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by
Immanuel Kant
translated
by J. M. D. Meiklejohn
Human
reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions,
which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it
cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.
It
falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with
principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the
truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience.
With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to
ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this
way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never
cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have
recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they
are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion
and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors,
which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs,
transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The
arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.
Time
was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for
the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her
object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to
heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken,
like Hecuba:
Modo maxima rerum,
Tot
generis, natisque potens...
Nunc
trahor exul, inops.
·
Ovid,
Metamorphoses. xiii
At
first, her government, under the administration of the dogmatists, was an
absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the
ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars
introduced the reign of anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who
hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to
time those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their
number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely put a stop
to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on
no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing
those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind
of physiology of the human understanding—that of the celebrated Locke. But
it was found that—although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could
not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a
circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims—as this
genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to
sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and
rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again became obnoxious to the contempt
from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods,
according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns
nought but weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother of chaos and
night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least
the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has
fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.
For
it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the
object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they
may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by
changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical
declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much
contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world
of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish
to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention
and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured
judgement* of the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with
illusory knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the
most laborious of all tasks—that of self-examination, and to establish a
tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces
against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner,
but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is
nothing less than the critical investigation of pure reason.
[*Footnote:
We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age, and of
the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a
secure foundation, such as mathematics, physical science, etc., in the least
deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and
in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with
the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.
In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,
severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought.
Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected.
The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many
regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But,
if they on they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and
cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which
has stood the test of a free and public examination.]
I
do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry
into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it
strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution
of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and
the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this
science. All this must be done on
the basis of principles.
This
path—the only one now remaining—has been entered upon by me; and I flatter
myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of—and consequently
the mode of removing—all the errors which have hitherto set reason at
variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not
returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by alleging the
inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the
contrary, examined them completely in the light of principles, and, after
having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason
fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these
questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires,
had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts,
and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass
of our mental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the
illusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and
valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this
work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a single
metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to
its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and therefore, if the if
the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient for the solution of
even a single one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives
birth, we must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its
sufficiency in the case of the others.
While
I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of
dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound
so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate
than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical
programme, in which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature
of the soul, or the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to
extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I
humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such
attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure
thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition,
because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides,
common logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the
simple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer the question how far
reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by
experience.
So
much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the
present task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are
imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.
The
above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As regards the
form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one who undertakes so
difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfil.
These conditions are certitude and clearness.
As
regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of
thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears
the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such
discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be
established upon a priori grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely
necessary; much more is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a
priori cognition, and to furnish the standard—and consequently an example—
of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what
I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine; it is the author’s
business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, without determining what
influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he
may have said may become the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend
to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise produce—he may be
allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty,
although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind
of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a
whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.
I
know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of
the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same time for the
determination of the rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the
second chapter of the “Transcendental Analytic,” under the title of “Deduction
of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding”; and they have also cost me by
far the greatest labour—labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated.
The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two
sides, The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is
intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective validity of
its a priori conceptions; and it forms for this reason an essential part of
the Critique. The other considers the pure understanding itself, its
possibility and its powers of cognition—that is, from a subjective point of
view; and, although this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong
essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the grand question is
what and how much can reason and understanding, apart from experience,
cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible? As the latter
is an, inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some
semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion,
this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I
had allowed myself to enounce a mere opinion, and that the reader must
therefore be at liberty to hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him
that, if my subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction
of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone
the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory.
As
regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first place,
discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conceptions, and,
secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means of intuitions, that is,
by examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I
could for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose;
and it thus became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice
to the second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the
progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations
always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch of the Critique,
naturally fell into their proper places. But I very soon became aware of the
magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems with which I should be
engaged; and, as I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if
delivered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it
unadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are
necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take this course
from the consideration also that the present work is not intended for popular
use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they
are always acceptable, and that they would have materially interfered with my
present purpose. Abbe Terrasson remarks with great justice that, if we
estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the
time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a
book that it would be much shorter, if it were not so short. On the other
hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition,
connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice: many a book
would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear.
For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in
the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the
mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear
conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the
system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his
observing its articulation or organization—which is the most important
consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.
The
reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with the present
author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a complete and solid
edifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him.
Metaphysics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of
completion—and with little labour, if it is united, in a short time; so that
nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and
applying it didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory
of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged.
Nothing can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself
cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so
soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The
perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure
conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar
intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this completeness not
only practicable, but also necessary.
Tecum
habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.
·
Persius. Satirae
iv. 52.
Such
a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the
title of Metaphysic of Nature*. The content of this work (which will not be
half so long) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique,
which has to discover the sources of this cognition and expose the conditions
of its possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation
for the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient
hearing and the impartiality of a judge; in the other, for the good-will and
assistance of a co-labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for
this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires
that no deduced conceptions should be absent.
These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually discovered;
and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the
Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the
case with their analysis. But this will be rather an amusement than a labour.
[*Footnote:
In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was never
published.]
PREFACE
TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787
Whether
the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province
of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which characterizes
the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those
who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding
as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most
elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is
reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we
may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the
certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping
about in the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an important service
to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must
travel, in order to arrive at any results—even if it should be found
necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been
proposed for its attainment.
That
logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest times, is
apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a
step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of
the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological
discussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination and wit,
metaphysical, discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds
of certitude, according to the difference of the objects (idealism, scepticism,
and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and
remedies: this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their
ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but
disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and allow
them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit
of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which has for its object
nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all thought,
whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and
whatever the difficulties—natural or accidental— which it encounters in
the human mind.
The
early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of its
field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be made of all the objects of
cognition with their characteristic distinctions, and in which the
understanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It is,
obviously, a much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path
of science, where it has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects
external to itself. Hence, logic is properly only a propaedeutic—forms, as
it were, the vestibule of the sciences; and while it is necessary to enable us
to form a correct judgement with regard to the various branches of knowledge,
still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought only in
the sciences properly so called, that is, in the objective sciences.
Now
these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain elements
of a priori cognition, and this cognition may stand in a twofold relation to
its object. Either it may have to determine the conception of the object—which
must be supplied extraneously, or it may have to establish its reality. The
former is theoretical, the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the
pure or a priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully
distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any other method
can only lead to irremediable confusion.
Mathematics
and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their
objects a priori. The former is purely a priori, the latter is partially so,
but is also dependent on other sources of cognition.
In
the earliest times of which history affords us any record, mathematics had
already entered on the sure course of science, among that wonderful nation,
the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this
science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as
it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the
contrary, I believe that it must have remained long—chiefly among the
Egyptians—in the stage of blind groping after its true aims and destination,
and that it was revolutionized by the happy idea of one man, who struck out
and determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and which
admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual
revolution—much more important in its results than the discovery of the
passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope—and of its author, has not
been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed discoverer of
some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration—elements which,
according to the ordinary opinion, do not even require to be proved—makes it
apparent that the change introduced by the first indication of this new path,
must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age,
and it has thus been secured against the chance of oblivion. A new light must
have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been
his name) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he
found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before
his eyes, or the conception of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus
endeavour to get at the knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary
to produce these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction;
and that, in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition, he must not
attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily
followed from that which he had himself, in accordance with his conception,
placed in the object.
A
much longer period elapsed before physics entered on the highway of science.
For it is only about a century and a half since the wise Bacon gave a new
direction to physical studies, or rather—as others were already on the right
track—imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction. Here, too,
as in the case of mathematics, we find evidence of a rapid intellectual
revolution. In the remarks which follow I shall confine myself to the
empirical side of natural science.
When
Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane,
when Torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated
beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water, or when Stahl,
at a later period, converted metals into lime, and reconverted lime into
metal, by the addition and subtraction of certain elements; [Footnote: I do
not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental method, of
which, indeed, the first steps are involved in some obscurity.] a light broke
upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that
which it produces after its own design; that it must not be content to follow,
as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with
principles of judgement according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to
reply its questions. For accidental observations, made according to no
preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that
reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of reason which can
give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when
experiment is directed by these rational principles that it can have any real
utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving
information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to
all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels
the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to
propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after
groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length
conducted into the path of certain progress.
We
come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a
completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of
experience. It deals with mere conceptions—not, like mathematics, with
conceptions applied to intuition—and in it, reason is the pupil of itself
alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all
the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. But it
has not yet had the good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method. This
will be apparent; if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We
find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain a
priori the perception even of those laws which the most common experience
confirms. We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances,
and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to
the desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical
pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the
contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the
display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests— a field in
which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which,
at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.
This
leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science
has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is impossible to
discover it? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless
aspirations after it, as if it were one of our weightiest concerns? Nay, more,
how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason, if it
abandons us in a matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the truth—and
not only so, but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to
betray us in the end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what
indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to
enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our
predecessors?
It
appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural
philosophy,
which, as we have seen, were brought into their present
condition
by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix
our
attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has
proved
so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the
experiment
of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational
sciences,
they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been
assumed
that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all
attempts
to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by
means
of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge,
have
been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the
experiment
whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if
we
assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears,
at
all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining
the
end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the
cognition
of objects a priori, of determining something with respect
to
these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do
just
what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial
movements.
When he found that he could make no progress by assuming
that
all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed
the
process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator
revolved,
while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same
experiment
with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition
must
conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can
know
anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object
conforms
to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then
easily
conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now
as
I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but—if they are to become
cognitions—must
refer them, as representations, to something, as
object,
and must determine the latter by means of the former, here
again
there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume
that
the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform
to
the object—and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity
as
before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is
the
same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects they
are
cognized, conform to my conceptions—and then I am at no loss
how
to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which
requires
understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is, a
priori,
I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which
are
expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then,
all
the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are
objects
which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot
be
given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason
thinks
them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish
an
excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted,
and
which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things
a
priori that which we ourselves place in them.*
[*Footnote:
This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher,
consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of
confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason,
especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do not admit
of our making any experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence,
with regard to those conceptions and principles which we assume a priori, our
only course ill be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one
and the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an
object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation
to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of
mere thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double
point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but
that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is involved in
self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish the correctness of this
distinction.]
This
attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to metaphysics, in
its first part—that is, where it is occupied with conceptions a priori, of
which the corresponding objects may be given in experience—the certain
course of science. For by this new method we are enabled perfectly to explain
the possibility of a priori cognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate
satisfactorily the laws which lie a priori at the foundation of nature, as the
sum of the objects of experience—neither of which was possible according to
the procedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of a
priori cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we derive a surprising
result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against the great end of
metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we come to the conclusion that
our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible
experience; and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this
science.
The
estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive
is
that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in
themselves,
while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its
sphere.
Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to
the
test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits
of
experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned, which reason
absolutely
requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to
complete
the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, on
the
one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects
as
things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without
contradiction,
and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our
representation
of things as they are given to us, does not conform
to
these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects,
as
phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction
disappears:
we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we
began
by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as
established
that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know
them,
or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in
themselves,
beyond the range of our cognition.*
[*Footnote:
This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the chemists,
which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more usually, the synthetic
process. The analysis of the metaphysician separates pure cognition a priori
into two heterogeneous elements, viz., the cognition of things as phenomena,
and of things in themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with
the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that this harmony
never results except through the above distinction, which is, therefore,
concluded to be just.]
But,
after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to
make
any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains
for
our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition
which
may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the
unconditioned,
to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience
from
a practical point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends
of
metaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for
such
an extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space
vacant,
still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we
can,
by means of practical data—nay, it even challenges us to make
the
attempt.*
[*Footnote:
So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies established the
truth of that which Copernicus, first, assumed only as a hypothesis, and, at
the same time, brought to light that invisible force (Newtonian attraction)
which holds the universe together. The latter would have remained forever
undiscovered, if Copernicus had not ventured on the experiment—contrary to
the senses but still just— of looking for the observed movements not in the
heavenly bodies, but in the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new
metaphysical method as a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the
first attempts at such a change of method, which are always hypothetical.
But in the Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically,
but apodeictically, from the nature of our representations of space and time.
and from the elementary conceptions of the understanding.]
This
attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of metaphysics,
after the example of the geometricians and natural philosophers, constitutes
the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the
method to be followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same
time, it marks out and defines both the external boundaries and the internal
structure of this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity,
that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the
limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of the
possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the
entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition a priori,
nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject
derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the
principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as
in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all
for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one
relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total
use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage—an
advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do with
objects—that, if once it is conducted into the sure path of science, by
means of this criticism, it can then take in the whole sphere of its
cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave it for the use of
posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh accessions. For
metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its
own employment as determined by these principles. To this perfection it is,
therefore, bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim
may justly be applied:
Nil
actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.
But,
it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose to bequeath
to posterity? What is the real value of this system of metaphysics, purified
by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent condition? A cursory view of
the present work will lead to the supposition that its use is merely negative,
that it only serves to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason,
beyond the limits of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this,
at once, assumes a positive value, when we observe that the principles with
which speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead inevitably,
not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of reason, inasmuch as
they threaten to extend the limits of sensibility, which is their proper
sphere, over the entire realm of thought and, thus, to supplant the pure
(practical) use of reason.
So
far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative
reason
within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch
as
it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes
and
even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses
a
positive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have
only
to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure
reason—the
moral use—in which it inevitably transcends the limits
of
sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be
insured
against the effects of a speculation which would involve it
in
contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the
service
which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as. to
maintain
that the system of police is productive of no positive
benefit,
since its main business is to prevent the violence which
citizen
has to apprehend from citizen, that so each may pursue his
vocation
in peace and security. That space and time are only forms
of
sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the
existence
of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no
conceptions
of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for
the
cognition of things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition
can
be given to these conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no
cognition
of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object
of
sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon—all this is proved in
the
analytical part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of
all
possible speculative cognition to the mere objects of
experience,
follows as a necessary result. At the same time, it must
be
carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of
cognizing,
we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things
in
themselves.* For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the
existence
of an appearance, without something that appears—which
would
be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, that we had not
undertaken
this criticism and, accordingly, had not drawn the
necessary
distinction between things as objects of experience and
things
as they are in themselves. The principle of causality, and,
by
consequence, the mechanism of nature as determined by causality,
would
then have absolute validity in relation to all things as
efficient
causes. I should then be unable to assert, with regard to
one
and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free,
and
yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,
not
free, without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both
propositions
I should take the soul in the same signification, as a
thing
in general, as a thing in itself—as, without previous
criticism,
I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand,
that
we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object
may
be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a
thing
in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the
conceptions
of the understanding, the principle of causality has
reference
only to things in the first sense. We then see how it does
not
involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that the will, in the
phenomenal sphere—in visible action—is necessarily obedient to the law of
nature, and, in so far, not free; and, on the other hand, that, as belonging
to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and, accordingly, is
free. Now, it is true that I cannot, by means of speculative reason, and still
less by empirical observation, cognize my soul as a thing in itself and
consequently, cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I
ascribe effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this
being as existing, and yet not in time, which—since I cannot support my
conception by any intuition—is impossible. At the same time, while I cannot
cognize, I can quite well think freedom, that is to say, my representation of
it involves at least no contradiction, if we bear in mind the critical
distinction of the two modes of representation (the sensible and the
intellectual) and the consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure
understanding and of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that
morality necessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a
property of our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical,
original principles a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this
presupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason had
proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It would then
follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the speculative
affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious contradiction, and that
liberty and, with it, morality must yield to the mechanism of nature; for the
negation of morality involves no contradiction, except on the presupposition
of liberty. Now morality does not require the speculative cognition of
liberty; it is enough that I can think it, that its conception involves no
contradiction, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But
even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold
sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the
doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their
proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which
warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things in themselves, and
establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere
phenomena.
[*Footnote:
In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its reality as attested by experience, or a priori, by means of reason.
But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that
is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to
answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of
possibilities. But something more is required before I can attribute to such a
conception objective validity, that is real possibility—the other
possibility being merely logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical
sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement,
but may derive them from practical sources.]
The
positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in relation to the
conception of God and of the simple nature of the soul, admits of a similar
exemplification; but on this point I shall not dwell. I cannot even make the
assumption—as the practical interests of morality require—of God, freedom,
and immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to
transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles
which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which
cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into
phenomena, and thus rendering the practical extension of pure reason
impossible. I must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief. The
dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to
advance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is the true source of the
unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates against morality.
Thus,
while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to posterity, in
the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in accordance with the
Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a bequest is not to be
depreciated. It will render an important service to reason, by substituting
the certainty of scientific method for that random groping after results
without the guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the
pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the
inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to the
cultivation of. genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on
speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to
invent new ideas and opinions. But, above all, it will confer an inestimable
benefit on morality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged
against them may be silenced for ever by the Socratic method, that is to say,
by proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never been,
and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or
another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it
powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error.
This
important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its fancied
possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not prove in any
way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The advantages which the world has derived from the teachings
of pure reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent,
on the monopoly of the schools, but does not in the slightest degree touch the
interests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the
proof of the continued existence of the soul after death, derived from the
simplicity of its substance; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the
general mechanism of nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of
subjective and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God,
deduced from the conception of an ens realissimum—the contingency of the
changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass
beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise
the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted that this has
not been the case and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding
for such subtle speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the
contrary, it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling,
which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to
meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be
doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of
inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious
order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give
rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the
genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on
rational grounds; and this public property not only remains undisturbed, but
is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine that the schools have no
right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of
general human concernment than that to which the great mass of men, ever held
by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the
schools should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these
universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory
proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of the
schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key
to the truths which they impart to the public.
Quod
mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.
At
the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just
title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without
its knowledge—I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason.
This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so;
for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little
impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against
these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on
every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty
of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of
speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical
controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is
only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be
saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of their
doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism,
fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are
universally injurious—as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are
dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If
governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it
would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as
well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which
alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to
support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of
danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has
never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel.
This
critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure
cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on
strict demonstration from sure principles a priori—but to dogmatism, that
is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure
cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the
principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing— without
first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the
possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of
pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers, and in opposing this
procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious
shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to
scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On
the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly
scientific system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a
priori, to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must,
therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the
plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the future system of
metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated
Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out
the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our
conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny,
instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which he set served to
awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation which is not yet
extinct in Germany. He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give a truly
scientific character to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to
prepare the field by a criticism of the organum, that is, of pure reason
itself. That be failed to perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be
ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on
this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times,
have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method
of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can have no other aim but to
shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into
opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy.
In
this second edition, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to remove the
difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine perhaps, have given
rise to many misconceptions even among acute thinkers. In the propositions
themselves, and in the demonstrations by which they are supported, as well as
in the form and the entire plan of the work, I have found nothing to alter;
which must be attributed partly to the long examination to which I had
subjected the whole before offering it to the public and partly to the nature
of the case. For pure speculative
reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing isolated or
independent, but every Single part is essential to all the rest; and hence,
the slightest imperfection, whether defect or positive error, could not fail
to betray itself in use. I venture, further, to hope, that this system will
maintain the same unalterable character for the future. I am led to entertain
this confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of the
result affords, when we proceed, first, from the simplest elements up to the
complete whole of pure reason and, and then, backwards from the whole to each
part. We find that the attempt to make the slightest alteration, in any part,
leads inevitably to contradictions, not merely in this system, but in human
reason itself. At the same time, there is still much room for improvement in
the exposition of the doctrines contained in this work. In the present
edition, I have endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical
part, especially with regard to the conception of time; to clear away the
obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions of the
understanding; to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the
demonstration of the principles of the pure understanding; and, lastly, to
obviate the misunderstanding of the paralogisms which immediately precede the
rational psychology. Beyond this point—the end of the second main division of
the “Transcendental Dialectic”—I have not extended my alterations,*
partly from want of time, and partly because I am not aware that any portion
of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among intelligent and
impartial critics, whom I do not here mention with that praise which is their
due, but who will find that their suggestions have been attended to in the
work itself.
[*Footnote:
The only addition, properly so called—and that only in the method of proof—which
I have made in the present edition, consists of a new refutation of
psychological idealism, and a strict demonstration—the only one possible, as
I believe—of the objective reality of external intuition. However harmless
idealism may be considered—although in reality it is not so—in regard to
the essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to
philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an
article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from
which, yet, we derive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense),
and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it
in question. As there is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as
it stands in the text, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows:
“But
this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds
of my existence which can be found in me are representations and, as such, do
themselves require a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my
existence in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein
they change.” It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that,
after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is, of
my representation of external things, and that, consequently, it must always
remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this representation does or
does not exist externally to me. But I am conscious, through internal
experience, of my existence in time (consequently, also, of the
determinability of the former in the latter), and that is more than the simple
consciousness of my representation. It is, in fact, the same as the empirical
consciousness of my existence, which can only be determined in relation to
something, which, while connected with my existence, is external to me. This
consciousness of my existence in time is, therefore, identical with the
consciousness of a relation to something external to me, and it is, therefore,
experience, not fiction, sense, not imagination, which inseparably connects
the external with my internal sense. For the external sense is, in itself, the
relation of intuition to something real, external to me; and the reality of
this something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it, rests solely on its
inseparable connection with internal experience as the condition of its
possibility. If with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the
representation: I am, which accompanies all my judgements, and all the
operations of my understanding, I could, at the same time, connect a
determination of my existence by intellectual intuition, then the
consciousness of a relation to something external to me would not be
necessary. But the internal intuition in which alone my existence can be
determined, though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is
itself sensible and attached to the condition of time. Hence this
determination of my existence, and consequently my internal experience itself,
must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which can be,
therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must look upon myself
as being related. Thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily
connected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of experience
in general; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things
external to me related to my sense as I am that I myself exist as determined
in time. But in order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external
me, really correspond, in other words, what intuitions belong to the external
sense and not to imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case,
to those rules according to which experience in general (even internal
experience) is distinguished from imagination, and which are always based on
the proposition that there really is an external experience. We may add the
remark that the representation of something permanent in existence, is not the
same thing as the permanent representation; for a representation may be very
variable and changing—as all our representations, even that of matter, are—and
yet refer to something permanent, which must, therefore, be distinct from all
my representations and external to me, the existence of which is necessarily
included in the determination of my own existence, and with it constitutes one
experience—an experience which would not even be possible internally, if it
were not also at the same time, in part, external. To the question How?
we are no more able to reply, than we are, in general, to think the
stationary in time, the coexistence of which with the variable, produces the
conception of change.]
In
attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as possible, I
have been compelled to leave out or abridge various passages which were not
essential to the completeness of the work, but which many readers might
consider useful in other respects, and might be unwilling to miss. This
trifling loss, which could not be avoided without swelling the book beyond due
limits, may be supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with
the first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the
greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands.
I
have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of various reviews
and treatises, that the spirit of profound and thorough investigation is not
extinct in Germany, though it may have been overborne and silenced for a time
by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking, which gives itself the airs
of genius, and that the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have
not prevented energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of
the science of pure reason to which these paths conduct—a science which is
not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can hope for a
lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these deserving men, who so
happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid exposition—a
talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing—I leave the task of
removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the statement of my
doctrines. For, in this case, the danger is not that of being refuted, but of
being misunderstood. For my own part, I must henceforward abstain from
controversy, although I shall carefully attend to all suggestions, whether
from friends or adversaries, which may be of use in the future elaboration of
the system of this propaedeutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced
pretty far in years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year—it will be
necessary for me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of
elaborating the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in confirmation of
the correctness of the principles established in this Critique of Pure Reason,
both speculative and practical; and I must, therefore, leave the task of
clearing up the obscurities of the present work—inevitable, perhaps, at the
outset—as well as, the defence of the whole, to those deserving men, who
have made my system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward
armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite
possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure
of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few
possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive
view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking
these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy
to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any
freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light
in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are easily
reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole.
If a theory possesses stability in itself, the action and reaction
which seemed at first to threaten its existence serve only, in the course of
time, to smooth down any superficial roughness or inequality, and—if men of
insight, impartiality, and truly popular gifts, turn their attention to it—to
secure to it, in a short time, the requisite elegance also.
Konigsberg,
April 1787.
INTRODUCTION
I.
Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge
That
all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.
For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened
into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and
partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of
understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and
so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of
objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no
knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.
But,
though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that
all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that
our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through
impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself
(sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot
distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has
made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a
question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first
sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience,
and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called a
priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources a
posteriori, that is, in experience.