceive
myself to have already made in the search after truth, and cannot help
entertaining such expectations of the future as to believe that if, among the
occupations of men as men, there is any one really excellent and important, it
is that which I have chosen.
After
all, it is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a little copper and
glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds.
I know how very liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves,
and also how much the judgments of our friends are to be suspected when given
in our favor. But I shall
endeavor in this discourse to describe the paths I have followed, and to
delineate my life as in a picture, in order that each one may also be able to
judge of them for himself, and that in the general opinion entertained of
them, as gathered from current report, I myself may have a new help towards
instruction to be added to those I have been in the habit of employing.
My
present design, then, is not to teach the method which each ought to follow
for the right conduct of his reason, but solely to describe the way in which I
have endeavored to conduct my own. They
who set themselves to give precepts must of course regard themselves as
possessed of greater skill than those to whom they prescribe; and if they err
in the slightest particular, they subject themselves to censure.
But as this tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as
a tale, in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found,
perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will
prove useful to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will
find some favor with all.
From
my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and as I was given to believe
that by their help a clear and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life
might be acquired, I was ardently desirous of instruction.
But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close
of which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I
completely changed my opinion. For
I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I
had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at
every turn of my own ignorance. And
yet I was studying in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe, in which I
thought there must be learned men, if
such were anywhere to be found. I
had been taught all that others learned there; and not contented with the
sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read all the books that had
fallen into my hands, treating of such branches as are esteemed the most
curious and rare. I knew the
judgment which others had formed of me; and I did not find that I was
considered inferior to my fellows, although there were among them some who
were already marked out to fill the places of our instructors.
And, in fine, our age appeared to me as flourishing, and as fertile in
powerful minds as any preceding one. I
was thus led to take the liberty of judging of all other men by myself, and of
concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature as
I had previously been given to believe.
I
still continued, however, to hold in esteem the studies of the schools.
I was aware that the languages taught in them are necessary to the
understanding of the writings of the ancients; that the grace of fable stirs
the mind; that the memorable deeds of history elevate it; and, if read with
discretion, aid in forming the judgment; that the perusal of all excellent
books is, as it were, to
interview with the noblest men of past ages, who have written them, and even a
studied interview, in which are discovered to us only their choicest thoughts;
that eloquence has incomparable force and beauty; that poesy has its ravishing
graces and delights; that in the mathematics there are many refined
discoveries eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive, as well as further
all the arts an lessen the labour of man; that numerous highly useful precepts
and exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on morals; that theology
points out the path to heaven; that philosophy affords the means of
discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters, and commands the
admiration of the more simple; that jurisprudence, medicine, and the other
sciences, secure for their cultivators honors and riches; and, in fine, that
it is useful to bestow some attention upon all, even upon those abounding the
most in superstition and error, that we may be in a position to determine
their real value, and guard against being deceived.
But
I believed that I had already given sufficient time to languages, and likewise
to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to their histories and fables.
For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel, are almost
the same thing. It is useful to
know something of the manners of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct judgment regarding our own, and be
prevented from thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous
and irrational, a conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has
been limited to their own country. On
the other hand, when too much time is occupied in traveling, we become
strangers to our native country; and the over curious in the customs of the
past are generally ignorant of those of the present.
Besides, fictitious narratives lead us to imagine the possibility of
many events that are impossible; and even the most faithful histories, if they
do not wholly misrepresent matters, or exaggerate their importance to render
the account of them more worthy of perusal, omit, at least, almost always the
meanest and least striking of the attendant circumstances; hence it happens
that the remainder does not represent the truth, and that such as regulate
their conduct by examples drawn from this source, are apt to fall into the
extravagances of the knight-errants of romance, and to entertain projects that
exceed their powers.
I
esteemed eloquence highly, and was in raptures with poesy; but I thought that
both were gifts of nature rather than fruits of study.
Those in whom the faculty of reason is predominant, and who most
skillfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them clear and
intelligible, are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of what
they lay down, though they should speak only in the language of Lower
Brittany, and be wholly ignorant of the rules of rhetoric; and those whose
minds are stored with the most agreeable fancies, and who can give expression
to them with the greatest embellishment and harmony, are still the best poets,
though unacquainted with the art of poetry.
I
was especially delighted with the mathematics, on account of the certitude and
evidence of their reasonings; but
I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that they
but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished
that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier
superstructure reared on them. On
the other hand, I compared the disquisitions of the ancient moralists to very
towering and magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud:
they laud the virtues very highly, and exhibit them as estimable far
above anything on earth; but they give us no adequate criterion of virtue, and
frequently that which they designate with so fine a name is but apathy, or
pride, or despair, or parricide.
I
revered our theology, and aspired as much as any one to reach heaven:
but
being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to the most
ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which lead to
heaven are above our comprehension, I did not presume to subject them to the
impotency of my reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake
their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of
being more than man.
Of
philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been
cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished men, and that yet there is
not a single matter within its sphere which is not still in dispute, and
nothing, therefore, which is above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that
my success would be greater in it than that of others; and further, when I
considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that
may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I reckoned as
well-nigh false all that was only probable.
As
to the other sciences, inasmuch as these borrow their principles from
philosophy, I judged that no solid superstructures could be reared on
foundations so infirm; and neither the honor nor the gain held out by them was
sufficient to determine me to their cultivation:
for I was not, thank Heaven, in a condition which compelled me to make
merchandise of science for the bettering of my fortune; and though I might not
profess to scorn glory as a cynic, I yet made very slight account of that
honor which I hoped to acquire only through fictitious titles.
And, in fine, of false sciences I thought I knew the worth sufficiently
to escape being deceived by the professions of an alchemist, the predictions
of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, or by the artifices and
boasting of any of those who profess to know things of which they are
ignorant.
For
these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the control
of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no
longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or of the great
book of the world. I spent the
remainder of my youth in traveling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding
intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting varied
experience, in proving myself in the different situations into which fortune
threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my
experience as to secure my improvement. For
it occurred to me that I should find much more truth in the reasonings of each
individual with reference to the affairs in which he is personally interested,
and the issue of which must presently punish him if he has judged amiss, than
in those conducted by a man of letters in his study, regarding speculative
matters that are of no practical moment, and followed by no consequences to
himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster his vanity the better the
more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as they must in this case,
the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable.
In addition, I had always a most earnest desire to know how to
distinguish the true from the false, in order that I might be able clearly to
discriminate the right path in life, and proceed in it with confidence.
It
is true that, while busied only in considering the manners of other men, I
found here, too, scarce any ground for settled conviction, and remarked hardly
less contradiction among them than in the opinions of the philosophers.
So that the greatest advantage I derived from the study consisted in
this, that, observing many things which, however extravagant and ridiculous to
our apprehension, are yet by common consent received and approved by other
great nations, I learned to entertain too decided a belief in regard to
nothing of the truth of which I had been persuaded merely by example and
custom; and thus I gradually extricated myself from many errors powerful
enough to darken our natural intelligence, and incapacitate us in great
measure from listening to reason. But
after I had been occupied several years in thus studying the book of the
world, and in essaying to gather some experience, I at length resolved to make
myself an object of study, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing
the paths I ought to follow, an undertaking which was accompanied with greater
success than it would have been had I never quitted my country or my books.
I
was then in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country, which have
not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the army from
the coronation of the emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a
locality where, as I found no society to interest me, and was besides
fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in
seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts.
Of these one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is
seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which
different hands had been employed, as in those completed by a single master.
Thus it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has
planned and executed, are generally more elegant and commodious than those
which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for
purposes for which they were not originally built.
Thus also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only
villages, have become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill
laid out compared with the regularity constructed towns which a professional
architect has freely planned on an open plain; so that although the several
buildings of the former may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the
latter, yet when one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a
large one and here a small, and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of
the streets, one is disposed to allege that chance rather than any human will
guided by reason must have led to such an arrangement.
And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all times
certain officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings contributed
to public ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with but the
materials of others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged.
In the same way I fancied that those nations which, starting from a
semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilization by slow degrees, have had
their laws successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply
by experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by
this process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those
which, from the commencement of their association as communities, have
followed the appointments of some wise legislator.
It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the true religion,
the ordinances of which are derived from God, must be incomparably superior to
that of every other. And, to
speak of human affairs, I believe that the pre-eminence of Sparta was due not
to the goodness of each of its laws in particular, for many of these were very
strange, and even opposed to good morals, but to the circumstance that,
originated by a single individual, they all tended to a single end.
In the same way I thought that the sciences contained in books (such of
them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstrations),
composed as they are of the opinions of many different individuals massed
together, are farther removed from truth than the simple inferences which a
man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting
the matters of his experience. And
because we have all to pass through a state of infancy to manhood, and have
been of necessity, for a length of time, governed by our desires and
preceptors (whose dictates were frequently conflicting, while neither perhaps
always counseled us for the best), I farther concluded that it is almost
impossible that our judgments can be so correct or solid as they would have
been, had our reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and had we
always been guided by it alone.
It
is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses of a
town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby
rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private
individual takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and that
people are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in danger
of falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure.
With this before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would
indeed be preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state
by fundamentally changing it throughout, and overturning it in order to set it
up amended; and the same I thought was true of any similar project for
reforming the body of the sciences, or the order of teaching them established
in the schools: but as for the
opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do
better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards
be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same
when they had undergone the scrutiny of reason.
I firmly believed that in this way I should much better succeed in the
conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leaned upon
principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust.
For although I recognized various difficulties in this undertaking,
these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as
attend the slightest reformation in public affairs.
Large bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up
again, or even kept erect when once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is
always disastrous. Then if there
are any imperfections in the constitutions of states (and that many such exist
the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure us), custom has
without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniences, and has even managed
to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a number which sagacity
could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in fine, the defects
are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their removal;
in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being much
frequented, become gradually so smooth and commodious, that it is much better
to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops of
rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.
Hence
it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and busy meddlers
who, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the management of
public affairs, are yet always projecting reforms; and if I thought that this
tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I was a victim of
such folly, I would by no means permit its publication. I have never contemplated anything higher than the
reformation of my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly my own.
And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to present
here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore recommend to every one
else to make a similar attempt. Those
whom God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps,
designs still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the
present undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate.
The single design to strip one’s self of all past beliefs is one that
ought not to be taken by every one. The
majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this be
at all a befitting resolution: in
the first place, of those who with more than a due confidence in their own
powers, are precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for
orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if men of this class
once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the
beaten highway, they will never be able to thread the byway that would lead
them by a shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for
life; in the second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or
modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power of
discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed,
ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for
more correct to their own reason.
For
my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I
received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the diversities
of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest
learning. But I had become aware,
even so early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and
incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some on of the
philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I remarked that all
those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours are not in that account
barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that many of these nations make an
equally good, if not better, use of their reason than we do. I took into account also the very different character which a
person brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits, from that which,
with the same mind originally, this individual would have possessed had he
lived always among the Chinese or with savages, and the circumstance that in
dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again,
perhaps, be received into favor before ten years have gone, appears to us at
this moment extravagant and ridiculous. I
was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and
example than any certain knowledge. And,
finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a
plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of
difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be
found by one than by many. I
could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of
preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my own
reason in the conduct of my life.
But
like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and
with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I would at least
guard against falling. I did not
even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my
belief without having been introduced by reason, but first of all took
sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task
I was setting myself, and ascertain the true method by which to arrive at the
knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.
Among
the branches of philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some attention
to logic, and among those of the mathematics to geometrical analysis and
algebra, -- three arts or sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute
something to my design. But, on
examination, I found that, as for logic, its syllogisms and the majority of
its other precepts are of avail- rather in the communication of what we
already know, or even as the art of Lully, in speaking without judgment of
things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown; and
although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent
precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious
or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult
to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana
or a Minerva from a rough block of marble.
Then as to the analysis of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns,
besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of
no use, the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of
figures, that it can exercise the understanding only on condition of greatly
fatiguing the imagination; and, in the latter, there is so complete a
subjection to certain rules and formulas, that there results an art full of
confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted
to cultivate the mind. By these
considerations I was induced to seek some other method which would comprise
the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects.
And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state
is best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like
manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is composed, I
believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me,
provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance
to fail in observing them.
The
first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be
such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to
comprise nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so
clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.
The
second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many
parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.
The
third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects
the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as
it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in
thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not
stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.
And
the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so
general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.
The
long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are
accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations,
had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is
competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing
so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot
discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true,
and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of
one truth from another. And I had
little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to
commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest and
easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have hitherto sought
truth in the sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able to find any
demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not doubt but
that such must have been the rule of their investigations.
I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest
objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to
be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a
distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound.
But I had no intention on that account of attempting to master all the
particular sciences commonly denominated mathematics: but observing that, however different their objects, they all
agree in considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting
among those objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these
proportions in the most general form possible, without referring them to any
objects in particular, except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of
them, and without by any means restricting them to these, that afterwards I
might thus be the better able to apply them to every other class of objects to
which they are legitimately applicable. Perceiving
further, that in order to understand these relations I should sometimes have
to consider them one by one and sometimes only to bear them in mind, or
embrace them in the aggregate, I thought that, in order the better to consider
them individually, I should view them as subsisting between straight lines,
than which I could find no objects more simple, or capable of being more
distinctly represented to my imagination and senses; and on the other hand,
that in order to retain them in the memory or embrace an aggregate of many, I
should express them by certain characters the briefest possible.
In this way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in
geometrical analysis and in algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by
help of the other.
And,
in point of fact, the accurate observance of these few precepts gave me, I
take the liberty of saying, such ease in unraveling all the questions embraced
in these two sciences, that in the two or three months I devoted to their
examination, not only did I reach solutions of questions I had formerly deemed
exceedingly difficult but even as regards questions of the solution of which I
continued ignorant, I was enabled, as it appeared to me, to determine the
means whereby, and the extent to which a solution was possible; results
attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most
general truths, and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in
the discovery of subsequent ones Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain,
if it be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one whoever
apprehends the truth, knows all that on that
point can be known. The
child, for example, who has been instructed in the elements of arithmetic, and
has made a particular addition, according to rule, may be assured that he has
found, with respect to the sum of the numbers before him, and that in this
instance is within the reach of human genius.
Now, in conclusion, the method which teaches adherence to the true
order, and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing .sought
includes all that gives certitude to the rules of arithmetic.
But
the chief ground of my satisfaction with thus method, was the
assurance
I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters, if not
with
absolute perfection, at least with the greatest attainable by me:
besides,
I was conscious that by its use my mind was becoming gradually
habituated
to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects; and I
hoped
also, from not having restricted this method to any particular
matter,
to apply it to the difficulties of the other sciences, with not
less
success than to those of algebra. I
should not, however, on this
account
have ventured at once on the examination of all the difficulties
of
the sciences which presented themselves to me, for this would have been
contrary
to the order prescribed in the method, but observing that the
knowledge
of such is dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy, in
which
I found nothing certain, I thought it necessary first of all to
endeavor
to establish its principles. .And
because I observed, besides,
that
an inquiry of this kind was of all others of the greatest moment, and
one
in which precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were most to be
dreaded,
I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a
more
mature age (being at that time but twenty-three), and had first of
all
employed much of my time in preparation