Go to Beginning of this Book |
Back to Philosopher's Page |
Table of Contents |
Fig Home |
This
eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
almost
no restrictions whatsoever. You
may copy it, give it away or
re-use
it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
with
this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net
Title:
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume II.
MDCXC,
Based on the 2nd Edition, Books III. and IV. (of 4)
Author:
John Locke
Release
Date: January 6, 2004 [EBook #10616]
Language:
English
Character
set encoding: ASCII
***
START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUMANE UNDERSTANDING, V2 ***
Produced
by Steve Harris and David Widger
[Based
on the 2d Edition] CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME
CHAP.
I.
OF WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL
II.
OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS
III.
OF GENERAL TERMS
IV.
OF THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS
V.
OF THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS
VI.
OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES
VII.
OF PARTICLES
VIII.
OF ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE TERMS
IX.
OF THE IMPERFECTION OF WORDS
X.
OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS
XI.
OF THE REMEDIES OF THE FOREGOING IMPERFECTION AND ABUSES
CHAP.
I.
OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL
II.
OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
III.
OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
IV.
OF THE REALITY OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
V.
OF TRUTH IN GENERAL
VI.
OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS: THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY
VII.
OF MAXIMS
VIII.
OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS
IX.
OF OUR THREEFOLD KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE
X.
OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD
XI.
OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS
XII.
OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE
XIII.
SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE
XIV.
OF JUDGMENT
XV.
OF PROBABILITY
XVI.
OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT
XVII.
OF REASON [AND SYLLOGISM]
XVIII.
OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES
XIX.
[OF ENTHUSIASM]
XX.
OF WRONG ASSENT, OR ERROR
XXI.
OF THE DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES
OF
WORDS OR LANGUAGE IN GENERAL.
God,
having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an
inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own
kind, but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great
instrument and common tie of society. Man, therefore, had by nature his organs
so fashioned, as to be fit to frame articulate sounds, which we call words.
But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other
birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by
no means are capable of language.
Besides
articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that he should be able
to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make them stand
as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known
to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds be conveyed from one to another.
But
neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they ought to be. It is
not enough for the perfection of language, that sounds can be made signs of
ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several
particular things: for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their
use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by.
[To remedy this inconvenience, language had yet a further improvement in the
use of GENERAL TERMS, whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of
particular existences: which advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by
the difference of the ideas they were made signs of: those names becoming
general, which are made to stand for GENERAL IDEAS, and those remaining
particular, where the IDEAS they are used for are PARTICULAR.]
Besides
these names which stand for ideas, there be other words which men make use of,
not to signify any idea, but the want or absence of some ideas, simple or
complex, or all ideas together; such as are NIHIL in Latin, and in English,
IGNORANCE and BARRENNESS. All which negative or privative words cannot be said
properly to belong to, or signify no ideas: for then they would be perfectly
insignificant sounds; but they relate to positive ideas, and signify their
absence.
It
may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and
knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common
sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and
notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from
obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and
made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses; v.g.
to IMAGINE, APPREHEND, COMPREHEND, ADHERE, CONCEIVE, INSTIL, DISGUST,
DISTURBANCE, TRANQUILLITY, &c., are all words taken from the operations of
sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. SPIRIT, in its
primary signification, is breath; ANGEL, a messenger: and I doubt not but, if
we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the
names which stand for things that fall not under our senses to have had their
first rise from sensible ideas. By which we may give some kind of guess what
kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who
were the first beginners of languages, and how nature, even in the naming of
things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their
knowledge: whilst, to give names that might make known to others any
operations they felt in themselves, or any other ideas that came not under
their senses, they were fain to borrow words from ordinary known ideas of
sensation, by that means to make others the more easily to conceive those
operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward sensible
appearances; and then, when they had got known and agreed names to signify
those internal operations of their own minds, they were sufficiently furnished
to make known by words all their other ideas; since they could consist of
nothing but either of outward sensible perceptions, or of the inward
operations of their minds about them; we having, as has been proved, no ideas
at all, but what originally come either from sensible objects without, or what
we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirits, of
which we are conscious to ourselves within.
But
to understand better the use and force of Language, as subservient to
instruction and knowledge, it will be convenient to consider:
First,
TO WHAT IT IS THAT NAMES, IN THE USE OF LANGUAGE, ARE IMMEDIATELY APPLIED.
Secondly,
Since all (except proper) names are general, and so stand not particularly for
this or that single thing, but for sorts and ranks of things, it will be
necessary to consider, in the next place, what the sorts and kinds, or, if you
rather like the Latin names, WHAT THE SPECIES AND GENERA OF THINGS ARE,
WHEREIN THEY CONSIST, AND HOW THEY COME TO BE MADE. These being (as they
ought) well looked into, we shall the better come to find the right use of
words; the natural advantages and defects of language; and the remedies that
ought to be used, to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in
the signification of words: without which it is impossible to discourse with
any clearness or order concerning knowledge: which, being conversant about
propositions, and those most commonly universal ones, has greater connexion
with words than perhaps is suspected. These considerations, therefore, shall
be the matter of the following chapters.
OF
THE SIGNIFICATION OF WORDS.
1.
Words are sensible Signs, necessary for Communication of Ideas.
Man,
though he have great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well
as himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all within his own
breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made to
appear. The comfort and advantage of society not being to be had without
communication of thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some
external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are
made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so
fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so
much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how
WORDS, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made
use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that
there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then
there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary
imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.
The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they
stand for are their proper and immediate signification.
2.
Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs of his
Ideas who uses them.
The
use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts, for the
assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and
lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary or immediate
signification, stand for nothing but THE IDEAS IN THE MIND OF HIM THAT USES
THEM, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the
things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it
is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as
marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the
marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks,
immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this
would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to
other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at
the same time; and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being
voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he
knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without
signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in
things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his
own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond
with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for
thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the
signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men’s ideas by
some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do,
it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he
has not.
3.
Examples of this.
This
is so necessary in the use of language, that in this respect the knowing and
the ignorant, the learned and the unlearned, use the words they speak (with
any meaning) all alike. They, in every man’s mouth, stand for the ideas he
has, and which he would express by them. A child having taken notice of
nothing in the metal he hears called GOLD, but the bright shining yellow
colour, he applies the word gold only to his own idea of that colour, and
nothing else; and therefore calls the same colour in a peacock’s tail gold.
Another that hath better observed, adds to shining yellow great weight: and
then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea of a shining
yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities
fusibility: and then the word gold signifies to him a body, bright, yellow,
fusible, and very heavy.
Another
adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold,
when
they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it
to:
but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea; nor
can he make it stand as a sign of such a complex idea as he has not.
4.
Words are often secretly referred, First to the Ideas supposed to be in
other men’s minds.
But
though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify
nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they in their
thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things.
First,
THEY SUPPOSE THEIR WORDS TO BE MARKS OF THE IDEAS IN THE MINDS ALSO OF OTHER
MEN, WITH WHOM THEY COMMUNICATE; for else they should talk in vain, and could
not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by the
hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But in this
men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they
discourse with have in their minds be the same: but think it enough that they
use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in
which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same
to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.
5.
Secondly, to the Reality of Things.
Secondly,
Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but
of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose the WORDS TO STAND
ALSO FOR THE REALITY OF THINGS. But this relating more particularly to
substances and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and
modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at
large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in
particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use
of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their
signification, whenever we make them stand for anything but those ideas we
have in our own minds.
6.
Words by Use readily excite Ideas of their objects.
Concerning
words, also, it is further to be considered:
First,
that they being immediately the signs of men’s ideas, and by that means the
instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one
another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts;
there comes, by constant use, to be such a connexion between certain sounds
and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite
certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did
actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible
qualities, and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us.
7.
Words are often used without Signification, and Why.
Secondly,
That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the
mind of the speaker, yet, because by familiar use from our cradles, we come to
learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our
tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to
examine or settle their significations perfectly; it often happens that men,
even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set
their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them
learned before the ideas are known for which they stand: therefore some, not
only children but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only
because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But
so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant
connexion between the sound and the idea, and a designation that the one
stands for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but
so much insignificant noise.
8.
Their Signification perfectly arbitrary, not the consequence of a
natural connexion.
Words,
by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in men certain
ideas so constantly and readily, that they are apt to suppose a natural
connexion between them. But that they signify only men’s peculiar ideas, and
that BY A PERFECT ARBITRARY IMPOSITION, is evident, in that they often fail to
excite in others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them
to be signs of: and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand
for what ideas he pleases, that no one hath the power to make others have the
same ideas in their minds that he has, when they use the same words that he
does. And therefore the great Augustus himself, in the possession of that
power which ruled the world, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word:
which was as much as to say, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what idea
any sound should be a sign of, in the mouths and common language of his
subjects. It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain
sounds to certain ideas in all languages, which so far limits the
signification of that sound, that unless a man applies it to the same idea, he
does not speak properly: and let me add, that unless a man’s words excite
the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he
does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the consequence of any man’s
using of words differently, either from their general meaning, or the
particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them; this is certain,
their signification, in his use of them, is limited to his ideas, and they can
be signs of nothing else.
OF
GENERAL TERMS.
1.
The greatest Part of Words are general terms.
All
things that exist being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reasonable that
words, which ought to be conformed to things, should be so too,--I mean in
their signification: but yet we find quite the contrary. The far greatest part
of words that make all languages are general terms: which has not been the
effect of neglect or chance, but of reason and necessity.
2.
That every particular Thing should have a Name for itself is
impossible.
First,
It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar
name. For, the signification and use of words depending on that connexion
which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of
them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind
should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name
that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But
it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of
all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw; every
tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most
capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious
memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army
by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted
to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their
heads; much less to call every leaf of plants, or grain of sand that came in
their way, by a peculiar name.
3.
And would be useless, if it were possible.
Secondly,
If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because it would not serve to
the chief end of language. Men would in vain heap up names of particular
things, that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn
names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood:
which is then only done when, by use or consent, the sound I make by the
organs of speech, excites in another man’s mind who hears it, the idea I
apply it to in mine, when I speak it. This cannot be done by names applied to
particular things; whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of
them could not be significant or intelligible to another, who was not
acquainted with all those very particular things which had fallen under my
notice.
4.
A distinct name for every particular thing not fitted for enlargement
of knowledge.
Thirdly,
But yet, granting this also feasible, (which I think is not,) yet a distinct
name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the
improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in particular things, enlarges
itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts, under general
names, are properly subservient. These,
with the names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not
multiply every moment, beyond what either the mind can contain, or use
requires. And therefore, in these, men have for the most part stopped: but yet
not so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by
appropriated names, where convenience demands it.
And therefore in their own species, which they have most to do with,
and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular persons, they make
use of proper names; and there distinct individuals have distinct
denominations.
5.
What things have proper Names, and why.
Besides
persons, countries also, cities, rivers, mountains, and other the like
distinctions of lace have usually found peculiar names, and that for the same
reason; they being such as men have often as occasion to mark particularly,
and, as it were, set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt
not but, if we had reason to mention particular horses as often as as have
reason to mention particular men, we should have proper names for the one, as
familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use as
Alexander. And therefore we see that, amongst jockeys, horses have their
proper names to be known and distinguished by, as commonly as their servants:
because, amongst them, there is often occasion to mention this or that
particular horse when he is out of sight.
6.
How general Words are made.
The
next thing to be considered is,--How general words come to be made.
For, since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by
general terms; or where find we those general natures they are supposed to
stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas: and
ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of time and
place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular
existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing
more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that
abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
7.
Shown by the way we enlarge our complex ideas from infancy.
But,
to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss to trace
our notions and names from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we
proceed, and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy. There
is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the persons children converse
with (to instance in them alone) are, like the persons themselves, only
particular. The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their
minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The
names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals; and the names
of NURSE and MAMMA, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons.
Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them observe that
there are a great many other things in the world, that in some common
agreements of shape, and several other qualities, resemble their father and
mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which
they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with
others, the name MAN, for example. And thus they come to have a general name,
and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new; but only leave out of the
complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is
peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.
8.
And further enlarge our complex ideas, by still leaving out properties
contained in them.
By
the same way that they come by the general name and idea of MAN, they easily
advance to more general names and notions. For, observing that several things
that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended out
under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by
retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have
again another and more general idea; to which having given a name they make a
term of a more comprehensive extension: which new idea is made, not by any new
addition, but only as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other
properties signified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life,
sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.
9.
General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more
complex ones.
That
this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to
them, I think is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it but the
considering of a man’s self, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of
their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks GENERAL NATURES or NOTIONS are
anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken
at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find
them. For let any one effect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of MAN
differ from that of PETER and PAUL, or his idea of HORSE from that of
BUCEPHALUS, but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each
individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several
particular existences as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas
signified by the names MAN and HORSE, leaving out but those particulars
wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those
making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name ANIMAL to it, one has
a more general term, that comprehends with man several other creatures. Leave
out of the idea of ANIMAL, sense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining
complex idea, made up of the remaining simple ones of body, life, and
nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term,
VIVENS. And, not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in itself;
by the same way the mind proceeds to BODY, SUBSTANCE, and at last to BEING,
THING, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our ideas whatsoever.
To conclude: this whole mystery of genera and species, which make such a noise
in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is
nothing else but ABSTRACT IDEAS, more or less comprehensive, with names
annexed to them. In all which
this is constant and unvariable, That every more general term stands for such
an idea, and is but a part of any of those contained under it.
10.
Why the Genus is ordinarily made Use of in Definitions.
This
may show us the reason why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but
declaring their signification, we make use of the GENUS, or next general word
that comprehends it. Which is not out of necessity, but only to save the
labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or
GENUS stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it.
But though defining by GENUS and DIFFERENTIA (I crave leave to use these terms
of art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those notions
they are applied to), I say, though defining by the GENUS be the shortest way,
yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is
not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For, definition being nothing
but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for,
a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined
in the signification of the term defined: and if, instead of such an
enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it
has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness, but for quickness and
dispatch sake. For I think that, to one who desired to know what idea the word
MAN stood for; if it should be said, that man was a solid extended substance,
having life, sense, spontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning, I doubt
not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea
it stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a
rational animal: which, by the several definitions of ANIMAL, VIVENS, and
CORPUS, resolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the
term MAN, followed here the ordinary definition of the schools; which, though
perhaps not the most, exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And
one may, in this instance, see what gave occasion to the rule, that a
definition must consist of GENUS and DIFFERENTIA; and it suffices to show us
the little necessity there is of such a rule, or advantage in the strict
observing of it. For, definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining
of one word by several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may
be certainly known; languages are not always so made according to the rules of
logic, that every term can have its signification exactly and clearly
expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary;
or else those who have made this rule have done ill, that they have given us
so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions more in the next
chapter.
11.
General and Universal are Creatures of the Understanding, and belong
not to the Real Existence of things.
To
return to general words: it is plain, by what has been said, that GENERAL and
UNIVERSAL belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions
and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern
only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when
used for signs of general ideas, and so are applicable indifferently to many
particular things; and ideas are general when they are set up as the
representatives of many particular things: but universality belongs not to
things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even
those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When therefore
we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own
making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into,
by the understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars. For the
signification they have is nothing but a relation that, by the mind of man, is
added to them.
12.
Abstract Ideas are the Essences of Genera and Species.
The
next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of signification it is
that general words have. For, as it is evident that they do not signify barely
one particular thing; for then they would not be general terms, but proper
names, so, on the other side, it is as evident they do not signify a
plurality; for MAN and MEN would then signify the same; and the distinction of
numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. That
then which general words signify is a SORT of things; and each of them does
that, by being a sign of an abstract idea in the mind; to which idea, as
things existing are found to agree, so they come to be ranked under that name,
or, which is all one, be of that sort. Whereby it is evident that the ESSENCES
of the sorts, or, if the Latin word pleases better, SPECIES of things, are
nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the essence of any
species, being that which makes anything to be of that species; and the
conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed being that which gives a
right to that name; the having the essence, and the having that conformity,
must needs be the same thing: since to be of any species, and to have a right
to the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, to be a MAN, or of
the SPECIES man, and to have right to the NAME man, is the same thing. Again,
to be a man, or of the species man, and have the ESSENCE of a man, is the same
thing. Now, since nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but
what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for, nor
anything be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has the
essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name
stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is
easy to observe, that the essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently,
the sorting of things, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts
and makes those general ideas.
13.
They are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their
Foundation in the Similitude of Things.
I
would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the
production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more
obvious, especially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by
seed. But yet I think we may say, THE SORTING OF THEM UNDER NAMES IS THE
WORKMANSHIP OF THE UNDERSTANDING, TAKING OCCASION, FROM THE SIMILITUDE IT
OBSERVES AMONGST THEM, TO MAKE ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and set them up in the
mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms, (for, in that sense,
the word FORM has a very proper signification,) to which as particular things
existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that
denomination, or are put into that CLASSIS. For when we say this is a man,
that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do
we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those
abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the
essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract
ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things
that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under?
And when general names have any connexion with particular beings, these
abstract ideas are the medium that unites them: so that the essences of
species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be
anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore
the supposed real essences of substances, if different from our abstract
ideas, cannot be the essences of the species WE rank things into. For two
species may be one, as rationally as two different essences be the essence of
one species: and I demand what are the alterations [which] may, or may not be
made in a HORSE or LEAD, without making either of them to be of another
species? In determining the species of things by OUR abstract ideas, this is
easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed REAL
essences, he will I suppose, be at a loss: and he will never be able to know
when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a HORSE or LEAD.
14.
Each distinct abstract Idea is a distinct Essence.
Nor
will any one wonder that I say these essences, or abstract ideas (which are
the measures of name, and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of
the understanding, who considers that at least the complex ones are often, in
several men, different collections of simple ideas; and therefore that is
COVETOUSNESS to one man, which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances,
where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they
are not constantly the same; no, not in that species which is most familiar to
us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: it having been more
than once doubted, whether the FOETUS born of a woman were a MAN, even so far
as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourished and
baptized: which could not be, if the abstract idea or essence to which the
name man belonged were of nature’s making; and were not the uncertain and
various collection of simple ideas, which the understanding put together, and
then, abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that, in truth, every distinct
abstract idea is a distinct essence; and the names that stand for such
distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is
as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat; and rain is as
essentially different from snow as water from earth: that abstract idea which
is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the other. And
thus any two abstract ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two
distinct names annexed to them, constitute two distinct sorts, or, if you
please, SPECIES, as essentially different as any two of the most remote or
opposite in the world.
15.
Several significations of the word Essence.
But
since the essences of things are thought by some (and not without reason) to
be wholly unknown, it may not be amiss to consider the several significations
of the word ESSENCE.
Real
essences.
First,
Essence may be taken for the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is.
And thus the real internal, but generally (in substances) unknown constitution
of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their
essence. This is the proper original signification of the word, as is evident
from the formation of it; essential in its primary notation, signifying
properly, being. And in this sense it is still used, when we speak of the
essence of PARTICULAR things, without giving them any name.
Nominal
Essences.
Secondly,
The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus
and species, the word essence has almost lost its primary signification: and,
instead of the real constitution of things, has been almost wholly applied to
the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true, there is
ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things; and it is past
doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple
ideas co-existing must depend. But, it being evident that things are ranked
under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to certain abstract
ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the essence of each GENUS, or
sort, comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general, or sortal
(if I may have leave so to call it from sort, as I do general from genus,)
name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word essence
imports in its most familiar use.
These
two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, the one the REAL,
the other NOMINAL ESSENCE.
16.
Constant Connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.
Between
the NOMINAL ESSENCE and the NAME there is so near a connexion, that the name
of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what
has this essence, whereby it answers that abstract idea whereof that name is
the sign.
17.
Supposition, that Species are distinguished by their real Essences
useless.
Concerning
the REAL ESSENCES of corporeal substances (to mention these only) there are,
if I mistake not, two opinions. The one is of those who, using the word
essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences,
according to which all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly
every one of them partake, and so become of this or that species. The other
and more rational opinion is of those who look on all natural things to have a
real, but unknown, constitution of their insensible parts; from which flow
those sensible qualities which serve us to distinguish them one from another,
according as we have occasion to rank them into sorts, under common
denominations. The former of
these opinions, which supposes these essences as a certain number of forms or
moulds, wherein all natural things that exist are cast, and do equally
partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the knowledge of natural things.
The frequent productions of monsters, in all the species of animals, and of
changelings, and other strange issues of human birth, carry with them
difficulties, not possible to consist with this hypothesis; since it is as
impossible that two things partaking exactly of the same real essence should
have different properties, as that two figures partaking of the same real
essence of a circle should have different properties. But were there no other
reason against it, yet the supposition of essences that cannot be known; and
the making of them, nevertheless, to be that which distinguishes the species
of things, is so wholly useless and unserviceable to any part of our
knowledge, that that alone were sufficient to make us lay it by, and content
ourselves with such essences of the sorts or species of things as come within
the reach of our knowledge: which, when seriously considered, will be found,
as I have said, to be nothing else but, those ABSTRACT complex ideas to which
we have annexed distinct general names.
18.
Real and nominal Essence
Essences
being thus distinguished into nominal and real, we may further observe, that,
in the species of simple ideas and modes, they are always the same; but in
substances always quite different. Thus, a figure including a space between
three lines, is the real as well as nominal essence of a triangle; it being
not only the abstract idea to which the general name is annexed, but the very
ESSENTIA or being of the thing itself; that foundation from which all its
properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far
otherwise concerning that parcel of matter which makes the ring on my finger;
wherein these two essences are apparently different. For, it is the real
constitution of its insensible parts, on which depend all those properties of
colour, weight, fusibility, fixedness, &c., which are to be found in it;
which constitution we know not, and so, having no particular idea of, having
no name that is the sign of it. But yet it is its colour, weight, fusibility,
fixedness, &c., which makes it to be gold, or gives it a right to that
name, which is therefore its nominal essence. Since nothing can be called gold
but what has a conformity of qualities to that abstract complex idea to which
that name is annexed. But this distinction of essences, belonging particularly
to substances, we shall, when we come to consider their names, have an
occasion to treat of more fully.
19.
Essences ingenerable and incorruptible.
That
such abstract ideas, with names to them, as we have been speaking of are
essences, may further appear by what we are told concerning essences, viz.
that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of the
real constitutions of things, which begin and perish with them. All things
that exist, besides their Author, are all liable to change; especially those
things we are acquainted with, and have ranked into bands under distinct names
or ensigns. Thus, that which was grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a
sheep; and, within a few days after, becomes part of a man: in all which and
the like changes, it is evident their real essence—i. e. that constitution
whereon the properties of these several things depended—is destroyed, and
perishes with them. But essences being taken for ideas established in the
mind, with names annexed to them, they are supposed to remain steadily the
same, whatever mutations the particular substances are liable to. For,
whatever becomes of ALEXANDER and BUCEPHALUS, the ideas to which MAN and HORSE
are annexed, are supposed nevertheless to remain the same; and so the essences
of those species are preserved whole and undestroyed, whatever changes happen
to any or all of the individuals of those species. By this means the essence
of a species rests safe and entire, without the existence of so much as one
individual of that kind. For, were there now no circle existing anywhere in
the world, (as perhaps that figure exists not anywhere exactly marked out,)
yet the idea annexed to that name would not cease to be what it is; nor cease
to be as a pattern to determine which of the particular figures we meet with
have or have not a right to the NAME circle, and so to show which of them, by
having that essence, was of that species. And though there neither were nor
had been in nature such a beast as an UNICORN, or such a fish as a MERMAID;
yet, supposing those names to stand for complex abstract ideas that contained
no inconsistency in them, the essence of a mermaid is as intelligible as that
of a man; and the idea of an unicorn as certain, steady, and permanent as that
of a horse. From what has been said, it is evident, that the doctrine of the
immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded
on the relation established between them and certain sounds as signs of them;
and will always be true, as long as the same name can have the same
signification.
20.
Recapitulation.
To
conclude. This is that which in short I would say, viz. that all the great
business of GENERA and SPECIES, and their ESSENCES, amounts to no more but
this:--That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with
names annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and
discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier
improvement and communication of their knowledge, which would advance but
slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.
OF
THE NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS.
1.
Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each something
peculiar.
Though
all words, as I have shown, signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the
mind of the speaker; yet, upon a nearer survey, we shall find the names of
SIMPLE IDEAS, MIXED MODES (under which I comprise RELATIONS too), and NATURAL
SUBSTANCES, have each of them something peculiar and different from the other.
For example:--
2.
First, Names of simple Ideas, and of Substances intimate real
Existence.
First,
the names of SIMPLE IDEAS and SUBSTANCES, with the abstract ideas in the mind
which they immediately signify, intimate also some real existence, from which
was derived their original pattern. But the names of MIXED MODES terminate in
the idea that is in the mind, and lead not the thoughts any further; as we
shall see more at large in the following chapter.
3.
Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signify always both real and
nominal Essences.
Secondly,
The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal
essence of their species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely,
if ever, anything but barely the nominal essences of those species; as we
shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in
particular.
4.
Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas are undefinable.
Thirdly,
The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition; the names of all
complex ideas are. It has not, that I know, been yet observed by anybody what
words are, and what are not, capable of being defined; the want whereof is (as
I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in
men’s discourses, whilst some demand definitions of terms that cannot be
defined; and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication
made by a more general word, and its restriction, (or to speak in terms of
art, by a genus and difference,) when, even after such definition, made
according to rule, those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of
the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think, that the
showing what words are, and what are not, capable of definitions, and wherein
consists a good definition, is not wholly besides our present purpose; and
perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas,
as to deserve a more particular consideration.
5.
If all names were definable, it would be a Process IN INFINITUM.
I
will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable, from
that progress IN INFINITUM, which it will visibly lead us into, if we should
allow that all names could be defined. For, if the terms of one definition
were still to be defined by another, where at last should we stop? But I
shall, from the nature of our ideas, and the signification of our words, show
WHY SOME NAMES CAN, AND OTHERS CANNOT BE DEFINED; and WHICH THEY ARE.
6.
What a Definition is.
I
think it is agreed, that a DEFINITION is nothing else but THE SHOWING THE
MEANING OF ONE WORD BY SEVERAL OTHER NOT SYNONYMOUS TERMS. The meaning of
words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them,
the meaning of any term is then showed, or the word is defined, when, by other
words, the idea it is made the sign of, and annexed to, in the mind of the
speaker, is as it were represented, or set before the view of another; and
thus its signification ascertained. This
is the only use and end of definitions; and therefore the only measure of what
is, or is not a good definition.
7.
Simple Ideas, why undefinable.
This
being premised, I say that the NAMES OF SIMPLE IDEAS, AND THOSE ONLY, ARE
INCAPABLE OF BEING DEFINED. The reason whereof is this, That the several terms
of a definition, signifying several ideas, they can all together by no means
represent an idea which has no composition at all: and therefore a definition,
which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several
others not signifying each the same thing, can in the names of simple ideas
have no place.
8.
Instances: Scholastic definitions of Motion.
The
not observing this difference in our ideas, and their names, has produced that
eminent trifling in the schools, which is so easy to be observed in the
definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. For, as to the
greatest part of them, even those masters of definitions were fain to leave
them untouched, merely by the impossibility they found in it. What more
exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent, than this definition:--‘The
act of a being in power, as far forth as in power;’ which would puzzle any
rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity, to
guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of. If Tully,
asking a Dutchman what BEWEEGINGE was, should have received this explication
in his own language, that it was ‘actus entis in potentia quatenus in
potentia;’ I ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have
understood what the word BEWEEGINGE signified, or have guessed what idea a
Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would signify to another, when he
used that sound?
9.
Modern definition of Motion.
Nor
have the modern philosophers, who have endeavoured to throw off the jargon of
the schools, and speak intelligibly, much better succeeded in defining simple
ideas, whether by explaining their causes, or any otherwise. The atomists, who
define motion to be ‘a passage from one place to another,’ what do they
more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is PASSAGE other than
MOTION? And if they were asked what passage was, how would they better define
it than by motion? For is it not at least as proper and significant to say,
Passage is a motion from one place to another, as to say, Motion is a passage,
&c.? This is to translate, and not to define, when we change two words of
the same signification one for another; which, when one is better understood
than the other, may serve to discover what idea the unknown stands for; but is
very far from a definition, unless we will say every English word in the
dictionary is the definition of the Latin word it answers, and that motion is
a definition of MOTUS. Nor will ‘the successive application of the parts of
the superficies of one body to those of another,’ which the Cartesians give
us, prove a much better definition of motion, when well examined.
10.
Definitions of Light.
‘The
act of perspicuous, as far forth as perspicuous,’ is another Peripatetic
definition of a simple idea; which, though not more absurd than the former of
motion, yet betrays its uselessness and insignificancy more plainly; because
experience will easily convince any one that it cannot make the meaning of the
word LIGHT (which it pretends to define) at all understood by a blind man, but
the definition of motion appears not at first sight so useless, because it
escapes this way of trial. For this simple idea, entering by the touch as well
as sight, it is impossible to show an example of any one who has no other way
to get the idea of motion, but barely by the definition of that name. Those
who tell us that light is a great number of little globules, striking briskly
on the bottom of the eye, speak more intelligibly than the Schools: but yet
these words never so well understood would make the idea the word light stands
for no more known to a man that understands it not before, than if one should
tell him that light was nothing but a company of little tennis-balls, which
fairies all day long struck with rackets against some men’s foreheads,
whilst they passed by others. For granting this explication of the thing to be
true, yet the idea of the cause of light, if we had it never so exact, would
no more give us the idea of light itself, as it is such a particular
perception in us, than the idea of the figure and motion of a sharp piece of
steel would give us the idea of that pain which it is able to cause in us. For
the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas
of one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different and distant one from
another, that no two can be more so. And therefore, should Des Cartes’s
globules strike never so long on the retina of a man who was blind by a gutta
serena, he would thereby never have any idea of light, or anything approaching
it, though he understood never so well what little globules were, and what
striking on another body was. And therefore the Cartesians very well
distinguish between that light which is the cause of that sensation in us, and
the idea which is produced in us by it, and is that which is properly light.
11.
Simple Ideas, why undefinable, further explained.
Simple
ideas, as has been shown, are only to be got by those impressions objects
themselves make on our minds, by the proper inlets appointed to each sort. If
they are not received this way, all the words in the world, made use of to
explain or define any of their names, will never be able to produce in us the
idea it stands for. For, words being sounds, can produce in us no other simple
ideas than of those very sounds; nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary
connexion which is known to be between them and those simple ideas which
common use has made them the signs of. He that thinks otherwise, let him try
if any words can give him the taste of a pine apple, and make him have the
true idea of the relish of that celebrated delicious fruit. So far as he is
told it has a resemblance with any tastes whereof he has the ideas already in
his memory, imprinted there by sensible objects, not strangers to his palate,
so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. But this is not giving us
that idea by a definition, but exciting in us other simple ideas by their
known names; which will be still very different from the true taste of that
fruit itself. In light and colours, and all other simple ideas, it is the same
thing: for the signification of sounds is not natural, but only imposed and
arbitrary. And no DEFINITION of
light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in
us, than the SOUND light or red, by itself.
For, to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound, however
formed, is to expect that sounds should be visible, or colours audible; and to
make the ears do the office of all the other senses. Which is all one as to
say, that we might taste, smell, and see by the ears: a sort of philosophy
worthy only of Sancho Panza, who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hearsay.
And therefore he that has not before received into his mind, by the proper
inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the
signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever, put
together according to any rules of definition. The only way is, by applying to
his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he
has learned the name already. A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his
head about visible objects, and made use of the explication of his books and
friends, to understand those names of light and colours which often came in
his way, bragged one day, That he now understood what SCARLET signified. Upon
which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man answered, It was
like the sound of a trumpet. Just such an understanding of the name of any
other simple idea will he have, who hopes to get it only from a definition, or
other words made use of to explain it.
12.
The contrary shown in complex ideas, by instances of a Statue and
Rainbow.
The
case is quite otherwise in COMPLEX IDEAS; which, consisting of several simple
ones, it is in the power of words, standing for the several ideas that make
that composition, to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there
before, and so make their names be understood. In such collections of ideas,
passing under one name, definition, or the teaching the signification of one
word by several others, has place, and may make us understand the names of
things which never came within the reach of our senses; and frame ideas
suitable to those in other men’s minds, when they use those names: provided
that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas,
which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought.
Thus the word STATUE may be explained to a blind man by other words, when
PICTURE cannot; his senses having given him the idea of figure, but not of
colours, which therefore words cannot excite in him.
This gained the prize to the painter against the statuary: each of
which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that
his was to be preferred, because it reached further, and even those who had
lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it. The painter agreed to
refer himself to the judgment of a blind man; who being brought where there
was a statue made by the one, and a picture drawn by the other; he was first
led to the statue, in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the
face and body, and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman.
But being led to the picture, and having his hands laid upon it, was told,
that now he touched the head, and then the forehead, eyes, nose, &c., as
his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth, without finding any
the least distinction: whereupon he cried out, that certainly that must needs
be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship, which could represent to
them all those parts, where he could neither feel nor perceive anything.
13.
Colours indefinable to the born-blind.
He
that should use the word RAINBOW to one who knew all those colours, but yet
had never seen that phenomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness,
position, and order of the colours, so well define that word that it might be
perfectly understood. But yet that definition, how exact and perfect soever,
would never make a blind man understand it; because several of the simple
ideas that make that complex one, being such as he never received by sensation
and experience, no words are able to excite them in his mind.
14.
Complex Ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they
consist have been got from experience.
Simple
ideas, as has been shown, can only be got by experience from those objects
which are proper to produce in us those perceptions. When, by this means, we
have our minds stored with them, and know the names for them, then we are in a
condition to define, and by definition to understand, the names of complex
ideas that are made up of them. But when any term stands for a simple idea
that a man has never yet had in his mind, it is impossible by any words to
make known its meaning to him. When any term stands for an idea a man is
acquainted with, but is ignorant that that term is the sign of it, then
another name of the same idea, which he has been accustomed to, may make him
understand its meaning. But in no case whatsoever is any name of any simple
idea capable of a definition.
15.
Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas of less doubtful meaning than those of
mixed modes and substances.
Fourthly,
But though the names of simple ideas have not the help of definition to
determine their signification, yet that hinders not but that they are
generally less doubtful and uncertain than those of mixed modes and
substances; because they, standing only for one simple perception, men for the
most part easily and perfectly agree in their signification; and there is
little room for mistake and wrangling about their meaning. He that knows once
that whiteness is the name of that colour he has observed in snow or milk,
will not be apt to misapply that word, as long as he retains that idea; which
when he has quite lost, he is not apt to mistake the meaning of it, but
perceives he understands it not. There is neither a multiplicity of simple
ideas to be put together, which makes the doubtfulness in the names of mixed
modes; nor a supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties depending
thereon, the precise number whereof is also unknown, which makes the
difficulty in the names of substances. But, on the contrary, in simple ideas
the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of
parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the
signification of name be obscure, or uncertain.
16.
Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.
Fifthly,
This further may be observed concerning simple Simple ideas and their names,
that they have but few ascents in linea praedicamentali, (as they call it,)
from the lowest species to the summum genus. The reason whereof is, that the
lowest species being but one simple idea, nothing can be left out of it, that
so the difference being taken away, it may agree with some other thing in one
idea common to them both; which, having one name, is the genus of the other
two: v.g. there is nothing that can be left out of the idea of white and red
to make them agree in one common appearance, and so have one general name; as
RATIONALITY being left out of the complex idea of man, makes it agree with
brute in the more general idea and name of animal. And therefore when, to
avoid unpleasant enumerations, men would comprehend both white and red, and
several other such simple ideas, under one general name, they have been fain
to do it by a word which denotes only the way they get into the mind. For when
white, red, and yellow are all comprehended under the genus or name colour, it
signifies no more but such ideas as are produced in the mind only by the
sight, and have entrance only through the eyes. And when they would frame yet
a more general term to comprehend both colours and sounds, and the like simple
ideas, they do it by a word that signifies all such as come into the mind only
by one sense. And so the general term QUALITY, in its ordinary acceptation,
comprehends colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, with
distinction from extension, number, motion, pleasure, and pain, which make
impressions on the mind and introduce their ideas by more senses than one.
17.
Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas not arbitrary, but perfectly taken from
the existence of things.
Sixthly,
The names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed modes have also this
difference: that those of MIXED MODES stand for ideas perfectly arbitrary;
those of SUBSTANCES are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, though with
some latitude; and those of SIMPLE IDEAS are perfectly taken from the
existence of things, and are not arbitrary at all. Which, what difference it
makes in the significations of their names, we shall see in the following
chapters.
Simple
modes.
The
names of SIMPLE MODES differ little from those of simple ideas.
OF
THE NAMES OF MIXED MODES AND RELATIONS.
1.
Mixed modes stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.
The
names of MIXED MODES, being general, they stand, as has been shewed, for sorts
or species of things, each of which has its peculiar essence.
The essences of these species also, as has been shewed, are nothing but
the abstract ideas in the mind, to which the name is annexed. Thus far the
names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with
other ideas: but if we take a little nearer survey of them, we shall find that
they have something peculiar, which perhaps may deserve our attention.
2.
First, The abstract Ideas they stand for are made by the Understanding.
The
first particularity I shall observe in them, is, that the abstract ideas, or,
if you please, the essences, of the several species of mixed modes, are MADE
BY THE UNDERSTANDING, wherein they differ from those of simple ideas: in which
sort the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives such as are
presented to it by the real existence of things operating upon it.
3.
Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.
In
the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made
by the mind, but MADE VERY ARBITRARILY, MADE WITHOUT PATTERNS, OR REFERENCE TO
ANY REAL EXISTENCE. Wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry
with them the supposition of some real being, from which they are taken, and
to which they are conformable. But, in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the
mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly. It unites
and retains certain collections, as so many distinct specific ideas; whilst
others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly suggested by outward
things, pass neglected, without particular names or specifications. Nor does
the mind, in these of mixed modes, as in the complex idea of substances,
examine them by the real existence of things; or verify them by patterns
containing such peculiar compositions in nature. To know whether his idea of
ADULTERY or INCEST be right, will a man seek it anywhere amongst things
existing? Or is it true because any one has been witness to such an action?
No: but it suffices here, that men have put together such a collection into
one complex idea, that makes the archetype and specific idea; whether ever any
such action were committed in rerum natura or no.
4.
How this is done.
To
understand this right, we must consider wherein this making of these complex
ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting
together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three
things: First, It chooses a certain number; Secondly, It gives them connexion,
and makes them into one idea; Thirdly, It ties them together by a name. If we
examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we
shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the
workmanship of the mind; and, consequently, that the species themselves are of
men’s making.
5.
Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Existence.
Nobody
can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary
collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original
patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may
be made, abstracted, and have names given them, and so a species be
constituted, before any one individual of that species ever existed. Who can
doubt but the ideas of SACRILEGE or ADULTERY might be framed in the minds of
men, and have names given them, and so these species of mixed modes be
constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well
discoursed of and reasoned about, and as certain truths discovered of them,
whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that
they have but too frequently a real existence? Whereby it is plain how much
the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they
have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as
when they really exist. And we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made
laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of their own
understandings; beings that had no other existence but in their own minds. And
I think nobody can deny but that the RESURRECTION was a species of mixed modes
in the mind, before it really existed.
6.
Instances: Murder, Incest, Stabbing.
To
see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we
need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will
satisfy us, that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent
ideas into one complex one; and, by the common name it gives them, makes them
the essence of a certain species, without regulating itself by any connexion
they have in nature. For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a
man than the idea of a sheep with killing, that this is made a particular
species of action, signified by the word MURDER, and the other not? Or what
union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with
killing than that of a son or neighbour, that those are combined into one
complex idea, and thereby made the essence of the distinct species PARRICIDE,
whilst the other makes no distinct species at all? But, though they have made
killing a man’s father or mother a distinct species from killing his son or
daughter, yet, in some other cases, son and daughter are taken in too, as well
as father and mother: and they are all equally comprehended in the same
species, as in that of INCEST. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites
into complex ideas such as it finds convenient; whilst others that have
altogether as much union in nature are left loose, and never combined into one
idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then that the mind,
by its free choice, gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas, which in
nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out: why
else is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken
notice of, to make the distinct species called STABBING, and the figure and
matter of the weapon left out? I do not say this is done without reason, as we
shall see more by and by; but this I say, that it is done by the free choice
of the mind, pursuing its own ends; and that, therefore, these species of
mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding.
And there is nothing more evident than that, for the most part, in the
framing these ideas, the mind searches not its patterns in nature, nor refers
the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts such together as
may best serve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precise imitation
of anything that really exists.
7.
But still subservient to the End of Language, and not made at random.
But,
though these complex ideas or essences of mixed modes depend on the mind, and
are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made at random, and
jumbled together without any reason at all. Though these complex ideas be not
always copied from nature, yet they are always suited to the end for which
abstract ideas are made: and though they be combinations made of ideas that
are loose enough, and have as little union in themselves as several other to
which the mind never gives a connexion that combines them into one idea; yet
they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief
end of language. The use of
language is, by short sounds, to signify with ease and dispatch general
conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but
also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In
the making therefore of the species of mixed modes, men have had regard only
to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. Those
they have combined into distinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst
others, that in nature have as near a union, are left loose and unregarded.
For, to go no further than human actions themselves, if they would make
distinct abstract ideas of all the varieties which might be observed in them,
the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as
well as overcharged to little purpose. It suffices that men make and name so
many complex ideas of these mixed modes as they find they have occasion to
have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs.
If they join to the idea of killing the idea of father or mother, and
so make a distinct species from killing a man’s son or neighbour, it is
because of the different heinousness of the crime, and the distinct punishment
is due to the murdering a man’s father and mother, different to what ought
to be inflicted on the murder of a son or neighbour; and therefore they find
it necessary to mention it by a distinct name, which is the end of making that
distinct combination. But though the ideas of mother and daughter are so
differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is
joined with it to make a distinct abstract idea with a name, and so a distinct
species, and the other not; yet, in respect of carnal knowledge, they are both
taken in under INCEST: and that still for the same convenience of expressing
under one name, and reckoning of one species, such unclean mixtures as have a
peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and
tedious descriptions.